In the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan, a dangerous power shift is underway. ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) is growing stronger by exploiting the deepening divisions in the Taliban leadership, and if this new threat is not contained within the Afghan borders it will endanger Pakistan, its neighbors and possibly the international community.

As the one-time unified movement breaks down, ISIS-K has been able to seize the opportunity to increase its presence and capability within the area

The present crisis has been caused by an unprecedented intra-Taliban fight for power. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the powerful Haqqani Network and the  Afghanistan Interior Minister, has defied the authority of the Supreme Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. The Taliban power struggle is a battle between two different visions within the Taliban. The pragmatic Haqqani network has supported the limited intervention by the international community whereas the hardline Kandahari faction of Hibatullah, who refuses to compromise on matters concerning women issues, including education has banned even the secondary education for girls. Thus, as the one-time unified movement breaks down, ISIS-K has been able to seize the opportunity to increase its presence and capability within the area.

The Afghan Taliban government is falling apart. The Haqqani Network, which has been the Taliban’s most effective fighting force, seems to be moving away from the central leadership. It is clear after the December 11, 2024 suicide bombing that resulted in killing of Khalil ur Rahman Haqqani, Sirajuddin’s uncle and a prominent Taliban figure_ a killing that was claimed by ISIS-K.

The ISIS-K group has increased from 4,000 fighters in 2021 to over 6,000 by mid-2024, with assistance of prison breaks and defections from other militant organizations

Rumors of Sirajuddin Haqqani’s resignation as Interior Minister were more credible when he left the country for a 50-day trip to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Haqqani network has held the portfolio of Interior Ministry since the Taliban’s 2021 comeback. It developed a different approach from the Kandahari group on how the state should be governed as well as its ideological moorings. This discord  has been responded to by ISIS-K with remarkable effectiveness. The ISIS-K group has increased from 4,000 fighters in 2021 to over 6,000 by mid-2024, with assistance of prison breaks and defections from other militant organizations.

The resurgence of ISIS-K was facilitated by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan on August  15, 2021, a pivotal moment in the modern history of the region. When the Taliban entered  Kabul and President Ashraf Ghani fled to the UAE, Bagram Airbase’s prison was opened  and 5,000 high value detainees were released, including numerous ISIS-K operatives like Abdul Rahman al-Loghari. The last thing anyone expected was that al-Loghari would strike twelve days later and kill 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghan civilians by bombing Kabul Airport. Sharifullah, who was seized by Pakistani authorities in 2025 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022) assisted in planning this attack with  the help of an operative named Sharifullah.

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has regained momentum following the Afghan Taliban’s return to power

Pakistan is now facing terror attacks from three militant groups. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has regained momentum following the Afghan Taliban’s return to power. It has launched more than 700 attacks in 2023 alone with more than 900 casualties — a 70 percent rise as compared to 2022. TTP, along with the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and ISIS-K, have continued to team up to launch attacks on Pakistani security forces and infrastructure, in what has been dubbed a summer offensive by them.

Historical connections between these groups are deep. TTP commander Hafiz Saeed Khan, hails from Orakzai district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and had once raised fighters to deploy in Iraq and received $800 per recruit. This operation enhanced the relationship between the TTP and what was to later become ISIS-K, before Khan was killed in a 2016 drone strike. The arrest of Sharifullah, the militant linked to the Kabul Airport attack, who was subsequently transferred to U.S. custody in 2025, suggests a possible renewal of Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation. Earlier, these two countries worked together to fight against TTP leadership.

Security analysts have pointed out that another large-scale counterterrorism operation may be required – one that is similar in scale to  2014’s Operation Zarb-e-Azab

Nek Muhammad was killed in 2004, Baitullah  Mehsud in 2008, Hakimullah Mehsud in 2013, and Mullah  Fazlullah in 2018.This cooperation was reduced in 2018 and the current TTP leaders Noor Wali Mehsud and Hafiz Gul Bahadur are relatively safe. It remains uncertain however, if Sharifullah’s shift is a revival of this  strategic partnership, or if Pakistan will have to deal with these threats on its own. Security analysts have pointed out that another large-scale counterterrorism operation may be required – one that is similar in scale to  2014’s Operation Zarb-e-Azab, although the new operation is likely to depend more on drone technology and satellite intelligence, than on mass deployments of troops.

ISIS-K’s leadership has a clear vision for the group that goes beyond regional borders. The leader of ISIS-K, Shahab al-Muhajir, a former trader from Kabul, has planned several international terrorist attacks including the January 2024 attack in Iran which killed 91 people  and the March 2024 attack on the Moscow theater that left 137 people dead.

Despite these countries having ISIS-K as their common enemy, the creation of a unified  U.S.-Taliban-Iran-China-Pakistan alliance against the group is unlikely as all these countries have their own geopolitical interests to look after

Operating mainly in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area near Kandahar and Balochistan, Al-Muhajir has also provided support to other extremist organizations, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) which is a big concern for China.  Despite these countries having ISIS-K as their common enemy, the creation of a unified  U.S.-Taliban-Iran-China-Pakistan alliance against the group is unlikely as all these countries have their own geopolitical interests to look after.

From a critical Security Studies  approach, ISIS-Khorasan’s rise is an example of how power vacuums, which  have been created by the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban infighting, enhance the resilience of  radical non-state actors.  Scholars such as David Lake state that fragility  offers  ‘opportunity structures’ for insurgent groups, a dynamic that is obviously visible in the   post-2021 Afghanistan context. The UN Security Council has pointed out that ISIS-K  has increased its strength by not only tactical opportunism but also by strategic exploitation of ideological fractures within the Taliban.

The Haqqani-Kandahari fracture, which is over the very essence of  what kind of country these  people should build, is a case of factionalism and the process of  fractionation and weakening of centralized authority as it happened during the Soviet Afghan war. This means that ISIS-K is not so much a product of its own unity as of  its ability to  capitalize on the fractures of its opponents.

The group’s attacks in Russia and Iran demonstrates  a network of extremism that can’t be  contained conventionally, as do ideas like Mark  Juergens Meyer’s theory of  “cosmic war” – global jihad unbound by geographical constraints. This presents a hybrid threat for Pakistan, which has experienced hundreds  of TTP attacks  every year and where local grievances are combined and expanded with ISIS-K’s  universalist ideology.

The inability to create a universal international coalition against ISIS-K is the result of geopolitical  mistrust. This duality of local forces exploiting political chaos and a global spread of terrorism – is  an example of ISIS-K embodying the new face of extremism in the 21st century. The source of ISIS-K can  be set as far back as 2013 when Al-Qaeda in Iraq started to recruit fighters from the  Afghanistan/Pakistan region and offered $800 per month, which was four times more than the 200$ Taliban offered. Hafiz Saeed Khan as a commander  was recruited in this manner. By 2015, Khan had created ISIS-K, after parting with the TTP because he accused it of being narrow-minded and of having  ties with the US through Pakistan.

Unlike the Taliban’s localized jihad, ISIS-K fights for the creation of a Global Caliphate, which it justifies using  the historical term ‘Khorasan’

Unlike the Taliban’s localized jihad, ISIS-K fights for the creation of a Global Caliphate, which it justifies using  the historical term ‘Khorasan’. The difference between the two groups is in the level of extremism where ISIS-K is more extreme  than the Taliban due to the latter having some moderate tendencies because of the Sufi influence. This is not the case with ISIS-K whose Salafi ideology makes it acceptable for it to attack anyone it associates with the Deobandi ideology.

The Taliban fragmentation, with the Haqqani faction still linked to Pakistan, the Kandahari faction linking up with the TTP and the BLA. ISIS-K subsequently taking advantage of the resulting chaos. Pakistan  may be helped by the return of support from the United States and the Haqqani Network, but  the Taliban’s role as a strategic depth for Pakistani interests may turn out to be counterproductive.

It  is a very complex and volatile situation and quite impossible to predict, but there is one thing that is clear: the continuing rise of ISIS-K is a threat to regional and global security, and only a coordinated international response can defeat this growing threat. In this brutal Game of Thrones, ISIS-Khorasan has the bloodiest approach and unless the world unites, this carnage will continue.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.