Starting from the Himalayas and bending across national borders in South Asia. South-Asian Rivers have sustained civilizations, ecosystems, and economies. The river system between India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, such as the Indus, Kosi, and Ganga Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM), binds these countries in a hydrological interdependence. Although there is a natural interconnectedness between these countries, trans boundary water governance is not streamlined; it is vulnerable to geopolitical and climate crises.
India revoked the Indus Water Treaty in 2025 after decades of survival through wars.
While a basic water sharing framework is provided due to bilateral treaties, basin-wide governance structures are absent. Moreover, water insecurity across these systems, particularly across the Kosi. Indus and GBM river systems require a shift towards adaptive, multilateral, and depoliticized water governance across the national borders in South Asia.
India is a middle riparian in three major basins and plays a pivotal role in the Indus: upper riparian for Pakistan, lower riparian of China. GBM: downstream from Nepal (Ganga), Bhutan (Brahmaputra), and China (Yarlung Tsangpo), then passing them to Bangladesh. Kosi: lower riparian of Nepal. However, considering the geography of these rivers, India appears to be a key actor in water governance; its hydropower stress and large population position it to play a major role in managing water resources.
Moving along the timeline, the Indus Water Treaty was brokered by the World Bank in 1960. According to this treaty, eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) were allocated to India and western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. The Indus water treaty has survived wars and hostility, but in May 2025, in the conflict between India and Pakistan, India unilaterally revoked the treaty and put it into abeyance this move raised concerns about India’s role as a responsible regional actor.
Moving forward, India and Bangladesh negotiated the Teesta water agreement in 2011, which was negotiated but was not signed, mainly due to India’s internal federal conflict with West Bengal. Bangladesh had proposed a 50:50 equal sharing, whereas India insisted on 42.5%. In the Mahakali treaty between India and Nepal in 1996, there was a concern about the Prancheshwar dam project and shared water usage from the Sarda, Kosi, and Mahakali rivers. But implementation remains stalled. These unsettled negotiations and weak implementation, due to internal tensions, portray India as an irresponsible regional actor, even threatening the future of existing agreements and further negotiations on water governance.
The Teesta water agreement remains unsigned due to India’s federal conflict with West Bengal.
Under this treaty, there was the formation of the Mahakali River Commission to look after the implementation and resolution of any disputes that may arise. 6480 MW Panchesshwar Multipurpose Project is still unrealized. From early 2025, the expert negotiations are underway, with unresolved equitable irrigation and flood control benefits. It has been stalled for nearly three decades since the treaty was signed.
The Nepali experts say the decision-making processes and construction delays have disadvantaged Nepal systematically, undermining the intent of the treaty to provide coordinating basin planning and equal entitlement. Stagnation of this treaty shows that there is a dire need for co-development models and trust-building, which should extend beyond the static agreements. Moreover, Nepal’s continuous concerns related to the unjust treaty provisions challenge the overall existence of the joint commissions in their present form.
The Ganges water treaty was signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996. According to this treaty, both countries signed a 30-year governing dry season flow from the Frakka Barrage. Bangladesh concerns about low flows during the dry season, and the inadequate data shared by the Indian government contradict India’s responsibilities as the middle riparian. Due to insufficient data transparency, the treaty illustrates how the lack of real-time hydrological coordination and adaptive clauses has caused dissatisfaction, especially considering the duration for which the treaty has been sustained
Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) stands as a bi-national technical mechanism for the 1960 Indus Water Treaty to look after any dispute. While Pakistan shares annual PIC reports, India does not, and there is no regular public reporting from both sides which limits public accountability and transparency. Moreover, despite its survival through conflicts, the question of its existence began when India issued a notice in 2023 calling for revision of the PIC negotiation, stating that Pakistan has allegedly misused the arbitration clause, which gave India a legal edge to take such step, and created limitations for bilateral-only frameworks.
Further, adding to this tension, India has unilaterally revoked the Indus Water treaty in 2025 following the Pahalgam attack. India’s such abrupt withdrawals and revisions make a case for critical inflection for the trans-boundary water governance. The Absence of multilateral trans-boundary governance in the region now exposes all nations to highly volatile political and economic frenzy.
The Mahakali Treaty’s Pancheshwar Dam project has stalled for nearly three decades.
In this context, fragmented treaties and reactive diplomacy will exacerbate the existing fault lines in the regional governance structure. It is high time that these nations should adopt an institutionalized approach that helps shared water governance frameworks, prioritizing science over suspicion and cooperation over coercion. Certain steps could be taken to strengthen this governance system.
The South Asia Hydrological Data Consortium should be established for real-time data sharing. This consortium should be governed collectively and must maintain transfer of historical data, machine learning, and hydrological modeling (e.g., HydroNets-style models tested in India). This will provide evidence-based allocation during dry seasons, which will lower political tensions. It will automatically build trust through mutually shared tools.
Formation of an externally monitored panel, which shall comprise academic institutions (e.g., SEI Asia, Geneva Water Hub, and ICIMOD) and independent audit compliance of water sharing through NGOs (e.g., Indus and Kushiyara withdrawals), could also be a vital step towards transboundary governance in the region. It will provide open access to basin dashboards and help finance adaptive contingency planning and reflect best practices to show transparency under TWAP and MRC. It will ensure the commission’s opacity (e.g., PIC) and more public confidence, and enable preventive climate actions based on global reports.
South Asia’s rivers are not just transboundary natural arteries; they are a geopolitical nexus where ecology, history, and political ambitions meet. Where existing treaties have ensured minimal benefits in cooperation, they are inadequate to respond to today’s hydrological realities, which are marked by upstream infrastructural interventions, climate volatility, and a shifting political landscape at the domestic level. India, as a middle riparian, holds both responsibility and opportunity, not for domination but to lead collaboratively.
A South Asia Hydrological Data Consortium could build trust through real-time data sharing.
Through collectively governed systems of data sharing, pilot experimentations, and public independent transparency embedded in future agreements, there would be a transition in South Asia’s water sharing mechanism from being bilateral and static treaties toward basin-scale and inclusive systems. Current governance models address present stalemates. Pacheshwar’s delays, Indus opacity, and Teesta’s political blockage will also form a stronghold against the climate uncertainty, ensuring equitable water sharing among stakeholders.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
