Ever since the start of Russian-Ukraine war, the understrength conventional power capability of Russia against the US-led NATO bolstering Ukraine often comes up with the nuclear saber-rattling. More recently, the Russian President Vladimir Putin while addressing the world community on November 21 argued that Russia launched ballistic missile strikes against Dnipro City in response to the recent attacks by Ukraine which used ATACMS (supersonic tactical ballistic missile) and Storm Shadow (air-launched cruise missile) provided by the US and UK against the military objects in Russia.

Putin warned the US-led NATO countries that Russia may strike the military facilities of the Western countries that supported Ukraine to use western missiles directly against Russia. Russia terms this as one of its “red lines” Russia perceives that the West is crossing, risking a large-scale military escalation to a nuclear level. Russia has already threatened to use nuclear weapons after Ukraine is largely supported by the US-led NATO members. It has stationed its tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus for deterrence and nuclear signaling purposes against the Western countries in Europe.

Scholars contend that in the nuclear war, there are no victors. This goes back to the Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev 1985 statement on nuclear war: “a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought.”

Why does Russia often come up with nuclear saber-rattling? What does it want to achieve? Are the US-led NATO members deterred? How much is the Russia-Ukraine war boiling for a nuclear use engulfing the entire Europe? Is the world considering nuclear risk reduction and the possible end of this war when Europe is turning into one of the world’s nuclear flash points?  These are some of the overarching questions the serious contemporary scholarship is focusing upon underpinned by various combinations of academic framework to understand the growing risk of nuclear escalation, the cost of which may be too high than the benefit each side may perceive.

Scholars contend that in the nuclear war, there are no victors. This goes back to the Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev 1985 statement on nuclear war: “a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought.” Based on the conceptual logic of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), this remains valid in a nuclear environment where each side will end up destroying each other. This primarily reflects from the 1958 seminal work of Albert James Wohlstetter on “the Delicate Balance of Terror” where he argued that the presence of thermonuclear weapons between the US and the Soviet Union had produced a “presumed automatic balance” of power which in turn makes nuclear war “extremely unlikely”.

From an academic point of view, the Russian threats of the use of nuclear weapons against the US-led NATO military support for Ukraine could be 1) to let the Western countries become serious while getting on board for resolving the Russia-Ukraine war to the best Russian terms, 2) to give deterrence signaling to the Western countries so that they stop supplying sophisticated defensive and offensive missile capability that undermine the Russian conventional force capability in its war against Ukraine and 3) to prevent the US from making Ukraine part of NATO. Although Russia appears to be succeeding on these strategic imperatives, many consider that most of the European including some sections in the US consider the Russian nuclear saber-rattling as mere rhetoric.

Presumably, if nuclear weapons exist and thereby deter the potential adversary from major offensive strikes, nuclear deterrence should have the value addition by serving its purpose.

However, the leading scholars such as John J Mearshiermer from a realist security paradigm consider that the people in the Pentagon must be taking Putin’s nuclear threats seriously. A nuclear threat from the state leadership becomes credible especially when it has the capability and the political will to use nuclear weapons in the worst-case scenario.

This reminds us of the seminal work on Guarding the Guardians by Peter D Feaver conceptual framework on the always/ never dichotomy that nuclear weapons should always be used when they are absolutely needed and should never be used when they are not required. Presumably, if nuclear weapons exist and thereby deter the potential adversary from major offensive strikes, nuclear deterrence should have the value addition by serving its purpose.

Nuclear saber-rattling may fall in such a conceptualized category of deterrence for Russia. Despite the understrength conventional force capability of Russia compared with the US-NATO allies, the credible Russia nuclear forces both at the tactical and strategic level remain one of the fundamental deterrents preventing the US-led NATO allies from crossing the red-lines that may not be acceptable to the Russian security leadership.

The recent tactics of Ukraine by striking Russia with the Western supported missiles might accidentally increase the chances of escalation to a nuclear level. As Europe is becoming the nuclear flash point, world leaders should mutually work for nuclear risk reduction, urge the Russian and the US-led NATO allies to demonstrate maximum restraint, and eventually negotiate to end the Russia-Ukraine war on the terms acceptable to all the stakeholders. Such measures can only help reduce the chances of a nuclear war emitting out of saber-rattling in Europe.