As part of its Nuclear Notebook, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists annually produces reports primarily describing the number of nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and the related delivery systems of all nine nuclear weapon states. More recently, it produced “Indian Nuclear Weapons, 2024” while describing the number of nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants, fissile materials production, nuclear warheads, and the related delivery systems.

India continues to ‘modernize its nuclear weapons arsenal and operationalize its nascent triad.

The report claims that although the Indian government “does not publish numbers about the size of its nuclear weapon stockpile”, through different reliable sources India continues to “modernize its nuclear weapons arsenal and operationalize its nascent triad.”

The report estimates that New Delhi currently has “eight different nuclear-capable systems: two aircrafts, five land-based ballistic missiles, and one sea-based ballistic missile.” It is reported that India has been working on five more delivery systems, on which the report remains substantially silent.

This report mentions that India has an estimated 172 nuclear weapons, which may be delivered through air, land, and sea-based delivery systems. At the same time, multiple nuclear power plants in India do not fall under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) where the South Asian country can produce lots of fissile materials, including the fast breeder nuclear plants for producing a huge quantity of plutonium.

India has “eight different nuclear-capable systems: two aircrafts, five land-based ballistic missiles, and one sea-based ballistic missile.”

It fails to mention that 1) India has been working on the project to test a thermonuclear weapon (the H-bomb), 2) Brahmos, a joint Russia-India supersonic missile project where India is now trying to turn this into hypersonic missile capability for enhancing its offensive capability, 3) Prahaar, a tactical nuclear weapon that India tested even before Pakistan tested Nasr, 4) the Cold Start Doctrine to wage a limited war against Pakistan with integrated battle groups, 5) aircraft carriers, 6) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems that India may use as a shield to strike first, 7) S-400 sophisticated air-defense system affecting the policies of India’s military and nuclear strategies, and more importantly 8) its increasing strategic partnerships with Russia, France, Israel, and the US while supplying lots of new technologies that India is integrating both in the conventional and nuclear domains.

The Nuclear Notebook describes India’s Agni series of ballistic missiles in not much detail. Rather, it transcribes the Agni V as the “near intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering a warhead to a distance of less than 6,000 kilometers.” To that end, it shies away from calling Agni V and/ or Agni VI ICBMs covering most parts of Europe, the American continent, and the Middle Eastern region including Israel.

Such missiles can be turned in any direction at any time since international relations dictum teaches us that there is no permanent friend and no permanent enemy in the international system. It is only the vital national security interest that matters for a state.

The report estimates that India currently has 172 nuclear weapons.

Therefore, India will not only continue to modernize its delivery systems and increase its warheads, but also increase the ranges of its missiles in land, air, and sea to help achieve sufficiency in its deterrent force capabilities.

All that being noted, this will greatly affect the nuclear policies of India. One, it will provide India the incentives for escalation dominance opting for a first-strike counterforce targeting, which will further impinge upon its so-called No-First Use (NFU) doctrinal posture. India will no longer follow the NFU option.

Pakistan never trusted India to practice this posture, and it appears to be correct. NFU is already affected by its 2003 Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) when it says that India can use nuclear weapons if its forces are attacked anywhere.

Two, with such juggernaut deterrent force development under the auspices of Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), India is getting away from minimum deterrence it earlier conceptualized. Although the minimum may never be quantified, India falls into a new commitment trap, that is, what is minimum against China cannot be minimum against Pakistan.

India’s Agni V is described as a ‘near intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering a warhead to a distance of less than 6,000 kilometers.

With such deterrent force development for offensive purposes and an aggressive policy for escalation dominance, India is increasing the risk of escalation, crisis instability, and a new arms race in South Asia. This in turn is affecting the broader strategic stability of the region. The risk of escalation gets even more serious when India and Pakistan have many unresolved outstanding issues including the issue of Kashmir.

Most of the CBMs are at a standstill position. The rivals are not talking to each other. The mistrust continues to prevail. There is little chance for the South Asian rivals to institutionalize the risk reduction mechanism.

The Nuclear Notebook while mentioning the nuclear forces reflects that India will continue to modernize its deterrence forces and modify deterrence force posturing in accordance with its choosing and calculations.

This will only spiral the risks of more military crises between the two rivals. Resultantly, Pakistan may continue to produce effective countermeasures as part of its competing strategy to deter Indian conventional and nuclear strikes.