Under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, India’s strategic maneuvering over shared water resources represents a growing threat to Pakistan’s water security, signaling a shift toward the weaponization of water for geopolitical objectives. In this context, water has emerged as a potent tool of geopolitical leverage in South Asia. The famous sentence after Uri attack by Modi, “Blood and Water cannot flow together,” was just the start of an infamous “Water Weaponization Doctrine”.
Modi’s “Blood and Water cannot flow together” marked the start of India’s water weaponization doctrine.
There is an in-depth strategic interest hidden behind the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, this suspension barred India from sharing annual water flow data to Pakistan, and to sideline the attention on Controversial Projects, where some are ongoing projects and some projects are stopped due to Pakistan’s reservations. Following the controversial revocation of Article 370 in 2019 and the subsequent reorganization of Ladakh into a Union Territory, the Modi government announced the construction of eight new small hydropower projects on the Indus River, with a combined generation capacity of 144 MW.
Notably, several of these projects are Durbuk Shyok, Kargil Hunderman, Nimu Chilling, and Rangdo are planned near the Line of Control (LoC), a region of significant geopolitical sensitivity. There is no actual ambition of water utilization for energy purposes, but Modi’s ambition is to assert control over key rivers’ flows and enhance strategic readiness near the LOC. Currently, India utilizes 95% of its share water from eastern rivers, and now started new three projects; Shahpur Kandi, Ujh, and the second Sutlej-Beas link to utilize the remaining 5% of water that currently flows to Pakistan to bring it completely on the brink of drought, and in future to weaponize it by sudden water release in the form of floods.
Pakistan has criticized India for initiating water storage capacity projects that are not explicitly permitted under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). According to the treaty, India is allowed to utilize only 3.5 million acre-feet (MAF) of water from the western rivers for limited purposes, including irrigation, agriculture, and run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects. But contrarily, India is constructing water projects of storage capacity, which decrease the water flow to the downstream region of Pakistan. Such tactics reveal the true face of the Modi government’s approach, highlighting how water is being weaponized to pose strategic threats to Pakistan through the potential for artificial flooding, diversion of natural water flows, and the destabilization of the Indus River system.
India’s projects exceed Indus Waters Treaty limits, threatening Pakistan’s downstream flows.
Projects like Salal, Baglihar, Pakal Dul, and Kiru, which are located on the Chenab River, have drawn repeated criticism from Pakistan, which accuses India of weaponizing water. However, the Modi government continues to dismiss these concerns. A total of 34 hydropower projects have been announced on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers, 27 of which are strongly contested by Pakistan. These projects appear to exceed the water storage limits permitted under the Indus Waters Treaty.
Such actions violate the spirit of United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 6, which upholds access to water as a fundamental human right. Syed Jamat Ali Shah, Pakistan’s Commissioner for Indus Water, claims that a total of 43 million cubic meters of water flowing toward Pakistan will be blocked once these projects are started. Pakistan is already a water-stressed country where per capita water availability has dropped from 5000 cubic meters in 1947 to 1000 cubic meters in 2023.
Global institutions have failed to act impartially, as India often uses its influence to sway decisions against Pakistan in arbitration and legal forums. A few examples Baglihar and Kishanganga Hydro-electric projects. Blaming Pakistan for the Pahalgam terror attack without evidence appeared to be a strategic move, serving as a pretext for the Modi government’s long-standing intent to challenge the Indus Waters Treaty and advance its broader geopolitical agenda.
Pakistan’s water storage capacity is only 30 days compared to India’s 190.
Modi government’s double-tactics further push Pakistan on a double-front war. In March 2021, the Indian government signed a deal of 236 million dollars with the Afghan government for the construction of Shahtoot Dam on Maidan River, which is a tributary of Kabul River, and the recent diplomatic breakthrough between the Afghan and Indian governments reinvigorated such an idea.
There is an imminent threat that this development will decrease the 16 to 17% water flow to Pakistan. Reflecting his confrontational approach, Modi has also faced water disputes with Bangladesh over the Teesta River and with China on transboundary rivers.
The path ahead must focus on that the Pakistani government should also take steps to fruitfully utilize the Indus Water Treaty and increase its storage capacity. The dredging of Mangla and Tarbela reservoirs has reached their dead levels due to huge silting, and they need desilting and sediment removal to maximize their water storage capacity.
Climate change demands an urgent revision of the Indus Waters Treaty.
The need to tackle seepage from canals is very necessary, which accounts for losses up to 40%. New water storage infrastructures are very necessary as Pakistan has only the capacity to store water for 30 days, as compared to India, of 190 days. Most importantly, due to Climate Change and its outcome in rapid glacial melt, the revision of the Indus Water Treaty is necessary according to the needs of the time.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
