In the early hours of 7 May 2025, India launched unprovoked missile strikes on multiple locations in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. New Delhi described this blatant aggression, “Operation Sindoor,” as a “focused, measured and non-escalatory” attack on alleged terrorist camps inside Pakistan. Islamabad, however, reported that six purely civilian sites (none militant bases) were hit and at least 26 innocent civilians were killed.

Deterrence works only if threats are believed; a mismatch between doctrine and action makes deterrence lose its credibility.

Pakistan condemned the strikes as a “blatant act of war” and vowed to reply at a time, place, and means of our own choice. This paper examines why Pakistan might feel strategically compelled to carry out visible retaliation (e.g. strikes on multiple strategic sites in India) to restore deterrence credibility, draw red lines, shape future behavior, and force crisis termination, all within the complex framework of South Asian nuclear deterrence.

Deterrence Dynamics in South Asia

The India–Pakistan dyad lives under a mutual nuclear overhang. Islamabad has long seen nuclear weapons as the surest way to offset India’s overwhelming conventional advantage and preserve strategic stability. Pakistani strategic enclave embraces “credible minimum deterrence” bolstered by a “full-spectrum” arsenal covering India’s entire territory. In practice, this means Pakistani leaders routinely warn that “no place [in India is] is beyond range; their doctrine explicitly includes counterforce (military) and countervalue (cities and infrastructure) targets in any retaliatory strike.

Pakistan values strategic stability in South Asia and deterrence credibility towards India across all spectrum, reflecting Islamabad’s need to appear both strong and restrained. Yet stability remains fragile. Repeated crises (Kargil 1999, the 2001 Parliament stand-off, Uri/Pathankot attacks of 2016, and Balakot 2019) have shown how quickly tension can spike under the nuclear shadow. Analysts warn that any significant use of force risks escalation: both sides have powerful second-strike capabilities and are under intense international pressure to avoid full-scale war.

Indeed, after India’s 2019 Balakot raid (itself an unprecedented breach of airspace between two nuclear states), Pakistan responded by shooting down an Indian jet but then swiftly de-escalated and released the pilot. The “quick cycle of attack and counter-attack” in February 2019 briefly raised the specter of all-out war, convincing both governments to stand down. In short, South Asian deterrence entered a precarious phase of balancing and counter-balancing: each side wants to deter the other, yet mutual nuclear vulnerability compels caution.

Restoring Deterrence Credibility

In this scenario, if a weaker power is struck and does nothing, its deterrent credibility is damaged. Pakistani strategists understand this well. Deterrence works only if threats are believed – a point underscored by Pakistani analysts who note that a mismatch between declared doctrine and action will make “deterrence…lose its credibility.” Hence, when Pakistan is attacked with impunity, New Delhi may infer Islamabad will not or cannot hit back. Indeed, Islamabad’s leaders have publicly tied “credible minimum deterrence” to the perception that Pakistan will impose costs when provoked.

President Sharif declared in 1999 that maintaining nuclear deterrence made Pakistan “acutely conscious of the risks and responsibilities” of war. More recently, Defense Advisor Khalid Kidwai has reaffirmed that Pakistan’s force posture covers all of India and its outlying territories, so as to leave Delhi with “no place to hide.” Such statements set high expectations: if Pakistan fails to respond now, it will erode the very deterrence on which it relies. In pragmatic terms, restoring credibility means demonstrating the ability to retaliate meaningfully. A forceful response would signal to India (and the world) that Islamabad’s threats are backed by action. Credible deterrence requires that rhetorical red lines have teeth; otherwise, aggressors conclude they can cross them without consequence.

Red lines must be visible, targeted, and verifiable to be meaningful in shaping adversary behavior.

If Pakistan refrains from any retaliation despite an Indian attack causing civilian deaths, future Indian commanders may doubt whether any Pakistani “red line” truly exists. Conversely, by visibly striking back, Pakistan would compel India to reckon with a restored balance: aggression has a price. As one policy study puts it, Pakistani nuclear doctrine hinges on “convergence in the declaratory doctrine and its operationalization,” lest deterrence credibility evaporate. In short, retaliation – especially if it inflicts real damage – would reinforce the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent posture.

Establishing Red Lines through Demonstrable Impact

A key purpose of retaliation would be to draw clear red lines for India. In deterrence theory, red lines are the boundaries of unacceptable action, lines that, if crossed, trigger unacceptable punishment. For such warnings materially work, Pakistan must make a retaliation visible, targeted, and independently verifiable. Attacks on symbolic or strategic sites (e.g. major military bases, missile installations, or critical infrastructure) would produce undeniable evidence of Pakistani resolve. This demonstrable destruction would constrain India’s future options: if Delhi knows Pakistan will strike back when it crosses a certain threshold, it is deterred from even trying.

Pakistan’s doctrine is illuminating here. As Gen. Kidwai recently stated, Pakistan retains “the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a target-rich India…to include countervalue, counterforce, and battlefield targets.” In plain terms, Islamabad claims the right to hit a wide array of Indian objectives, from military installations to cities, should deterrence break down. If Pakistan now translates words into action by striking carefully selected Indian targets, it would materially establish those red lines.

For example, a missile strike on an airbase or command center would be instantly noted by open-source surveillance and media, giving Pakistan a “verifiable impact” to show for its warning. Even more dramatically, hitting civilian or economic infrastructure (sadly implied by the phrase “countervalue”) would scream to India and the world that Pakistan is deadly serious. In sum, a robust Pakistani reprisal would set precedents. It would be Pakistan’s way of telling India: “We warned you – now you have seen it.” This is essential in a region where false or unchartered threats have little deterrent weight. Only by making retaliation both real and observable can Islamabad hope to redefine Indian strategic calculations.

Influencing Future Adversary Behavior

Deterrence is ultimately about shaping an adversary’s choices. A potent Pakistani response would aim to make future Indian leaders more pragmatic in crises. In practical terms, India’s decision-makers would factor in the demonstrated risk of retaliation when considering any future strike or military escalation. Scholars of crisis behavior emphasize that actors learn from precedents: one costly response today makes an enemy second-guess repeating similar actions tomorrow. For instance, Arzan Tarapore observed that India’s 2019 Balakot raid was meant to “impose costs on Pakistan” and show resolve, yet it also “made the next crisis more dangerous”.

Likewise, a Pakistani retaliation would broadcast Islamabad’s willingness to “cross thresholds” itself and inflict pain. The psychological impact can be as important as the material damage. If Pakistan convincingly damages Indian assets, it will seed uncertainty and fear in Indian war planners, they cannot assume that even a deep strike will go unanswered. This could slow or deter Delhi’s decision-making in future crises. As analysts note, after intense exchanges, India and Pakistan often revert to de-escalation once each side proves it can hurt the other.  In this way, timely retaliation can be a strategic pressure valve: by convincing India that any further action invites serious consequences, Pakistan may hasten the end of confrontation.

A well-timed Pakistani retaliation could help terminate the crisis on favorable terms and reestablish escalation dominance.

In effect, Islamabad would be renegotiating the coercive bargaining balance. If India has learned that strikes on Pakistan invite only verbal protests, it is emboldened. But if India learns (through hard experience) that Pakistan will indeed strike back, Delhi will be more likely to moderate its behavior. In this wake a potent Pakistani response – especially one that demonstrably penalizes India – could recalibrate deterrence by making Pakistan’s resolve incontrovertible.

Escalation Management and Crisis Termination

A well-timed Pakistani retaliation could also help Pakistan terminate the crisis on favorable terms. In theory, if Pakistan can escalate to a level where India sees no gain in further conflict, Islamabad achieves “escalation dominance.” By inflicting significant damage quickly, Pakistan might force India to pause operations and seek a diplomatic face-saving exit. The Atlantic Council notes that in the current crisis, both sides have incentives to avoid a full war – awareness of nuclear danger and international pressure. Indeed, even India’s public statements emphasize restraint (e.g, avoiding Pakistani military facilities), suggesting New Delhi is careful not to force too much escalation. However, there is a profound paradox: attempting to escalate dominance in South Asia is extremely risky. Analysts warn that any “limited” conventional war can quickly acquire a nuclear dimension. Tarapore warned that while India’s Balakot strike might have established deterrence through bloodletting, it also “raised the specter of general – even nuclear – war,” ultimately leading both sides to de-escalate. Pakistan must similarly recognize that each step up the ladder threatens a match that neither side wants to trigger. Thus, Pakistan’s strategic community must weigh carefully: a robust retaliation could coerce India into de-escalation, but it could also provoke a dangerous upward spiral. The framing of any Pakistani response will matter,  e.g, publicly stressing that strikes target only legitimate military or anti-terrorist objectives might reduce Pakistan’s risk of international isolation and help limit India’s justification for further action. In sum, strong retaliation offers a path to regain initiative and close the crisis, but it must be executed with tight escalation control.

Policy Recommendations

In light of these considerations, Pakistan’s leadership should craft a response that balances signaling strength with managing escalation. Key policy recommendations include:

• Bolster Conventional Deterrence: Consistent with recent expert analyses, Pakistan should invest in its conventional forces so that it need not immediately resort to nuclear threats. As one policy memo argues, Islamabad should redeploy forces eastward, improve jointness of army–navy–air operations, and enhance air and missile capabilities. This would give Pakistan genuine means to retaliate swiftly without crossing the nuclear threshold. Strengthening missile defenses, surveillance, and precision firepower will also ensure any retaliation is effective and contained.
• Demonstrate Credible Nuclear Signaling (Carefully): While conventional options are first, Pakistan must not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Maintaining a transparent but credible nuclear posture (as in full-spectrum doctrine) ensures India knows the ultimate stakes. At the same time, Islamabad should avoid inflammatory rhetoric (e.g. “zero range” nukes) that could invite pre-emption or international alarm. Pakistan might periodically publicize credible testing or drills of its strategic forces to reinforce its red lines, but must calibrate messaging to deter escalation beyond conventional retaliation.
• Calibrated Retaliation with International Engagement: If Pakistan strikes back militarily, it should choose targets to maximize deterrent effect while minimizing unnecessary civilian harm (e.g. military bases or missile sites). Satellite imagery and media scrutiny mean that “verifiable impact” can be achieved without indiscriminate bombing. Pakistan should simultaneously engage allies and international organizations (e.g. China, OIC, UN) to frame India’s strike as the initial breach and to justify Pakistan’s defensive response. Maintaining diplomatic channels and seeking mediation (for example, urging the UN to facilitate de-escalation) can help cap the crisis.
• Public Diplomacy and Domestic Resilience: Pakistan’s strategic community must also attend to public messaging. It should highlight India’s initial aggression (and civilian casualties) to build domestic unity and international sympathy, while carefully explaining the purpose of any retaliation as restoring deterrence. Internally, military planners should refine crisis protocols and communication with political leadership to prevent miscalculations. Ensuring lines of communication with India (direct backchannels) remain open could help manage the crisis even amid retaliation.

Retaliation must be strong yet calibrated, ensuring deterrence without igniting full-scale war.

It may be posited that a potent Pakistani response to the May 2025 strikes could, in theory, restore Islamabad’s deterrence credibility, carve out clearer red lines, and compel India toward de-escalation. Strategic literature and recent experience tell us, however, that such retaliation must be weighed against the grave risk of uncontrolled escalation. Pakistan’s strategic elite should therefore combine decisive deterrent action with prudent restraint and diplomatic outreach to defend national honour without spiraling into ruinous conflict.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.