Society discourse in Ukraine or political leadership and responsibility: what is the right pathway to resolving the difference between victory and defeat?

Any military conflict is a challenge for the people of a country. The history of military conflicts after World War II has one defining feature: almost all military conflicts ended in a political way. This means that the question of whether the conflict ended in victory or defeat did not have a clear answer at the time of the conflict’s end. History provided a clear answer over time.

At the same time, in a society wounded by war, there is a temptation to have an immediate, public discourse to answer this question during the military conflict. This is a natural temptation, because it is a derivative of society’s demand for justice, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the desire to have confidence in the future of their country.

In the matter of victory and defeat in the war, the population of Ukraine feels this temptation, as evidenced by lively public discussions of this issue and constant polls. Is preserving state sovereignty and independence but not returning to the 1991 borders a victory or a defeat? Are security guarantees from partner countries sufficient for Ukraine’s post-war security or not, and is it worth appealing to NATO membership?

The history of military conflicts after World War II has one defining feature: almost all military conflicts ended politically.

These two questions are the main ones in Ukrainian society now in order to approach the answers to the main question of victory and defeat. But is it always the case that public discourse should be the instrument for answering both the main question and the two auxiliary questions mentioned above? Let’s look at the international experience.

Why was there no discourse on this topic in Finland during the war of 1939-1940 and in 1944, i.e., during the time of Mannerheim? Because during the war, Mannerheim immediately formed realistic expectations among people: to save the statehood and preserve the independence of Finland.

He achieved this and became a legendary figure not only in his country but also in the world. Was it a victory or a defeat? Of course, it was a victory, and Mannerheim immediately formed the definition, that is, the boundaries of victory, with his own hands.

Adenauer and his dilemma in the 1950s: “Germany will be united or it will be in NATO.” It was a difficult choice, and Adenauer made it without high expectations: the security of the country was above all, and the country would become united again in time. This is exactly what happened after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the corresponding political decisions in 1990.

In a society wounded by war, there is a temptation to have an immediate, public discourse to answer this question during the military conflict.

What Mannerheim and Adenauer have in common is that they did not set complicated, even unrealistic expectations for their people, i.e. they had a strategy and it was realistic, so it was understandable to the public, and therefore the public did not suffer from moral asymmetry during and after the war.

The situation in Ukraine is different now – expectations are high, and foreign policy experts in the West have repeatedly stated that moral asymmetry is a threat to Ukraine. Samuel Charap disclosed the problem of moral asymmetry in the context related to the war in Ukraine and residual problems of peacemaking in his article in Foreign Affairs.

Futhermore, the main thing here is that the public discourse on the question of victory and defeat in the context of high moral asymmetry in society will not answer this question NOW, but it will split society, which will be a big problem for the West, which is more difficult to manage than even ending the war politically.

Recently, ZN.UA asked Ukrainians: “Do you think the time has come for Ukraine and Russia to start official peace talks?” A relative majority of rear Ukraine — 44% — thinks that it is time that official peace talks with Russia started. Another 35% think it is not. Many are in the gray zone of the undecided — 21%.

What Mannerheim and Adenauer have in common is that they did not set complicated, even unrealistic expectations for their people, i.e. they had a strategy and it was realistic.

Furthermore, assuming that the Ukrainian authorities do launch official negotiations with Russia, it is important to understand what minimum acceptable conditions Ukrainian society is ready to start with. That is why sociologists asked respondents the following question: “Which of the conditions do you consider to be the minimum necessity to conclude a peace agreement with Russia?”.

Here the answers: half of Ukrainians (51%) insist on the liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops within the borders of 1991. 26% can agree to stop the war along the border line of early 2022, and only 9% are ready to recognize the border along the frontline at the time of the agreement.

These results evidence that the attitudes of Ukrainians to such sensitive issue related to the war – official peace talks to Russia, are not homogenous. This is a source of possible tension in the Ukrainian society. Moreover, the survey has confirmed the deep ambivalence of Ukrainian society. Most Ukrainians are willing to negotiate with Russia, but are not willing to give up anything. This is a call for a strong and resonsible leadership in Ukraine able to take responsibility for decisions reltaed to the end of war and further peacemaking.

Therefore, this major question about fixing the difference between victory and defeat must now be answered by the country’s leaders, as Mannerheim and Adenauer did in their time, i.e., it is not a matter of discourse, but a matter of exclusively political responsibility of the country’s leaders. In this context, even talks about the next postwar presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine look natural now – this is how people will evaluate the leaders’ decisions during the elections.

Samuel Charap disclosed the problem of moral asymmetry in the context related to the war in Ukraine and residual problems of peacemaking.

In general, this is a very complex topic. It’s a challenge – the issue of victory and defeat, elections, and the Security Assurances of Ukraine, that is, the security future of Ukraine. If George Kennan were alive, he would confidently confirm this. He had a fairly systematic and unbiased point of view, which is interesting to explore. This is something that both we and the West have been putting on the back burner since 1991. What can I add to this? George Kennan’s wisdom is worth of attention.

Head of the State Department’s political planning group in the 1940s, diplomat, author of the famous “long telegram” in which he provided the first and still most meaningful definition of the nature of Russian statehood and foreign policy almost 80 years ago.

Thanks to his ideas, the Cold War between the West and the USSR did not turn into a hot war. Kennan was a prophet of sorts, as he predicted Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the war between the two countries as early as 1948. In his opinion, after the West wins the Cold War and the USSR collapses, NATO’s further too rapid movement to the East will lead to exactly this development – the buffer zone between the West and Russia will significantly decrease in size, and Ukraine, as a country with a strong national idea in the status of a buffer zone, will become the target of Russia’s attack.

That is, Kennan, back in the 1940s, actually demanded that Washington formulate longer-term planning horizons for the post-Cold War era. We are talking about a long-term strategy of the West, and therefore of Washington, towards Ukraine and Russia, which is probably being formed only now.

Probably, in order to have a clear perspective, we need to pay attention to retrospect frankly and persistently. Even the 33 years of Ukraine’s independence provide society with a large layer for analysis. And if we look at it on a global scale, there will be enough objects for analysis to answer these complex questions frankly and correctly.

The country’s leaders must now answer this major question about fixing the difference between victory and defeat, as Mannerheim and Adenauer did in their time.

The topic of moral asymmetry against the backdrop of war is no less of a challenge than the war itself or the search for a way to end it. The West, and Washington in particular, is well aware of this, which is why they call the situation a mess. Ever since the days of President Bush, the United States has considered Ukrainians to be desperate people trying to manage geopolitical issues following the collapse of the USSR. This is a fuel for the fire of moral asymmetry, especially at a stage close to the end of the war.

Ending a war and preventing an internal explosion is a really difficult task. This could have been prevented if geopolitical leadership worldwide, including the US administration, had remembered the rule: Desperate people do not need to be cornered. Nuclear disarmament of Ukraine in the 1990s and the lack of a clear NATO strategy for Ukraine’s membership in the alliance after the end of the Cold War—the list of geopolitical mistakes is much longer.

In the end, a solution will be found somewhere in the minds of Mannerheim and Adenauer spiced by ideas of Kennan.

“Victory without a hot war is much better for the world order than a hot war without victory.” This is probably the main thesis of George Kennan’s work we can generate. This is an issue rather of political leadership and responsibility than society discourse at least in the time of a hot war.