Since the 2008 Mumbai attack, the not-so-good bilateral relations between the two neighbors have been further strained, and the long and winding road of stability-instability paradox somehow always leads the two neighbors to the door of the US intervening for a ceasefire.
Indian allegations against Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism inside its territory and in Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir have not only lacked factual evidence, but are always followed by India denying any possible mechanism to have a fair investigation of the incidents. Ironically, the Indian stance has remained the same after Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), and now Pahalgam’s terrorist attacks (2025) in the IIOJK.
Pakistan has controlled the escalation cycle, which has set a new norm for the modern warfare between two nuclear states.
Pakistan’s response to Modi’s ‘new normal’,i.e., repeatedly conducting surgical strikes against Pakistan to pursue political objectives without escalating a limited war into an all-out war, has been met with calculated countermeasures, retaliating only when necessary to deliver a befitting response. Pakistan has controlled the escalation cycle, which has set a new norm for the modern warfare between two nuclear states, setting the outcome for future wars. The precedent has been set that under the nuclear umbrella, it is not the quantity rather the quality of conventional weapons that will decide the outcomes.
However, it is entirely a different playing field when it comes to Pakistan and India, where the fact that nuclear weapons allow both states to annihilate one another fundamentally, certainly define the nature of security relationship between the two possessor states which share a common view that escalating to a nuclear war is unthinkable yet two nuclear-armed neighboring states, at such proximity presents a unique case study and allows us to capture the nuances of the stability–instability paradox.
The stability–instability paradox is premised on the notion that two nuclear-armed states that are certain that all-out warfare would lead to their mutual annihilation have significant incentives to avoid escalating disputes to that level however, this nuclear deterrence might prevent an all-out war, it also increases the likelihood of smaller, yet more frequent conflicts at conventional level.
India rejected its call for a neutral probe, suspended the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), and launched air attacks on Pakistan.
Similarly, it is also interesting to understand nuclear weapons in terms of the specific threats they pose to the state’s survival. The world has witness that since the advent of nuclear weapons and especially after the testing of 1998 in the South Asian region, the nuclear armed states behave differently towards one and other based on severity of those existential threats they pose to each other, capable of jeopardizing the political and economic viability of a state, those facing the greatest risks of annihilating one another in a full-scale nuclear war will be the ones most likely to pick small fights with one another.
This suggests that nuclear weapons do more to encourage conventional conflict and less to prevent it, but the proximity makes the case even more complicated for Pakistan. India rejected its call for a neutral probe, suspended the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), and launched air attacks on Pakistan under the pretext of Operation Sindoor on 7 May. The attacks on multiple locations inside Pakistan killed 31 innocent civilians, including children and women.
The precedent has been set that under the nuclear umbrella, it is not the quantity rather the quality of conventional weapons that will decide the outcomes.
To restore deterrence stability, Pakistan’s military responded, though in defensive retaliation, and inflicted immense military costs on India. The aerial combat between the Pakistan Airforce PAF and the Indian Airforce IAF resulted in the downing of five Indian jets by Pakistani Forces, including three Rafales, and one each of Russian planes, a Su-30 and a MiG-29. As dangerous as it sounds, yet the befitting response of Pakistan’s armed forces was essential, calculated, and imperative for the credibility of the entire Pakistani deterrence strategy.
South Asian stability requires a dual approach of strategic pragmatism along with diplomatic resilience among both countries to pursue long-term stability in the future, but the brutal question here is whether the two states can afford to continue taking such risks and whether every time United States will jump in to facilitate the mediation process, stopping the escalations.
The long and winding road
That leads to your door
Will never disappear
I’ve seen that road before
It always leads me here
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
