The nuclear environment of South Asia has never been the same ever since India successfully carried out the first nuclear test in the year 1974 at Pokhran, under the pretence of a peaceful nuclear program. This type of deceitful politics sparked nuclear destabilization in the area.

India’s nuclear program exhibits strategic overreach with Agni-V missiles capable of global power projection, threatening regional stability.

India had built up its nuclear infrastructure with foreign help that was meant to be used on civilian purposes. Repurposing of that aid to weaponries development, however, posed a threatening precedent and a blow to the trust regionally. Pakistan responded directly by testing its atomic bomb in a response programme to maintain strategic balance and in defence of its national security.

In contrast to India, the nature of Pakistan in nuclear posture has been concentrated and moderate. Its dogma is based on having a credible minimum deterrence to India only. It also has all its weapons and missile systems geared towards deterrence and not power projection. Pakistan has persistently served the voluntary international conventions by submitting its civilian nuclear reactors to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is an indication of transparency and non-proliferation. This ambiguity is antithetical to the rising ambitions and the veiled nature of Indian nuclear policy.

The culture of responsibility can be felt in the command-and-control infrastructure of Pakistan. It’s based on best practices by the major nuclear nations, with evident civilian control, safeguards, and periodic safety checks. Such safety reviews are often shared with international partners, which strengthens a doctrine of last resort use. Crisis management procedures are institutionalized, preventing nuclear deterrence from turning into the realm of the possible, daring at times of tension.

The nuclear behaviour, on the other hand, in India shows an emerging aggressive course. Comprehensive IAEA safeguards do not apply to over 100 nuclear facilities in India, and this leaves serious doubts on the issue of civilian fissile material leading to military stocks. Such absence of control creates a space of opacity and dual-use ambiguity, which deteriorates the global non-proliferation attempts. In addition, the delivery mechanisms of India are changing way beyond the regional levels of deterrence.

Pakistan maintains a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, transparency, and civilian control, emphasizing responsibility and de-escalation.

The strategic overreach is seen in the Agni-V missile, which has a near-intercontinental range of 8,000 km, and in the planned Agni-VI with potential ability of having a potential range of 12,000 km. India, together with the K series of submarine-fired ballistic missiles, has put its nuclear capabilities in a position of global projection, not only in a standoff against Pakistan or even China.

Such trends are indications of the intensity of doctrinal change to the counterforce capabilities, denoting a readiness to pre-empt or allegorize against the nuclear weaponry of an adversary. This sway poses threatening repercussions on the stability of the region, inviting to a first strike during a crisis. It also makes the security dilemma faced by Pakistan worse, as that country must continuously review its posture to have credible deterrence.

Not only is the proliferating arsenal in India becoming strategically provocative, but there are some disturbing failures of nuclear professionalism. There are several recorded accidents that indicate insufficient institutional control and a lack of safety culture. The most serious was, perhaps, the 2022 mislaunch of one BrahMos cruise missile into Pakistani airspace, an unprompted and unaccounted intrusion that threatened to incur horrific reprisals.

The ambiguous statement that India made with a touch of non-responsibility aggravated the severity of the event. This kind of irresponsibility raises doubts in the capacity of India to handle its nuclear resources responsibly. In addition, cases of radioactive thefts playing out in Indian medical and industrial centres have emerged during the years of concern internationally. All such incidents point to security lapses that may be used by non-state actors.

At a time when the threat of nuclear terrorism has not disappeared, the phenomenon of lax management of radiological substances in India not only threatens South Asia but is a threat to nuclear security across the whole world.

India’s lax nuclear safety culture and provocative rhetoric increase the risks of accidents and miscalculation in the region.

The irresponsible rhetorics by the Indian military and political leadership also take away India’s higher up in the field of nuclear brinkmanship. Agitation of thoughts about pre-emptive attacks, threatening to revise the No First Use policy, and openly aggressive language used toward neighbours demonstrates an attitude that has become, in a way, at ease with the use of nukes along the lines of intimidation.

This kind of talk destroys trust between each other, decreases the area of diplomacy in times of crisis, and increases the chance of miscalculation. Pakistan, on the contrary, has been able to sustain the policy of controlled talking and tactical signalling. It is a known fact that even during peak levels of tensions, like after the Pulwama, Balakot standoff, Islamabad remained measured and in favour of de-escalation, underlining its professed doctrine of deterrence with responsibility. The difference in style was as mutually exclusive as it can be, with Pakistan showing a preference for stability, and India inclined towards escalation.

South Asia is a nuclear powder keg, and what India is doing is further kicking up the flames. The endeavour to project power internationally and its dark nuclear dealings, laxity in operations, and the provocative rhetoric never help in creating a placid regional circumstance. The emergence of these developments requires an objective international study of the nuclear course of India.

South Asia is not in a position to assume strategic stability amidst a nuclear-armed power that seems to be losing its system of constraint and accountability faster. Regional powers, world powers, and non-proliferation institutions should seek more transparency and accountability on the part of India. Confidence-building should further be renewed through mutual inspection, reinforcement of hotlines, and arms control dialogue.

Urgent international efforts are needed for transparency, arms control dialogue, and confidence-building to prevent a catastrophic nuclear conflict.

Absent them, the region is at risk of lurching into an apocalyptic war not brought about by design but by mistake or misperception. The brinkmanship on the nuclear issues by India is a serious threat to peace in South Asia. A renewed sense of prudence, respect for precautionary measures, and new commitment to non-proliferation standards are key to preventing a catastrophe and regaining balance in a region that is already characterized by past conflicts and strategic distrust.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.