Peace activists in both India and Pakistan want their respective governments to resume talks and end the long bilateral deadlock without further procrastination. They strongly feel the present impasse is not only mutually harmful but also affecting the region as a whole. And unless the two largest countries in South Asia join hands, the region would remain stuck in wretchedness. To them, realizing national and regional prosperity has become hostage to seemingly intractable Pakistan-India hostility. They feel disappointed at the general nonchalance in the region towards addressing multiple and multidimensional challenges. In short, they find no justification for the two countries to live in perpetual animosity.

Their pursuit of peace is praiseworthy. But as far as I know, they have yet to come up with workable propositions. Expressing the desire for peace is not enough. It must be backed by building unignorable pressure on Islamabad and New Delhi. And that will happen only if they have a well thought-out, realistic plan of action in hand.

To them, realizing national and regional prosperity has become hostage to seemingly intractable Pakistan-India hostility.

In essence, activists on both sides of the border must understand that issues that continue to bedevil Pakistan-India relations are enormously complex. The fundamental question remains as to how to get the two countries engage in a process that seamlessly segues from conflict management to conflict resolution.

At the same time, is it reasonable to expect peace activists on both sides of the border to defenestrate their historical and national biases? Even if they genuinely believe in their admirable cause and try to be as impartial as possible, they are often snubbed by their fellow citizens and accused of mortgaging their patriotism and national loyalty. Such is the bilateral environment. Ergo, it is not surprising that peace activists have not been able to develop a groundswell of support on either side; traction to their cause remains minuscule at best.

As I look at the present situation, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. The two countries have tried almost all possible approaches towards normalizing their relations but to no big avail. India traditionally believed that addressing the difficult disputes such as Jammu and Kashmir would not be possible without first creating a conducive environment through a slew of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in less controversial areas including trade, culture and people-to-people contact. In the past, New Delhi would invariably demur to setting preconditions for negotiations.

Pakistan, however, would approach the bilateral relationship differently. Islamabad would usually hold the view that the Jammu and Kashmir was the core dispute. Once this was settled, normalization would follow on its own, enabling the two countries to also address the peripheral issues. Interestingly, the two countries would often even bicker over whether Jammu and Kashmir is an ‘issue’ or a ‘dispute’ as words are critical in ‘Diplomacy’ as in ‘Law’.

The two countries have tried almost all possible approaches towards normalizing their relations but to no big avail.

The Composite Dialogue framework that was put together in 1997, comprising eight components for talks, was the combination of the two approaches. It was the mechanism for both putting in place CBMs, and finding solutions to core issues related to peace and security including Jammu and Kashmir. The dialogue, however, could not begin as bilateral tensions soared following the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. Par for the course, Pakistan responded with its own nuclear tests. The nuclear genie had finally come out of the bottle in South Asia.

Then, there was the Kargil conflict in the first half of 1999 which created more chasms with mutual distrust touching the nadir. It was the SAARC summit in Pakistan held in January 2004 that provided the opportunity to break the long logjam. President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee met on the margins and agreed to give a chance to the Composite Dialogue.

As one looks back, the period between 2004 and 2008 was most peaceful as well as fruitful. Several CBMs were initiated including tourism and trade across the Line of Control (LoC). Dividends were visible as diplomacy was also working on the backchannel mandated to find a mutually palatable solution to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Peace activists could now relatively easily travel to each other across the border. “Aman ki Asha” (Hope for Peace) became the buzzword. However, India’s prevarication on Kashmir could not sustain the momentum of congeniality for long.

The November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai brought almost everything back to square one. Accusations and counter-accusations vitiated the atmosphere yet again. “Aman ki Asha” did not take much time to dissipate, and the peace activists also sort of went into dormancy. There was some initial cooperation to bring the culprits of the Mumbai attack to justice but there are still some serious roadblocks to conclude the ongoing trial in Pakistan. I know for a fact that earnest cooperation from the Indian side has been lacking and, in my view, New Delhi is not very keen to put a closure to the trial as the Mumbai attack is a convenient talking point to keep hammering Islamabad on terrorism, and avoiding serious talks on Kashmir.

It is time for our Indian friends and peace activists to exert pressure on New Delhi to understand that Jammu and Kashmir is neither an integral part of India nor of Pakistan.

The election of Modi as prime minister did engender some hopes but those too could not last long, for Modi’s agenda was clear from the very beginning that he was not interested in talking to Pakistan on Kashmir. Yet the latter offered itself to be inveigled into believing otherwise. The July and December 2015 joint statements issued in Ufa and Islamabad, respectively were indubitably poorly negotiated statements from our side. Islamabad unilaterally and rather readily conceded too much ground on Kashmir.

The Pathankot attack on January 2, the arrest of Commander Kulbhushan Jhadav in March, the martyr of Burhan Wani in July, Modi’s remarks on Balochistan in August, the Uri attack in September and the cancellation of the scheduled SAARC summit in Islamabad in November made 2016 one of the most difficult years in Pakistan-India relations. As Pakistan’s high commissioner in New Delhi, it was disquieting for me to see the relationship going from bad to worse. Indeed, I was far more worried than the peace activists. In the end, diplomacy is not about fulfilling desires but about achieving policy objectives. This is what puts diplomats and peace activists at odds most of the time.

Even at present I see wide gaps between the two. Indian and Pakistani peace activists have reemerged with the message of “engagement” and “normalization”. The question is how. Should Pakistan accept what India did on August 5, 2019 in clear violation of its commitments to Kashmiris, Pakistan and the international community by illegally annexing the occupied Jammu and Kashmir? My worry is that Islamabad may be tempted to breaking the deadlock on Indian terms yet again.

There is no gainsaying that regional and global challenges from climate change to water crisis do warrant a thaw. But it is also true that effective regional cooperative frameworks cannot be built on rickety foundations of unpredictable and hostile bilateral relations.

It would be a huge diplomatic mistake on the part of Pakistan to revert to the bilateral engagement and negotiations under the Ufa and Islamabad joint statements. In any case, those lopsided documents were never workable, and have become totally irrelevant post-5 August 2019.

I am not doubting for a moment the intentions of peace activists. Nevertheless, they cannot deny the fact that this time the onus is on India to break the deadlock not only for resuming bilateral engagement but also normalizing relations irreversibly by settling the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

It is time for our Indian friends and peace activists to exert pressure on New Delhi to understand that Jammu and Kashmir is neither an integral part of India nor of Pakistan. This is for Kashmiris to decide and please let them decide in an honorable manner. Otherwise, good-neighborly relations between India and Pakistan would continue moving from a stalemate to a stalemate.

Resuming trade, cricketing ties and cultural exchanges are all good stuff but, as a former diplomat, I would be careful to not fall for illusions.