The recent episode of India-Pakistan military clash has changed the conventional wisdom attached to the South Asian intense regional security environment under the nuclear shadows. The existing literary debates developed by the leading strategic communities of the world have been underestimated with the involvement of two South Asian nuclear powers in a conventional war.

The deterring role of nuclear weapons in the region, aligning with the Cold War models, always advocated the conventional deterring patterns of nuclear weapons aimed at eliminating the probabilities of direct armed confrontation in the nuclear contestations of states. In the South Asian case, the arrival of nuclear weapons in the region made the direct military confrontation a less likely situation, parallel to creating the debates of stability-instability paradox in the South Asian context.

The post-1998 history of the South Asian crisis between two nuclear neighbours and the increasing intensities of their low-level conflicts proved that the existence of nuclear weapons has stabilised the region strategically

The post-1998 history of the South Asian crisis between two nuclear neighbours and the increasing intensities of their low-level conflicts proved that the existence of nuclear weapons has stabilised the region strategically by preventing the probabilities of conventional wars analogous to the pre-1998 period. So, the inception of nuclear weapons in the South Asian regional security apparatus witnessed the low-level military clashes of land and aerial forces corresponding with a brief layer of occasional border skirmishes.

The unexpected expansions between New Delhi and Islamabad reached unprecedented levels during the Kargil Conflict in 1999, the Pathankot-Uri Crisis in 2016, and the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis in 2019

This scenario provided legitimacy to the absence of a probable conventional war scenario between the pair of South Asian nuclear states, and a consistent growth of specific security threats of sub-conventional nature. The prevailing threats of military confrontations and the unexpected expansions between New Delhi and Islamabad reached unprecedented levels during the Kargil Conflict in 1999, the Pathankot-Uri Crisis in 2016, and the Pulwama-Balakot Crisis in 2019.

The situation turned worse with the rise of increasing formal allegations by New Delhi against Islamabad in the counterterror domain, where the two-sided leaders have mutually subscribed to the US-sponsored global terror-combating efforts, mainly designed by Washington in the post-9/11 scenario. Thus, India’s alleged blame on Pakistan in the counterterrorism domain became a vibrant trend of New Delhi’s mainstream defence planning, which could be measured through the incidents of the Indian Parliament attack in 2001 and the Mumbai Terror attack in 2008.

In response, the formal government authorities of Pakistan have confirmed the Indian covert involvement in creating an indigenous security problem in Pakistan’s provinces bordering Afghanistan and Iran. Additionally, the Indian opposition to Islamabad’s decision to accept China’s greater trading plans has resulted in New Delhi’s exclusive concentration on the unconventional naval developments.

New Delhi’s strategic manifestations in the maritime domain have compelled Pakistan to concentrate on the advancement of its defensive naval capabilities under the regional security compulsions

It drew the attention of Islamabad-based strategic community towards maritime politics, where the Chinese-supported port construction project is a primary Indian concern. It has raised serious apprehensions in New Delhi about Pakistan’s port construction, which, in Indian interpretations, is a potential security threat to its regional oceanic standing. Thus, New Delhi’s strategic manifestations in the maritime domain have compelled Pakistan to concentrate on the advancement of its defensive naval capabilities under the regional security compulsions.

Contrasting with the quarter-century history of South Asian nuclear politics and its consistent evolution on the Cold War’s political patterns, the recent episode of a brief military confrontation between two nuclear powers has challenged the main course of the world’s strategic learning based on the traditional conceptions of deterrence and strategic stability. Both conceptions’ application in the recent crisis of the South Asian nuclearised subcontinent marked certain upgrades in the conventional strategic wisdom.

The crisis originated from the tragic incident of Pahalgam, as formally condemned by Pakistan’s government, which led New Delhi towards the use of its regular armed forces under the Operation Sindoor. The operation’s concentration on the use of specific drones and missile strikes compelled Islamabad to launch a decisive retaliation, formed in Operation Bunyan al–Marsoos, and it forced Indian state officials to the ceasefire.

An overwhelming wave of multifaceted attacks in the cyber and information warfare domains supplemented this brief military clash. The suspension of decades-long water sharing agreement under the Indus Water Treaty, the targeting of critical infrastructure in the cyberspace, a broader operationalisation of multi-layered disinformation campaigns, the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and initiating trading pressures were exerted.

It proved that the Indian security establishment attempted to exhibit it as the operationalisation of its hybrid defence capabilities against a nuclear neighbour which have alarmed the entire international strategic community. In this way, the prevailing uncertainties during a brief military confrontation between two nuclear states demonstrated that the decades-long Cold War models of nuclear learning have started losing their logical relevance with the contemporary nature of hybrid warfare and its unquestionable integration with the states’ mainstream defence planning, like India.

A brief analytical survey of recent crisis under the nuclear shadows proved that the varying power dynamics of South Asia regional politics could not be studied entirely on the Cold War patterns

A brief analytical survey of recent crisis under the nuclear shadows proved that the varying power dynamics of South Asia regional politics could not be studied entirely on the Cold War patterns where the conventional notion of deterrence advocated the absence of conventional war between nuclear rivals. The over-reliance of South Asian regional nuclear politics on the Soviet-US Cold War politics, cementing their inflexible struggle to become dominant and influential in international world politics, has been revealed in the case of India-Pakistan’s strategic contest.

The South Asian regional politics is upset by India’s regionally dominating strategic aspirations, which Pakistan’s counterbalancing defensive potential has effectively constrained

The prevalent historical narrations suggest that the South Asian regional strategic and Cold War’s international strategic orientations could not be treated in an analogous context because the geographical features of both cases present distinct circumstances. The primary validation of the argument could be attained from the Cold War political models pertaining to nuclear learning of the two great powers for global dominance. In contrast, the South Asian regional dynamics restrict the strategic posturing of New Delhi and Islamabad within the region. The South Asian regional politics is upset by India’s regionally dominating strategic aspirations, which Pakistan’s counterbalancing defensive potential has effectively constrained.

The India-Pakistan territorial disagreements, shaped by certain geographical regional patterns, could be treated inversely because this regional conflict is mainly associated with the disputed and territorially adjoining areas of Kashmir. Geography shaped distinctive deterrence models in both cases, where the Moscow-Washington competition was separated by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, which reduced the risks of a strategic surprise originating from the conventional and unconventional domains. So, the transcontinental distances of the Cold War make the conventional deterrence models less relevant to the South Asian regional politics, where the two states have developed several formal incompatibilities on certain territorially adjoining areas.

The presence of nuclear weapons led the former Soviet and American state officials to avoid direct confrontation and greatly rely on the complex nature of proxy warfare on a global scale

The presence of nuclear weapons led the former Soviet and American state officials to avoid direct confrontation and greatly rely on the complex nature of proxy warfare on a global scale based on their contrasting ideological and strategic designs. It resulted in the conflicting supporting connections of both superpowers with various governments or rebel groups, whereas the South Asian models of proxy warfare were constrained by regional security compulsions and led the two nuclear powers to target each other directly, where New Delhi is taking the lead. Moreover, the scope of strategic stability during the Cold War was based on the strategic posturing of two superpowers, and their formal national security architectures were the primary actors; however, in the South Asian case, the regional scope of strategic stability heavily relies on the extra-regional powers such as the United States and China.

It is appropriate to maintain that the South Asian regional strategic experts are now required to adopt a pragmatic approach to comprehend the complex nature of the India-Pakistan conflict

Apart from witnessing the historical variations in the nuclear learning of the Cold War and South Asia politics, the recent India-Pakistan short military confrontation challenged the traditional framework of nuclear politics established by the decades-long strategic contention of the former Soviet Union and the United States.

Further verification of the argument could be attained from the post-2025 strategic posturing of New Delhi and Islamabad, which has become an inevitable demand now. The two-sided strategic communities have jumped into a new phase of strategic contestation beyond the Cold War models. In this way, it is appropriate to maintain that the South Asian regional strategic experts are now required to adopt a pragmatic approach to comprehend the complex nature of the India-Pakistan conflict, where the probability of a conventional war cannot be ruled out.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.