Russia has always sought to keep friendly ties with both India and Pakistan, positioning itself as a geopolitical balancer in South Asia. In the meantime, Russia’s dual imperatives, maintaining India as a traditional ally and broadening its strategic convergence with China, combine with its balancing act. Russia has become more economically and diplomatically reliant on China as a result of its eastward shift, particularly after the acquisition of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Moscow’s balancing act has once again shown its limitations and contradictions due to the recent escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

In 2023 alone, their combined trade of $241 billion hit a new high. However, Moscow finds it challenging to keep the balance given China’s expanding influence in Asia, its posture in the Asia-Pacific, and especially its close relationships with Pakistan. Additionally, both Pakistan’s and China’s relations with India too. It has become a diplomatic tightrope walk for Moscow to balance these conflicting objectives without alienating either partner.

However, Moscow’s balancing act has once again shown its limitations and contradictions due to the recent escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Even though Russia has maintained that it is neutral toward these nations, its actions during the most recent India-Pakistan conflict exposed a clear bias, casting doubt on its credibility as a neutral actor and beginning to raise some serious concerns about the coherence of its foreign policy.

Some detractors sometimes argue that Russia’s strategic alliance with India is a logical byproduct of realpolitik, motivated by shared geopolitical objectives, military sales, and persistent bilateral connections. Given the current scenario, it’s evident that India does not see the United States or Russia as restraining powers, given New Delhi’s ignorance of the Simla Agreement and numerous transgressions of international standards and laws, including cross-border military operations without multilateral permission.

Rather, it asserts its strategic independence by frequently taking unilateral action in any regional crisis. When the conflict erupted and escalated along the Line of Control (LoC) in March 2025, Moscow was quick to issue an obligatory call for “restraint on both sides.” Yet, beneath this diplomatic thin cover, Russia’s policy moves leaned towards India.

Russia’s policy moves leaned towards India, offering intelligence-sharing against Pakistan and support for the operation ‘Sindoor’.

Pakistan not only responded to the escalation by India responsibly but also continuously urged global powers to intervene diplomatically and de-escalate tensions. Whereas, Russia responded by supporting its “long-lasting strategic partner” India, by offering intelligence-sharing against Pakistan and for operation ‘Sindoor’ and its support on so-called “counterterrorism efforts”, a term that New Delhi’s propagated throughout the conflict.

This is not new. Russia than the Soviet Union, has historically sided with India, most notably during the 1971 war, when it deployed naval flotillas to deter the U.S. fleet, which supported Pakistan at that time. Although times have changed and Russia now hosts defense dialogues with Islamabad, the strategic hierarchy remains clear.

India is a major arms buyer with 8.3% of arms imports from Russia, and around 36% of Russian arms are bought by India. It is also a member of BRICS, and a critical partner in Russia’s pivot to Asia, specifically after increasing global isolation of Russia due to the Ukraine war. However, Pakistan remains a peripheral actor in the Russian foreign policy outlook, despite recent energy and defense ventures.

The strategic hierarchy remains clear… Pakistan remains a peripheral actor in the Russian foreign policy outlook.

Russia proceeded with its commitment to deliver advanced military equipment to India. Notably, the INS Tushil, a Russian-made stealth frigate, was commissioned into the Indian Navy in December 2024, with its sister ship, INS Tamal, which will be received by India in 2025. Other than this, the majority of the weapons and systems that India used against Pakistan were Russian-made made like S-400 Triumf, SAMAR Air Defence System (uses Russian R-73/R-27 missiles), Schilka ZSU-23-4, Zu-23mm Anti-Aircraft Guns, R-73 and R-27 Missiles.

All these weapons and their usage against Pakistan accentuated the fact that India has been strengthening and enhancing its military capabilities to wage war against Pakistan, while using China only as an excuse to convince the international community. However, these statements and concerns have been made time and again by Pakistan on international forums.

On the contrary, Russia ended its arms embargo on Pakistan in 2014, and in 2016, it held its first-ever combined military drills with Islamabad. These actions were perceived as an effort to lessen excessive reliance on India and hedge bets. But the recent response to the crisis and its quick unification with New Delhi validates that these were mainly symbolic actions without any strategic realignment.

Furthermore, given Russia’s growing economic and diplomatic dependence on China, its disregard for Pakistan’s lingering security threats may be interpreted as implicit support for New Delhi’s forceful regional posture, which Beijing also finds unsettling. What Russia does not understand is that the substance and appearance of its foreign policy dent its quest for balance. You cannot support India’s cross-border military activities under the pretense of “anti-terror operations” while courting Islamabad with cheap energy sales and joint drills. This duality is a contradiction rather than a balance.

This duality is a contradiction rather than a balance.

Russia’s refusal or incapacity to act as a true mediator in South Asia has been shown by the most recent India-Pakistan war. Moscow’s balancing act will remain a geopolitical fantasy as long as it confuses strategic goals with selective assistance. Furthermore, illusions are harmful in the unstable South Asian theater. From a realist perspective, Russia’s actions make sense strategically because India is a key node in Moscow’s “Greater Eurasia” goal, a larger defense market, and a BRICS partner. Furthermore, Pakistan’s view of Russian neutrality is complicated by this selective participation, which also reduces Russia’s ability to mediate future conflicts.

Additionally, it might move Islamabad (a gateway to Eurasia) closer to China, which would lessen Moscow’s influence in the larger Eurasian geopolitical struggle. All things considered, Russia’s activities during the India-Pakistan war in 2025 were both materially and diplomatically in line with Indian goals rather than being blatantly interventionist. In addition to rhetorical balance, a methodical reevaluation of crisis diplomacy, public messaging, and strategic delivery would have been necessary for a truly neutral position.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.