The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal and voluntary export control regime that bears a political understanding between the member states to curb the presumed proliferation of Category I and Category II missiles and missile technology. The MTCR is not a formal and legally binding treaty between the states such as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), formed in 1968 and enforced in 1970 (Missile Technology Control Regime). Today, the NPT is the largest nonproliferation treaty having 191 members. India, Israel, and Pakistan have never been part of the NPT since its inception while North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 before it conducted its nuclear weapon tests in 2006 (the NPT).

The U.S. policy shift in MTCR will blur the lines between members and non-members, making missile control measures increasingly ineffective.

The MTCR, unlike the NPT, works voluntarily and is subject to amendments from time to time. It was formed in 1987 by the G-7 technologically advanced countries. Currently, it has 35 members including that of India that joined the MTCR in 2016 after the special waiver by the US provided to India in terms of the so-called India-US civil nuclear deal. The global rising China is not part of the MTCR. Although China, the perceived rival of the US and India requested its membership in 2004, the membership was not offered due to obvious geopolitical and geostrategic rivalry. Pakistan is also not part of this informal political understanding of the MTCR.

The fundamental rationale of the MTCR regime including both its Category I and Category II is to curtail the export of missiles and missile technology that has a range of 300km with the ability to carry a payload of 500kg of any type of weapons of mass destruction.  The US and its strategic allies and partners often consider this restraint outdated and thereby they consider that such guidelines need to be updated and/or modified in accordance with the US interpretation of the changing strategic environment where the US and its allies and partners consider themselves to be threatened by the perceived archrivals and their partners. That said, the US made exceptions for Ukraine and South Korea for their development of such missiles supposed to be denied, otherwise (U.S. Reinterprets MTCR Rules, September 2020).

The Rationale of the US MTCR Policy Shift

More recently, the Biden-Harris Administration “Introduced New Guidance for Missile Technology Exports to Advance Nonproliferation Goals and Bolster Allied Defense Capabilities.” On January 3, 2025, President Biden issued a National Security Memorandum (NSM) regarding the MTCR voluntarily. The January 3 fact sheet argues that “These updates reflect a renewed US commitment to non-proliferation while advancing the President’s goals of strengthening allied defense capabilities, bolstering the US defense industrial base, streamlining defense trade, and deterring adversaries.”

The fact sheet opines that “These policy changes will help the United States advance shared defense objectives with close allies, including the implementation of AUKUS while maintaining a strong leadership role on nonproliferation and export control policy. Also, this politically voluntarily modified policy establishes a memorandum that “the MTCR is not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for WMD” (FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration, January 7).

This is not the first time the US attempted to modify the changes voluntarily. In 1992, the US with its allies and partners modified the MTCR by putting restraints on the export of missile technology that may help deliver all types of weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons. During President Trump’s first tenure, the US modified the MTCR guidelines for sharing drone technology such as the Predatory and Reaper drones that go beyond the then-existing ranges and payloads as initially described by the MTCR.

Pakistan’s missile program remains India-specific, reinforcing deterrence amid evolving U.S. strategic policies favoring India.

For example, Clarke Cooper, the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs argued “We think this kind of reform is necessary in order to respond to a rapidly changing technological environment. With the growing proliferation of [the] technology, particularly by China, coupled with a growing demand for Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) for both military and commercial applications, we need to adjust US policies to address US national security concerns” (U.S. Reinterprets MTCR Rules, September 2020).

In this regard, the White House Statement also reflected the similar imperative Cooper argued: “Not only do these outdated standards give an unfair advantage to countries outside of the MTCR and hurt United States industry, but they also hinder our deterrence capability abroad by handicapping our partners and allies with subpar technology,”.

Challenges and Opportunities

The new MTCR policy initiated by the US will help boost US arms sales to its strategic allies and partners. The US considers itself lagging in terms of sales for both commercial and military purposes, while countries outside the MTCR are exploiting such advantages. For example, many in the US think that China and Israel are already capturing the markets. This reflects the realpolitik of the international system based on geopolitical and geostrategic values.

The new US MTCR policy will make the broader standing of the MTCR irrelevant, ineffective, and biased whether one is part of the MTCR or not. Membership may not make any better difference between those who are members and those who are out of the MTCR. In other words, it undermines the credibility of this informal multilateral regime aimed at curbing the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.

On the one hand, the US considers this policy shift as a better opportunity for its allies and partners to acquire missiles, the UAS, and the Space Launched Vehicle (SLV) with increasing ranges and payloads contrary to the traditional MTCR constraint measures. But, on the other hand, the US claims to be active while following the nonproliferation measures.

In this context, it is interesting to note the critique of Henry Sokolski, executive director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, who argued that “Our government may want to make love by sharing dangerous missile technology with countries it views as ‘people like us.’ That’s a policy decision. But in this case, the White House is trying to dress this love up as if it’s making nonproliferation. It’s not” (Breaking Defence, January 8).

The shift in MTCR policy reflects geopolitical realpolitik, where arms sales and security alliances dictate nonproliferation measures.

Many may consider that the US remains responsible for proliferating the long ranges and payloads to its strategic allies and partners, which in turn will increase, an arms race, security dilemma, and dangerous military escalation between the rivals.

There will be more cracks in the MTCR export control regime. Those who have already gotten rid of their missile capabilities to become part of the MTCR may regret their past voluntary decisions in the growing complex world where security continues to be supreme as part of the state’s policy.

Those countries as part of the MTCR who initially got rid of their missile capability of the prescribed rates and load might also ask for exceptions because of the increasing security threat in Europe due to the Russia-Ukraine war. Such measures based on the new US policy change will further undermine the spirit of the regime, making exceptions for some while restricting others. It will further boost a big industry push for making and selling missiles and their related technology both within the US and abroad.

Implications for South Asia

Apparently, Pakistan may be under some pressure, especially after the Biden Administration’s restrictions on certain industries putting export control that may help Pakistan develop part of the missile for security purposes. Pakistan has already lived under such pressures. Nevertheless, the strategic community in Pakistan may reflect that Pakistan needs to stay upright and remain fully confident since its nuclear and missile programs are India-specific.

The newly, changed US MTCR policy imperatives, especially Jake Sullivan’s statement regarding such policy in India, also provide an opportunity for Pakistan to express its security concerns to the US regarding its nuclear weapons development program, including the use of its missiles as part of credible delivery systems for deterrence purposes. Pakistan may assert that all its force posturing is India-specific.

Pakistani leadership may raise genuine security concerns at the diplomatic, military, bureaucratic, and political levels that restrictions on Pakistan’s development of deterrent forces for deterrence purposes may undermine the broader strategic stability in South Asia. This, in turn, will never be in the supreme security interest of any stakeholder, including the US, in South Asia, even though the US has withdrawn its military forces from Afghanistan. The US continues to have a special interest in South Asia for a variety of geopolitical and geostrategic reasons.

Pakistan must maintain strategic autonomy and strengthen ties with China and Russia while keeping diplomatic channels open with the U.S.

Pakistan may reinforce that its nuclear weapons program has been and will continue to be India-centric while deterring India. Its long-range missile delivery system is only 2750km reaching up to Andaman and Nicobar Islands where India has a military system that might be used to target Pakistan. The strategic community in Pakistan considers that unlike India which has been developing its long ranges with increasing payloads may not only threaten the entire Europe but may also threaten the US mainland security at some point in the future.

Realism depicts that international politics is never permanent for any of the strategic players in the system. Today’s friend can be tomorrow’s archrival as in the case of Russia and China for the US, once part of the alliance system to defeat Nazi Germany during WWII.

Conclusion

Pakistan may continue to develop its indigenous capability for developing and testing systems that can be used for deterrence purposes. Self-sufficiency is the best strategy to begin with. It may continue to hold strong relationships with China, Russia, and other regional players that are part of the MTCR system.

Also, it may continue to hold a balanced relationship with the US which remains the leading player in the international system despite the withering of the unipolar moment. There is no harm in making friends to accomplish one’s national security interests. All states practice a similar imperative, which is normal in this imperfect world.

Whether be or out of the MTCR, Pakistan like other countries could continue to develop capabilities for its security and deterrence purposes despite all the pressures. If the security threat remains genuine, it eventually surpasses all regional and international pressures.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.