India is subtly fostering a far darker legacy in the midst of its growing international prominence, one that should make headlines but doesn’t. A rising, mainly unreported nuclear black market that jeopardizes not just regional stability but also international security is the unsettling reality hidden beneath the glowing tales of nuclear cooperation and energy expansion.

India ranked 20th out of 25 in NTI’s 2023 global nuclear material security index, below Pakistan.

As New Delhi continues to reap the benefits of strategic nuclear waivers and worldwide acclaim, troubling doubts still linger. Radioactive materials are vanishing from India’s hospitals, research facilities, and nuclear plants, not from adversarial nations or rogue laboratories.

These drugs aren’t disappearing in isolated cases; rather, they are frequently ending up in the hands of local criminals, smugglers, perhaps most concerning, players who operate outside of state borders. This isn’t speculation. These worries stem from a lengthy history of reported incidents, including radioactive thefts, questionable inventory gaps, and numerous instances of failing to notify international organisations.

The idea of India as a responsible nuclear state has been widely recognised for years. That view has evolved into a cosy myth of sorts. However, ease does not equate to prudence. An unsettling incident was discovered by Indian law enforcement in August 2024, a gang was found in possession of almost $100 million worth of Californium, a rare and extremely radioactive material, on the illicit market.

The substance, which is so powerful that it is utilised in neutron moisture gauges and nuclear reactors, was acquired in India rather than being trafficked over international boundaries. The incident wasn’t the first. A concerning trend has surfaced over the last thirty years: radioactive materials continue to seep into uncontrolled hands, and India’s nuclear security system is crumbling.

The 2008 civil nuclear deal with the United States and persistent efforts to gain membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have reinforced India’s reputation as a respectable nuclear state in the West for decades. Despite mounting evidence of repeated failures, thefts, and the illegal trade of radioactive materials, this myth has protected India from closer examination. The most recent of such breaches, which now constitutes a risky and indisputable pattern with ramifications well beyond India’s boundaries, is the August 2024 Californium incident.

The incident sparked “grave concern” from Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which emphasised how frequent nuclear thefts are in India. It brought up a crucial concern in its statement: how do radioactive materials, particularly classified sources like Californium, wind up in the hands of private individuals? It also noted three distinct thefts of Californium that were reported in 2021.

The Ministry also cited another concerning incident in July 2024, when five people were apprehended in Dehradun in possession of a radioactive item that was allegedly taken from the extremely secure Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). The integrity of India’s whole nuclear system is at risk when establishments like BARC, which are regarded as some of the country’s most secure, are breached.

Californium worth $100M was seized from a local gang in August 2024, originating inside India.

India has a long and well-established record of nuclear material safety. The history of the episodes stretches back several decades. Eight kilograms of uranium were confiscated by Indian officials in Tamil Nadu in 1994. One hundred kilograms of uranium were found in West Bengal in 1998 with a politician. In 2001, a terrorist organisation close to the Bangladeshi border found 225 grams of milled uranium. The tendency continued after that. The theft of a radioactive container from a protected research site in eastern India occurred in 2006. Numerous uranium and californium thefts were reported in Maharashtra, Kolkata, and Bihar between 2009 and 2024.

The fact that many of the people apprehended were scrap merchants, labourers, and street criminals rather than professional smugglers or spies highlights how deeply these materials have permeated the unorganised sector.

Examine the following chart, which shows theft incidents reported between 1994 and 2024, to get a sense of the scope of this crisis:

The frequency and escalation of these episodes point to a failure of both enforcement and state control. These aren’t isolated incidents. Those are structural flaws. According to an Indian parliamentary investigation, 147 accidents and safety issues were reported in Indian nuclear reactors between 1995 and 1998. Yet no serious international accountability mechanism has been implemented.

The fact that India has refused to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of these recurring errors is what makes them even more concerning. All such instances are intended to be reported in real time under the agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in order to guarantee tracking and collective vigilance. However, India has a history of not reporting these thefts. Transparency is compromised, as are the fundamental tenets of international nuclear governance. A hazardous precedent is set when a nation with the size and nuclear capability of India does not adhere to international standards.

Furthermore, it is blatantly against UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to repeatedly grant unauthorised access to nuclear materials. The resolution, which was adopted in 2004, requires nations to stop non-state actors from obtaining WMDs, such as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as how they are delivered. It forbids any direct or indirect assistance to non-state groups pursuing nuclear weapons and requires stringent control over nuclear materials. This duty is contradicted by India’s ongoing failure to protect such materials.

India has failed to consistently report incidents to the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

In spite of this, India has not received much pressure from other countries. Rather than advocating for changes, the United States and its allies have increased their civil nuclear cooperation with India. Despite not being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India was granted a historic NSG waiver in 2008. It is even being considered for full membership in the NSG today. It is a startling dichotomy that the same nation that frequently supplies radioactive materials on the illicit market is also given elite status under the framework of global non-proliferation.

A closer look at independent evaluations of nuclear material security reveals the double standards. A reputable international organisation called the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) assigns rankings to nations according to their ability to safeguard nuclear materials that can be used to make weapons. India ranked 20th out of 25 nations in the 2023 Secure Materials Ranking, only a hair above North Korea and Iran. Pakistan, on the other hand, came in at number 19, continuing to hold a steady lead since 2020 and being named the “most improved” nation in 2020 for preventing theft.
The following chart illustrates this reality:

The international narrative that presents India as a safer nuclear power is at odds with this persistent performance disparity. It also draws attention to Pakistan’s notable advancements in border security, regulatory supervision, and legislative frameworks—developments that have not gotten enough international recognition.

When seen in a regional perspective, the discrepancy between perception and reality becomes much more concerning. One of the world’s most populous and unstable regions is still South Asia. The margin of error is dangerously small when there are nuclear-armed enemies nearby, long-standing rivalries, and continuous insurgencies. If used in a dirty bomb, even a small quantity of radioactive material that has been stolen might cause widespread disruption. Every unsecured gram of uranium or californium in such a setting poses a transnational hazard in addition to being a domestic failing.

The possibility that non-state actors would take advantage of these weaknesses is much more concerning. Cross-border smuggling is a feasible path for terrorist groups due to the open borders between India and its neighbors. These aren’t hypotheticals. These are real-time flashing red flags.

However, without calling for any structural changes, the international community keeps normalizing India’s place in world nuclear politics. This equates to the risk being dangerously normalised. It conveys the idea that geopolitical ties are more important than nuclear security. And in doing so, it damages the legitimacy of organisations such as the United Nations itself, the IAEA, and the NSG.

The nuclear black market in India is a threat to international security, which is not only a domestic problem. The international community, as well as India, must address its persistent violations, inadequate supervision, and lack of accountability. Diplomatic quiet and denial are no longer viable options.Repeated thefts from high-security sites like BARC raise questions about India’s nuclear control systems.

Repeated thefts from high-security sites like BARC raise questions about India’s nuclear control systems.

It’s obvious what has to be done. First, India’s nuclear regulatory framework needs to be changed right away. Complete independence from economic and political interference must be guaranteed to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). Second, by international standards, India ought to be obligated to notify the IAEA of any nuclear occurrences.

Third, under international supervision, a thorough evaluation of India’s nuclear infrastructure, particularly its unsafeguarded civilian facilities, should be carried out. Fourth, the law needs to be changed to make carelessness a crime and to hold people accountable for security lapses. Fifth, quantifiable advancements in nuclear governance should be a prerequisite for international civil nuclear cooperation with India.

The gravity of the situation cannot be overstated. The next theft might be far larger. The next buyer could be a non-state actor planning to detonate. The next headline might be disastrous. It’s time to address the blind spot. The world cannot afford a nuclear tragedy caused by inaction.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.