May 2025, the South Asian chessboard got still more altered, even fewer numbers would have anticipated. It did not require a long war, cumbersome diplomacy or the attrition of years. Four days that showed the world Pakistan can overpower its bigger neighbour, through its military doctrine, technological integration and strategic patience, producing a clean and contained victory.
Four days that showed the world Pakistan can overpower its bigger neighbour, through its military doctrine, technological integration and strategic patience.
It was speedy and convincing. The Chinese-manufactured J-10C fighters of Pakistan, boasting cutting-edge radar capability, EW abilities and precision-guided missile capability, were proven successful in realising confirmed kills, with India having its most prized aircraft falling like flies, namely a Rafale and a Su-30MKI. At least two jet fighters were later confirmed to be shot down by U.S. authorities, with Islamabad reporting five jets. Such a decision as non-release of details on the part of India spoke louder than a press statement. At the end of the war, Pakistan was not only able to justify its stance, but it also made New Delhi agree to a ceasefire on its terms, which guaranteed regional stability as well as undermining Indian illusions of military invulnerability.
It was not a strategic one only. It was the result of years of investing in the integration of forces, Chinese technology transfer and training, integrating native doctrine with foreign hardware. Pakistan demonstrated that it could take matters to the logical extremes without presenting a nuclear brinkmanship scenario and could still accomplish its goals. China caused no lack of restraint in world capitals.
Policy on the diplomatic level shifted to Washington a few weeks earlier. The pictures of the Pakistani Army Chief Field Marshall Asim Munir entering the White House had more than people imagined at the onset. The trip led to an accord to cut U.S. tariffs on Pakistani exports to 19 per cent, a deal to possibly mine unexploited Pakistani oil resources and a remark by President Donald Trump that at some point “Pakistan may be selling oil to India.” That was a conveniently last line. It was not only an indication of American willingness to explore the potential of Pakistan’s resources, but it was also an indication that Washington was ready to put Islamabad in an economic niche of standing above New Delhi.
The figures do speak volumes. Foreign direct investment in Pakistan increased by 28 per cent to 4.5 billion dollars in the first six months of 2025 as compared to the same period in the previous year. The amount of remittances bounced to a steady 3.2 billion dollars per month. Karachi Stock Exchange has risen by 18 per cent during the two-month sales period of the ceasefire. The Gulf sovereign funds reopened discussions on equity stake in Pakistani state enterprises. The second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor saw Chinese investors work faster on the timelines of industrial parks.
Foreign direct investment in Pakistan increased by 28 per cent to 4.5 billion dollars in the first six months of 2025.
The development in India was quite the opposite of the trend. Prime Minister Narendra Modi became one of the first leaders to meet Trump after he was re-elected at the beginning of the year. They have committed to doubling the bilateral trade of 500 billion dollars by 2030. Trump labelled Modi as his great friend. It had all gone 6 months down the line in the friendship.
This resulted in the United States imposing a 25 per cent tariff on Indian goods and then another 25 per cent fine in the case of further purchase of Russian oil. Trump also threatened to impose another 10 per cent extra due to India belonging to the BRICS group, in which Washington sees a strategic problem. The steps taken were labelled as unfair, unjustified and unreasonable by the government of Modi. Trump, further, labelled the Indian economy as dead.
The aftermath of it was instant. The rupee fell to its lowest ever of over 94 against the dollar. The manufacturing PMI in India fell to 48.7 and indicated reduced activities. In the second quarter of the year, the outflow of money by foreign investors in the Indian equities was over 6 billion dollars.
Delhi-based frustration was summed up by Michael Kugelman, an expert on South Asia based in Washington, who said: The fact that this is going on with high and heavy levels of U.S. engagement in Islamabad directly following an India-Pakistan conflict makes this all the more galling to Delhi and the Indian people, more broadly. All this only furthers the suspicion that the U.S. cannot be relied upon as an ally. He continued that, though there is certain baggage of the Cold War behind some of the bitterness in this case, the anger is even greater now due to real-time events.
The timing is good for Pakistan. The world is shifting in a way that America does not unipolarly dominate and becoming more fragmented and multipolar. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched by Beijing and various forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS+, transformed the existing middle powers and helped them to gain new spaces. Pakistan is no longer a security appendage in the Chinese strategy. It is a port state that connects the western China industry (its industrial engine) with Gulf energy through Gwadar.
There are numerous opportunity fronts in this congruence. The Gulf capitals view Pakistan not only as the source of labour but also as an energy security and logistics partner. Central Asian states are considering export paths via the Pakistani road and rail system to avoid a Russian stranglehold. The second layer of CPEC is to move beyond roads to build industrial zones, energy grids, and a logistics hub, which will entangle supply chains of Pakistan into the region.
Pakistan is no longer a security appendage in the Chinese strategy; it is a port state that connects western China industry with Gulf energy through Gwadar.
The about-turn by Washington towards Islamabad does not concern sentimentality. It is a hedge that is made with calculations. Through economic and diplomatic relations with Pakistan, the U.S. holds the possibility of control in a nuclear state which has just demonstrated its military ability. It also develops a bargaining chip on India that Trump feels is drifting to strategic non-alignment. His insistence that this is a ceasefire brokered by the U.S. in May is as much to do with American home politics as it is with sending the message to the Asian world that Washington is still a definitive force in the South Asian region.
Pakistan is currently faced with a dilemma of converting this situation into a strategic sustainable stance. That is more than just going and gorging on the spoils of victory. It involves the subordination of municipalities. The military side of the question suggests that Islamabad needs to keep pursuing modernisation of military forces in cooperation with China, improve its interoperability with Gulf States, and keep the nuclear posture stable and clear. Overextended militaries that think themselves in the euphoria of victory end up isolated or overextended.
Diplomatically, Pakistan has to make sure that what it has right now is an opening with Washington that should be formalised into an organised dialogue that entails the three aspects of trade, security and technology and not just chemistry between the leaders. It ought to strengthen relationships with the Central Asian republics and the ASEAN countries, severing its partnership ties with Beijing and Washington. Control of narrative concerning multilateral forums is significant since, within the BRICS+ and the SCO, India will move to neutralise the positioning by Pakistan.
There is an economic necessity that Pakistan should use the current inflows in long-term productive activities, such as export-led manufacturing, high-value agriculture, and logistics infrastructure. Given that the present reason given for increased domestic energy exploration is to sell overseas, and that any future exports should be seen as beyond demand rather than a gamble, domestic energy exploration should be scaled to first fulfil internal demand. CPEC Phase-II must be handled transparently so that it does not become overly dependent on a particular partner, regardless of how friendly they may be.
The victory in wars can be achieved in a matter of days. Influence that makes decades must be gained by a persistent, disciplined, unsentimental sense of what is national interest.
It is no time to mix up a military convenience with a permanent regularity of policy. The war that lasted four days has shifted the perceptions in Washington and Beijing, and the Gulf; however, perceptions can move much faster unless they have strength in their structures. It is a rare opportunity that Pakistan has to be viewed as not only a spoiler of the security equation in South Asia but also as a maker of economic and diplomatic future in the region.
There was no more unipolar world. Multipolarity has rewarded the state that has been able to maintain relationships without being subjected to slavery to any one bloc. Pakistan has room to manoeuvre in the new order; however, only with strategic patience. The victory in wars can be achieved in a matter of days. Influence that makes decades must be gained by a persistent, disciplined, unsentimental sense of what is national interest.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
