The beginning of the Cold War, the 1950s, formed the basic rules of the geopolitical game. Any war that directly or indirectly involves countries that possess nuclear weapons must be ended in a timely manner, before a direct military clash between them. That is, the war ends not when the participants have achieved their goal, but when the war has reached the rubicon, which opens a war between nuclear-armed countries.

The Korean War of 1950-1953 is worth mentioning here. At the outbreak of the war, each side aimed for military victory and further unification of Korea under the rule of the South or the North, meaning expansion of the sphere of influence of either the West or the communist USSR and China. During the first year of the war, both sides reached a rubicon in terms of the intensity of conventional warfare, and it was either the use of nuclear weapons, but President Truman did not agree to this, or the search for a political settlement of the war. The political instrument of ending the war was chosen, and it eventually ended in July 1953.

The West wants to leave the issue of the occupied territories to the political process, diplomacy, and time.

At the same time, the war could have ended much earlier, in 1951, but it lasted almost two years because of Truman’s demand that North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war be allowed to choose whether they wanted to return home after the war or not. Eventually, after President Eisenhower took office and Stalin died on March 1, 1953, the US and the USSR quickly reached an understanding and by early spring 1953, the plan to end the war was finally ready, thus preventing an irreversible military escalation between the US and the USSR.

But then the President of South Korea Syngman Rhee stood in the way of ending the war, as he did not agree to end the war without achieving the previously defined goal of unifying Korea under the rule of the pro-Western South and withdrawing Chinese troops from North Korea. The South Korean population resorted to mass demonstrations in June 1953 to prolong the war in order to achieve this goal.

According to Gideon Rose, editor-in-chief of Foreign Affairs, in his book How Wars End, there were thoughts in the corridors of the White House to remove the South Korean president from power so that he would not interfere with peace. In the end, the United States rejected this idea and resorted to peace coercion, among other things, by offering a postwar security instrument to South Korea. Hence, the United States declared its readiness to leave its army in South Korea. Coercion worked, and in July 1953, a truce was established, which, except for occasional border escalations, continues to this day.

President Zelensky cannot rationally insist on continuing the war to restore the country’s territorial integrity.

The war in Ukraine is approaching its third anniversary, which means that it is approaching the Korean War in terms of timing. As early as 2023, the Biden administration began to state quite publicly that the war in Ukraine should not cross the same rubicon as a war between nuclear powers.

Perhaps for the first time, such a statement was made in early July 2023 by White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan when he sharply rejected the idea, voiced increasingly by some Washington strategists, that Biden is overplaying the Russian nuclear threat and deterring NATO from all-in support for Kyiv. The hawks, he said, argue: “This nuclear threat is complete nonsense. Don’t worry about it at all. It’s to be completely discounted.”

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Sullivan rebuffed the no-worry approach: “It is a threat. It is a real threat. It’s one we need to take seriously. And it’s one that does evolve with changing conditions on the ground.”

This was followed by President Biden’s public statement in December 2023, in which the US leader said, “We want to see Ukraine win the war. Winning means Ukraine is a sovereign, independent nation. And it can afford to defend itself today and deter further aggression”. At the same time, Biden did not mention the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within the 1991 borders by military means, and Western leaders have consistently stated that they do not recognize Russia’s occupied territories. In other words, the West wants to leave the issue of the occupied territories to the political process, diplomacy, and time.

It is Washington that should show leadership in the West and offer reliable security instruments to Ukraine.

This statement brings us back to the events of 1939-1944, the war between the USSR and Finland, which began with Soviet aggression in late 1939 and lasted intermittently until 1944. The commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, and later the country’s president, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, had a choice: either to continue the war for the sake of the country’s eastern territories or to end it. Continuation of the war could have resulted in the loss of state sovereignty and independence of the country, and the death of a large number of Finns. In this difficult dilemma, Mannerheim chose the lives of his fellow citizens, Finnish state sovereignty and independence. As a result, Finland and the USSR ended the war politically by negotiating and signing an armistice, and Mannerheim became a legendary hero for his military talent, political foresight, and love for the people of Finland.

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The West does not see it appropriate to seek a military breakthrough by Ukraine in the war, making unequivocal statements about the need for a political settlement. Reason? The West believes that Ukraine, like Finland in 1944, has won by defending its sovereignty and independence. At the same time, the West is clearly trying to force Ukraine to peace, just as it did with South Korea in 1953.

Among the tools used by the West to force Ukraine to peace are the lack of permission for Ukraine to use long-range weapons from the West to strike at Russian territory, the unwillingness of Western countries to provide offensive weapons in the amount necessary for an effective counteroffensive (here it is worth mentioning General Zaluzhny’s analytical article in The Economist of December 2022), Germany’s position on the unwillingness to provide long-range Taurus missiles, and a sharp decrease in the total amount of military assistance to Ukraine starting in the second half of 2023.

The slow movement of Western arms manufacturers to establish joint ventures in Ukraine (a process that is probably politically driven), and the reduction in overall financial assistance to Ukraine, as a result of which Ukraine seeks to compensate for the loss of external revenues by increasing taxes from October 2024), are also these tools. And don’t forget September 30, 2023, when the US $32 billion lend-lease to Ukraine expired, and not a cent of it was allocated to Ukraine.

Can President Zelenskyy rationally insist on continuing the war to restore the country’s territorial integrity in the face of the West’s growing pressure on Ukraine to make peace?

To answer this question, it is worth clarifying under what conditions the restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 borders would mean the end of the war. This is possible only if tensions within Russia increase, leading to its collapse or a change of government to a democratic one. The West realizes that neither the first nor the second scenario is possible now and will not be possible for many years. It is here that the West, through Biden, emphasizes to the Ukrainian authorities that Ukraine has already won the victory by defending its sovereignty and independence, and it is time for the Ukrainian authorities to make a choice between keeping people in Ukraine and further attempts to return the 1991 territories by military means, realizing that this will still not be the end of the war.

There is an opportunity to reconsider all red lines in relations between the West and Russia, and even in a broader geopolitical context involving China and countries of the Global South,

Biden’s statement in the summer of 2024, that the war in Ukraine had reached its escalation rubicon and that if it was not stopped politically, World War III was a realistic development that the West could not accept. A similar statement was made by Biden’s political opponent, Republican presidential candidate Trump in October 2024 and even before. So, Washington’s political elites are answering the question above: No, President Zelensky cannot rationally insist on continuing the war to restore the country’s territorial integrity. Therefore, coercion of Ukraine to peace will continue to gain momentum until the goal is achieved and the war is over.

What can Zelensky rationally insist on in such a difficult situation?

The experience of South Korea will not work here – the US military will not be in Ukraine either during or after the war. Washington sees no political reason for this step, but it will create a huge pretext for Russia to escalate. It is probably worth remembering the experience of Germany in the 1950s and the dilemma of Chancellor Adenauer: Germany will be united or it will be in NATO.

For Zelenskyy, this dilemma is losing its clear structure and turning into a question to be outlined in the next paragraph. Furthermore, to become united again now within the 1991 borders requires agreement and much greater Western support for continuing the war and expecting Russia to collapse or change to a democratic government in the near future. This is unlikely, if not impossible. In other words, the first part of Chancellor Adenauer’s dilemma is not an option for President Zelensky.

This dilemma of Adenauer is being transformed into Zelensky’s question: Is the West ready to invite Ukraine to NATO or use other instruments to ensure Ukraine’s post-war security and put the country on the path to recovery?

This question has an obvious addressee: the West, namely the United States. It is Washington that should show leadership in the West and offer reliable security instruments to Ukraine. One of these instruments is Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Here, it is worth considering very carefully the options of extending an invitation to Ukraine within the territories under its control. In addition, the so-called East German model with a modification may be an option – extending an invitation to Ukraine within the territories under its control, without deploying NATO troops, but with NATO weapons and using Article 5 of the NATO Charter in relation to these territories under Ukraine’s control. And, of course, those Western countries that signed security agreements with Ukraine in 2023, and there are more than 20 such countries, must properly fulfill their obligations.

This would be the best solution for Russia as well, because, as Henry Kissinger noted in January 2023, Putin, by invading Ukraine in 2022, personally erased his own red line on Ukraine’s NATO membership, which he had announced to the US Ambassador to Russia, William Burns, in 2008. Right now, in the context of the world disorder, there is an opportunity to reconsider all red lines in relations between the West and Russia, and even in a broader geopolitical context involving China and countries of the Global South, and finally correct the geopolitical and security mistakes of the West in the 1990s regarding Ukraine, which should finally get rid of its buffer zone status. It is obviously that an exact moment for the strategic dialogue with all parties involved directly and indirectly has come. Only a world security rubicon is further.