The recent claims by a few so-called analysts that Pakistan is pursuing an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program that would be capable of striking continents have generated intense debate within strategic circles. The claims do not offer any missile designation, testing data, satellite imagery, or technological milestone, but are just an anonymous attribution to US intelligence.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is Indian-centric; ICBMs do not serve any strategic purpose in this framework.

The criticism and claims lack evidence about the technical, doctrinal, or political implausibility of such a development. The most important and yet unexplored dimension is the strategic improbability of Pakistan’s embarking on that figurative ICBM program at this juncture. This underappreciated perspective not only undermines the credibility of the US assertion but also the global frameworks.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is rooted in credible minimum deterrence, later full-spectrum deterrence, primarily aimed at deterring India. While ICBMs are designed for targets thousands of kilometers away, typically in regions far outside Pakistan’s immediate security calculus. Pakistan has already established a credible deterrence vis-à-vis India and does not have any target or goal across the world. The ranges required for credible deterrence are already covered by existing missile systems, such as the Shaheen-III (2,750 kilometers range), which can reach all major targets within India (specifically to cover Indian territories like the Andaman and Nicobar Islands).

Historically, Pakistan’s missile programs have progressed in carefully calibrated increments, with new capabilities publicly revealed only after operational maturity is achieved. There is a notable lack of evidence, open-source intelligence, satellite imagery, or official acknowledgment, suggesting that Pakistan is engaged in activities consistent with ICBM development. The abrupt leap to ICBMs, without any verifiable precursor activities, simply does not fit this pattern.

The leap to ICBMs lacks technical indicators and contradicts Pakistan’s incremental missile development trajectory.

Many may argue that pursuing the ICBM capability is not its strategic goal in the first place. Others may contemplate that this may invite new and unpredictable security dilemmas by prompting concerns in distant capitals. The pursuit of ICBMs would radically alter Pakistan’s international image, shifting it from a regional power focused on self-defense to a state with aspirations for global power projection, which is something Pakistan may not like to pursue, as this would contradict the country`s Indian centric military capabilities.

India is the only South Asian state that is testing and deploying ICBMs. Currently, India fields the Agni-V missile (5,000–7,500 km range) and is developing the Agni-VI (reportedly capable of exceeding 10,000 km with MIRV capabilities). Despite these doctrinally intercontinental systems and sea-based deterrents like the K-4 and K-5 SLBMs, designed for power projection beyond Pakistan, there is minimal Western scrutiny of India’s expanding arsenal or its increasingly ambiguous no-first-use policy.

In contrast, speculative claims about a Pakistani ICBM, unsupported by any credible evidence or program history, reflect a narrative asymmetry driven less by technological facts and more by geopolitical trust and alignment. The great powers do not need to worry about Pakistan’s long-range missiles program, but need to tilt their attention towards states like India, which is acquiring such developments in South Asia.

India’s Agni-V and future MIRV-capable systems reflect real global power projection aims, but face little global scrutiny.

Amid ongoing narrative asymmetry, the absence of credible evidence, technical indicators, or doctrinal necessity, the claims regarding Pakistan’s pursuit of an ICBM program remain strategically improbable and analytically flawed. Pakistan’s existing missile capabilities, rooted in its doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, already fulfil its regional security objectives, specifically concerning India.

The real question, then, is not why Pakistan is allegedly pursuing ICBMs but why India’s tested and developing intercontinental systems, such as Agni-V and Agni-VI, draw little international scrutiny. India’s advancement toward long-range, MIRV-capable missiles and sea-based deterrents signals an ambition for global power projection, far beyond South Asia. Yet, the narrative remains disproportionately focused on an imaginary Pakistani ICBM program. This selective alarmism only underscores the geopolitical biases that shape global threat perceptions.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.