On May 7, 2025, at midnight, India launched a major air assault on Pakistan using state-of-the-art fighter jets, several of which were reportedly shot down. The strike caused numerous civilian casualties and destroyed critical infrastructure, including the Neelum-Jhelum Dam. The attack followed Pakistan’s call in the UNSC meeting on May 6, for an evidence-based investigation into the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist incident, which left 26 civilians dead.
Suspending the IWT weaponizes a vital non-military domain, i.e. water.
India’s response shows the region’s fragile and volatile security dynamics. The targeting of a major Neelum-Jhelum Dam – combined with the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) – raises serious questions about India’s strategic intentions. Although the Indian Defence Minister described the operation as an “assured non-escalatory intention,” such framing appears unconvincing, pointing instead to a shift in posture from counterterrorism to potential water-based coercion.
India suspended the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT). The IWT has been a rare beacon of bilateral agreement between the two archrivals and has survived during many wars and tense times. It represents a commitment of the two nuclear powers. In this challenging moment, this suspension affects South Asia’s fragile stability.
Kashmir has always been a point of contention between India and Pakistan since their inception in 1947. It is a contested region where India claims the entire Kashmir region and Pakistan stands for the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people under the Charter of the United Nations. India has illegally occupied Kashmir, as it garners strategic, economic, and political benefits for India. Among these benefits, water generated from the region has drawn the Indian strategic attention, as India can control Pakistan’s share even under the IWT, and much more effectively in its absence.
In this century, traditional concepts of state security have changed. Security paradigms have shifted to non-traditional security dimensions. The new trend is crystal clear, as the non-traditional security dimension is impacting the traditional security. Water is a non-traditional security element. In 1948, both states confronted each other for the first time when India attempted to stop the flow of river water towards Pakistan.
This is a regression in Indian strategic maturity and a signal that unilateral restraint by Pakistan may no longer define bilateral crisis management.
The realization of possible water wars resulted in the establishment of IWT to regulate water sharing with the mediation of the World Bank. Although the IWT was signed in the 1960s to resolve the water issues between the two states, it has still not fully mitigated tensions over river resources. The suspension of IWT represents a mutually destructive scenario and risks strategic consequences for both states. Back in 1995, former World Bank Vice President Dr Ismail Serageldin said, “If the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water – unless we change our approach to managing this precious and vital resource.”
The global concern about water as a trigger for conflict found early manifestations in South Asia. In this region, water politics have increasingly overlapped with traditional security disputes. A notable incident occurred after the 2016 Uri attack. It was when the Indian government took the position of converting a non-traditional security threat to a traditional security threat by announcing that New Delhi might weaponize the water of the Indus River.
PM Modi was reported to have stated to government officials that “Blood and water cannot flow together”, a phrase widely covered by multiple Indian journalists. India needs water for hydroelectricity to facilitate its Information Technology sector, along with other industries. It has plans for the construction of new dams on the rivers to gain maximum utilization of water, including for energy and agricultural benefits.
Amid the evolving calculus of power politics and energy arms race, water has emerged as a strategic asset. As defined by Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels in ‘The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,’ a strategic weapon targets “the heart of the enemy’s power” with a decisive blow. In the South Asian context, water flows feed Pakistan’s agrarian economy and hydroelectric infrastructure.
Therefore, it qualifies as a potential strategic lever. In theory, control over these critical resources can inflict economic, military, and social instability on an adversary. Suspending the IWT weaponizes a vital non-military domain, i.e. water. This risks escalation pathways that were previously considered unlikely. As Freedman and Michaels argue in ‘The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,’ strategic assets target “the heart of an adversary’s power.” In this case, water access now emerges as such a vector.
When strategic assets like water are leveraged asymmetrically, they create space for miscalculation.
On the other hand, being a strategic asset, Islamabad denounced New Delhi’s suspension of the treaty unilaterally and takes it seriously. As per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, this international treaty cannot be terminated or suspended by one party therefore, under international law the treaty should be intact. All treaties are bound by the principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda,’ which requires parties to interpret and implement their obligations in good faith. Hence, unilateral or biased interpretation undermines this principle. It will potentially lead to violations and inequitable implementation of treaty provisions.
Historically, the IWT functioned as a strong Confidence Building Measure (CBM). Having said that, it is among the few enduring bridges between two nuclear-armed rivals for multiple major wars. Its unilateral suspension disrupts this delicate balance and exposes a dangerous trend in South Asia. The selective dismantling of the legacy of IWT as a CBM without introducing new measures, particularly in the face of emerging technologies such as electronic warfare, autonomous weapon systems, space, and artificial intelligence, reflects strategic regression.
In the absence of parallel CBMs in emerging domains, crisis dynamics risk becoming increasingly opaque and volatile. This is a regression in Indian strategic maturity and a signal that unilateral restraint by Pakistan may no longer define bilateral crisis management. This is the rationale why Pakistan has, time and again, focused on conflict resolution between India and Pakistan.
Moreover, using the IWT as a retaliatory tool reflects a shift in strategic signaling. It is shifting water from a common to a strategic resource, which may cause strategic instability in a deterrence-based environment. In this environment, equilibrium rests on predictable behavior and mutual vulnerabilities. When strategic assets like water are leveraged asymmetrically, they create space for miscalculation and the possibility of escalation of conflict towards total war. Such aggressive and unilateral measures by India result in the erosion of mutual trust, becoming hallmarks of strategic instability.
A recurring pattern in history shows that India accuses Pakistan of instigating unrest in its occupied territories, as seen in the previous Uri and Pulwama attacks in IIOJK. Although Pakistan itself is fighting the menace of terrorism on its soil, it is dragged into this blame game by India without any evidence of its involvement. A recent major terrorist attack targeting the Jafar Express happened in March 2025, where a Pakistani passenger train, on its way to Peshawar from Quetta with more than 400 passengers, was hijacked by the Baluchistan Liberation Army. In contrast to the response of India, Pakistani forces managed to encounter the attack but didn’t take it to the borders with India and opted for an escalation.
The fatal flaw in India’s coercive logic lies in underestimating the survival instinct embedded in Pakistan’s red lines.
The objective for states is to survive, and there are no grey areas in attempts to create differences with a nuclear armed state based on coercion through water because people cannot live without water. The fatal flaw in India’s coercive logic lies in underestimating the survival instinct embedded in Pakistan’s red lines. No state should even nudge other nuclear weapon states to that level.
This act will force regional states towards conflict and its aftermath, such as war, agricultural collapse, famine, power shortages, etc., and may spread across the regions. It is counterproductive for India to trigger Pakistan’s response, which may be more than proportional. It is in favor of both states to join hands to counter the menace of terrorism in the region. It can only be done through mutual determination to cooperate and work together.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
