From the very onset, Afghanistan’s irredentist claims have caused physical and ontological insecurity in Pakistan. When Sardar Daud Khan, a former President of Afghanistan, controlled the throne of Kabul in the 1970s and fomented Pashtun nationalism across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border against Islamabad, it compelled Pakistan to retaliate. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) provided a chance for Pakistan to tackle the threats, such as Pakhtun nationalism, the Soviet threat, and India’s nefarious motive of encirclement of Pakistan that emanated from Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts have comprised both kinetic and non-kinetic measures.

However, after the 9/11 incident, the terrorists, such as Al-Qaida, were moved from Afghanistan to the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) due to the porous Pak-Afghan border. These militants have started terrorist activities against Pakistan. Consequently, the courageous security forces of Pakistan commenced counterterrorist efforts to hunt down these terrorists and prevent them from creating mayhem in Pakistan, particularly in Ex-FATA.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts have comprised both kinetic and non-kinetic measures. However, it primarily focused on kinetic measures to root out the menace of terrorism. In 2001, Pakistan backed the United States (US) in Operation Enduring Freedom. Consequently, various terrorist outfits emerged in FATA, which spread to other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and challenged the state’s writ. Similarly, Pakistan’s security forces have started different minor and major military operations to deal with terrorism.

For instance, Operation Al-Mizan (2002), Operation Zalzala (2008), Operation Rah e Haq and Rah e Raast (2009), Operation Sher Dil (2008), Operation Rah e Nijat (2011), Operation Zarb e Azab (2014), Operation Radul Fasad (2017), Operation Sirat Mustaqeem (2008), Operation Brekhna (2008), Operation Koh e Sufaid (2011), Operation Eagle Swoop, Operation Mountain Scanner-1 and 2, and Operation Zarb e Kaleem.

Furthermore, various peace agreements were signed with these militant organizations, including the Shakai Peace Agreement on April 24, 2004, the Sararogha Agreement of 2005, and the Malakand Accord of 2009, aimed at ensuring peace; however, they ultimately failed to achieve their long-term objectives. On the one hand, the security forces have successfully cleared almost all the regions in these operations.

Policymakers should give more weight to non-kinetic measures to carry out counterterrorism efforts effectively.

On the flip side, as a result of these operations, the people of FATA were severely affected psychologically, economically, politically, and socially, which became a cause of resentment for them that was exploited by the ethnonationalist movements against the state. Moreover, some non-kinetic measures were also taken to counter terrorism. These include de-radicalization programs such as Saboon, Rastoon, Sparlya, and Misaal, which were initiated in 2009.

Similarly, when the terrorists fled to Afghanistan in response to Pakistan’s counterterrorist efforts, they found their safe havens. After the revival of the Afghan Taliban 3.0 in 2021, they started to operate from there and became involved in terrorist activities in Pakistan. As their terrorist activities increased, Pakistan launched Operation Azm e Istehkam in 2024, which comprises kinetic and non-kinetic measures. At the moment, Policymakers should give more weight to non-kinetic measures to carry out counterterrorism efforts effectively.

They should design a strong counter-narrative to dominate the narratives of terrorists, should engage the community to easily hunt down the terrorists because local populations’ support is indispensable in counterterrorism, should keep a hawk eye on the online activities of terrorists because the terrorists are using digital means to commit their terrorist activities. Therefore, digital counterterrorism should be at the forefront because it can hinder the terrorist recruitment process and activities. Finally, sustainable deradicalization and rehabilitation programs should be implemented in the long term.

Digital counterterrorism should be at the forefront because it can hinder the terrorist recruitment process and activities.

In addition, various practitioners of counterterrorism have identified several critical factors for successful counterterrorism, including population support, a competent government, robust and well-trained security forces, influencing political will, cost-benefit calculations, and the role of functional actors such as the media, think tanks, academics, and others, which play crucial roles in counterterrorism. The role of these factors was previously limited in counterterrorism efforts; however, there is now a pressing need to incorporate them into counterterrorism efforts to make them more comprehensive.

Terrorism has posed a grave threat to Pakistan for decades. Initially, the primary focus was on kinetic measures instead of non-kinetic measures. Policymakers should pay more attention to non-kinetic measures, in addition to kinetic measures, to win the hearts and minds of the people and to crush the militants with precision. There is a dire need to revitalize the strategy of counterterrorism to root out the menace of terrorism and ensure peace and stability.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.