Following the recent attack in Pahalgam in Illegally Indian-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir; when armed assailants opened fire on tourists in broad daylight resulting in a number of civilian casualties, South Asia appears to be once again on the precipice of an escalation. While there can be no justification for such an attack no matter the political context, however, what followed next was expected; a frenzy of jingoistic blame game that not only blamed Pakistan for this attack but also called for retaliation.
Such jingoism, where emotive knee jerk reactions have resulted in military escalations, is nothing new for South Asia. In 2019, after the Pulwama incident, India carried out aerial strikes at Balakot, claiming to have targeted alleged “terror camps”. In the process, the Indian Air Force (IAF) violated Pakistan’s airspace, in response to which the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) downed two Indian fighter jets and captured one IAF pilot alive. India’s attempt at setting escalation dominance not just faltered but also exposed fissures in its tactical prowess, where the fog of war got the best of its commanders.
The Indian authorities, which should have been held accountable for a serious security lapse, have instead become the judge, jury and executioner
In the aftermath of the Pahalgam incident, public and legacy media, as expected, jumped to analyse the incident with emotional binaries and subjective biases, amid an aggressive public sentiment demanding retribution against the “perpetrators” – a label which the Indian establishment much conveniently swerves against Pakistan, that too without any thorough investigative process; a classic card out of academic nuance of diversionary warfare. The Indian authorities, which should have been held accountable for a serious security lapse, have instead become the judge, jury and executioner that rushed to bring Pakistan into their crosshairs.
Bilateral diplomatic ties between India and Pakistan – already significantly strained since 2019 – have gone further downhill following the Pahalgam incident. Soon after the incident, New Delhi hastily announced to hold the Indus Water Treaty – an international agreement which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn from – in “abeyance”. In addition to this, New Delhi also announced to close down the Integrated Check Post at Attari and declared the defence advisors in the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi as Persona Non-Grata. In reciprocity, Islamabad announced to hold all bilateral agreements with India – “including but not limited to Simla Agreement” – in abeyance. Hence, in the political-diplomatic domain, the mutual suspension of foundational bilateral agreements – while it could be temporary – is indicative of the apparent erosion of the essential guardrails managing India-Pakistan bilateral ties.
The Modi-administration could be well-expected to divert public anger to further its right-wing agenda for political capital
A key question pertains to the likely escalatory options that India may take against Pakistan. The plausibility of New Delhi opting for any such course lies in the extremist-nationalist ideology of the Indian government, which thrives on anti-Pakistan narrative, and its commitment trap. Hence, the Modi-administration could be well-expected to divert public anger to further its right-wing agenda for political capital. However, India’s military options vis-à-vis Pakistan have visibly shrunk over the years. While New Delhi has consistently sought ways to fight a limited war with Pakistan, however, the nuclear overhang has curtailed this, thereby narrowing India’s strategic space.
This strategic conundrum has been evident from the shifts in the Indian military doctrines. While the Sundarji Doctrine of the 1980s sought to launch a large-scale armoured thrust inside Pakistani territory, however, following the nuclearization of the region, India shifted to Cold Start Doctrine towards the early 2000s. While India introduced its Land Warfare Doctrine in 2018, however, since 2016 – having been increasingly frustrated by the strategic and operational constraints of its military doctrines, and its desire to fight a limited conventional war vis-à-vis Pakistan under the nuclear overhang– India has turned to publicizing the so called “surgical strikes” against Pakistan as its preferred military option against Pakistan.
The element of surprise has diminished in aerial combat with the emergence of Airborne Warning and Control Systesm (AEWACS) and Electronic warfare aircraft
However for India, the risks pertaining to fighting a limited war most evidently came to fore during the 2019 showdown between the Indian Air Force and the Pakistan Air Force. As India’s attempt at a precision airstrike failed, the PAF responded by shooting down two Indian fighter jets. In addition to this, the IAF ironically brought down its own Mi-17 chopper in a friendly fire when India’s SPYDER missile battery system mistakenly targeted it in Budgam. Not to mention, how the element of surprise has diminished in aerial combat with the emergence of Airborne Warning and Control Systesm (AEWACS) and Electronic warfare aircraft. This, when coupled with Pakistan’s relative edge may deny India the ability to establish aerial superiority. The stand-off munition delivery is also marred in this case and weapon delivery at long range can be detected and countered.
Prime Minister Modi – entrenched in his strongman avatar and compelled to appease the brewing domestic political sentiment – may still attempt to manoeuvre within his already limited options
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Modi – entrenched in his strongman avatar and compelled to appease the brewing domestic political sentiment – may still attempt to manoeuvre within his already limited options. Any action by the BJP administration, however, is likely to be constrained by two key factors. First, India may seek to act in a way that avoids provoking any significant retaliation from Pakistan. As such, the kinetic options under consideration could include targeted operations against the so-called “militant infrastructure” across the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan-administered territory, or claimed aerial strikes aimed at neutralizing alleged terrorist camps and launchpads.
New Delhi would likely aim to keep such operations minimally damaging to prevent a Pakistani military response—and to avoid a repeat of the strategic and diplomatic embarrassment that followed the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot episode
New Delhi would likely aim to keep such operations minimally damaging to prevent a Pakistani military response—and to avoid a repeat of the strategic and diplomatic embarrassment that followed the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot episode. India might employ its newly acquired Rafale aircraft (utilising its beyond-visual-range capabilities and ability to fire SCALP- EG and Meteor Missiles). Ground based rocket systems might also be employed in parallel to any troop intrusion across the LOC. However, any such action will be deduced as an act of war, resulting in rapid ascend on the rungs of the escalation ladder.
The second factor constraining India’s possible action against Pakistan could be the absence of quite the support that New Delhi was expecting to gain from western quarters. Most prominently, the Trump administration distanced itself, and showed little interest in the incident, stating that both countries would eventually resolve the matter on their own. More recently, the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has held telephonic conversations with Pakistan’s premier ,Shahbaz Sharif, and Indian External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar.
The readout from both conversations is interesting since Rubio has called on New Delhi to work with Pakistan to “ de-escalate the situation in South Asia”. Furthermore, Rubio refrained from seconding India’s blatant allegations against Pakistan. He further said that Pakistan should cooperate in investigations around the incident, a position Pakistan already holds in aftermath of the attack.
Prior to this, the UN Security Council also issued a statement condemning the attack in the strongest terms, however, making no reference to “cross-border sponsorship of terrorism” or to Pakistan, as alleged by India. Additionally, following India’s accusations, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, held a telephonic conversation with his Pakistani counterpart, Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar. Acknowledging Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India, the Chinese foreign minister reiterated the all-weather strategic partnership between the two countries and called for a swift and fair investigation into the Pahalgam attacks. It is pertinent to note that these developments have arrived after Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri huddled in a meeting with ambassadors of G20 states to brief them on the incident in an attempt to highlight Pakistan’s alleged involvement and rally support in India’s favour.
The suspension of bilateral agreements and confidence building measures will drastically complicate India-Pakistan interactions and render crisis management between the two nuclear-armed states an even more difficult affair
In conclusion, for now, on one hand, the suspension of bilateral agreements particularly the Indus Water Treaty remains the most immediate casualty of this unfortunate incident. In addition to this, the suspension of bilateral agreements and confidence building measures will drastically complicate India-Pakistan interactions and render crisis management between the two nuclear-armed states an even more difficult affair. On the other hand, the threat of an Indian action – albeit expectedly mild – remains eminent. While escalation may temporarily serve the optics desired by the Indian political elite amid limited international support and constrained kinetic options against Pakistan, it poses significant risks to regional strategic stability. If an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ scenario unfolds, the resulting strategic instability in South Asia—exacerbated by India’s aggressive posture on the Indus Waters Treaty—will also raise questions over the potential viability of any third-party arbitration going forward.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
