More than 150 countries have signed on to China’s global connectivity vision, but nowhere are its consequences more visible than in South Asia’s power grids. In the last decade, Chinese-funded energy projects have added thousands of megawatts to the electricity systems of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Lights that once flickered now stay on longer. Industrial zones operate with fewer shutdowns. Governments speak the language of connectivity and growth with renewed confidence. Behind these gains lies a deeper strategic story.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not simply about roads, ports, and power plants. It is a calculated tool through which China strengthens its own energy security while expanding its strategic footprint. For South Asian developing states, the BRI offers genuine development opportunities, but it also creates financial pressures and geopolitical risks that demand careful management.

This matters because energy security is directly tied to economic stability, political sovereignty, and long-term national resilience. Understanding this balance is essential for policymakers, students of international relations, and citizens who want to know where their countries are headed.

When China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, it presented the vision as a platform for cooperation and shared development. The initiative includes transport corridors, ports, railways, digital links, and large-scale energy infrastructure. China is one of the world’s largest consumers of oil and gas. Its industries depend heavily on imported energy, much of which travels through vulnerable maritime routes, particularly the Strait of Malacca. Any disruption in these sea lanes would have serious economic consequences. Reducing this vulnerability has therefore become a core strategic objective.

Through the BRI, China pursues three key goals related to energy: Diversifying supply routes through land corridors and alternative maritime access. Investing in overseas energy production and infrastructure. Developing strategic ports and logistical hubs that support long-term access and flexibility. South Asia sits at the heart of this strategy. Located along critical Indian Ocean shipping lanes and facing significant infrastructure gaps, countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have become central partners in this expanding network.

The flagship BRI project in South Asia is the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). With planned investments estimated at around $62 billion, CPEC represents one of the most ambitious bilateral corridors under the broader BRI framework. Energy has been the backbone of CPEC.

Pakistan, which once struggled with chronic electricity shortages and prolonged load-shedding, has added significant generation capacity through coal, solar, wind, and hydropower projects developed under this corridor. Official figures suggest that CPEC-related projects have added approximately 6,570 megawatts (MW) to the national grid, contributing a substantial share to total electricity generation in recent years.
The benefits are visible: Reduced power shortages. Improved reliability for industries.

Expanded energy mix beyond expensive furnace oil. These changes supported industrial production and export-oriented sectors, offering Pakistan short-term economic relief.
However, the picture is not entirely positive. Capacity payments, rising debt obligations, and fiscal stress have become pressing concerns. Pakistan has accumulated significant liabilities related to CPEC power projects.

Moreover, strong strategic alignment with China narrows diplomatic flexibility in a region shaped by rivalry, especially with India. Environmental considerations also raise questions. Many early CPEC projects relied on coal, a relatively cheap but carbon-intensive energy source. While this helped address immediate shortages, it complicates long-term sustainability goals. Pakistan’s experience shows that large-scale infrastructure can deliver rapid gains, but it can also deepen financial exposure and strategic dependence if not carefully managed.

Bangladesh has also engaged actively with BRI-linked projects, particularly in energy and transport. Chinese-supported power plants, including major coal-based facilities, have added substantial electricity generation capacity. Infrastructure initiatives such as the Padma Bridge Rail Link have strengthened domestic and regional connectivity.
At the same time, Bangladesh has pursued renewable energy partnerships and welcomed foreign direct investment in solar and wind projects.

This diversification reflects a more balanced approach. The advantages are clear: Increased electricity production, Improved transport infrastructure, Enhanced trade connectivity with China and other markets. Challenges remain. Several projects rely on commercial loans with higher interest rates than those offered by multilateral development institutions. Coordination issues have occasionally led to inefficiencies, such as delays in transmission infrastructure.

What distinguishes Bangladesh is its diversified external engagement. By maintaining relations with multiple development partners, including Japan and international financial institutions, it has avoided excessive reliance on a single source of funding. Compared to its neighbors, Bangladesh appears to have managed risks more cautiously.

Sri Lanka’s engagement with the BRI has drawn global attention, especially regarding Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City project. Large-scale Chinese loans financed infrastructure development, but fiscal mismanagement and economic vulnerabilities eventually led Sri Lanka into a severe debt crisis. In 2017, the government leased Hambantota Port to a Chinese company for 99 years after struggling to meet repayment obligations. Critics interpreted this as a loss of strategic control.

It is important to note that Sri Lanka’s crisis was shaped by multiple factors, including domestic policy failures and global economic shocks. However, heavy reliance on external borrowing, including from China, amplified financial vulnerability. Sri Lanka’s experience highlights a crucial lesson: infrastructure projects can become burdensome if institutions are weak and debt management lacks transparency and discipline.

The BRI can be understood through different lenses. From a realist perspective, China is acting in its national interest by securing energy routes and strengthening its strategic position. From a liberal perspective, infrastructure connectivity fosters interdependence and shared economic growth.

From a dependency viewpoint, developing countries risk structural reliance on a more powerful state through debt and unequal economic arrangements. In South Asia, all three dynamics are visible. The BRI has delivered real improvements in electricity supply and infrastructure. Yet it has also created asymmetries in financial leverage and strategic influence.

If South Asian countries want to convert BRI engagement into sustainable development, several priorities stand out: Ensure transparency in contracts and power purchase agreements, Conduct rigorous cost-benefit and debt sustainability assessments before committing to projects, Diversify financing sources to avoid overdependence, Strengthen domestic regulatory institutions, Shift gradually toward cleaner and renewable energy sources. These steps do not require rejecting cooperation with China. They require managing it strategically.

The Belt and Road Initiative is neither purely a development gift nor simply a debt trap. It is a strategic framework through which China advances its energy security while offering infrastructure investment to partner states. In South Asia, outcomes differ. Pakistan gained rapid energy expansion but faces heavy financial commitments. Bangladesh pursued infrastructure growth with greater diversification. Sri Lanka illustrates how weak governance and concentrated borrowing can turn opportunity into crisis.

The real lesson is straightforward. The success of BRI projects depends less on China’s intentions and more on the policy discipline, transparency, and institutional strength of participating states. For South Asia, the central question is not whether engagement with China should continue. It is whether that engagement is guided by long-term national interest, fiscal prudence, and strategic balance. The answer to that question will shape the region’s energy future for decades to come.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.