In the wars of tomorrow, the most dangerous weapons will be neither bombs nor bullets, but data and DNA. The intersection of the biological and cyber worlds is becoming a defining issue of the twenty-first century as challenges to global security move beyond traditional conflict. Although cyberattacks and biological weapons have always been viewed as separate threats, their combination is now posing complicated, covert, and frequently international threats that conflate the domains of national defence, digital infrastructure, and public health.

The actual threat is where bandwidth meets biology.

Pakistan is at a key juncture in this changing environment. The nation has continuously promoted the peaceful application of biotechnology and is still dedicated to international non-proliferation standards as a responsible actor in international security.

However, the potential for infections to be weaponised, enhanced by cyber technologies, needs new levels of integration, readiness, and foresight. These show how urgent it is to make sensible adjustments in the face of hybrid dangers, not how vulnerable we are.

Biological weapons are not a novel threat. The potential for accessibility, scale, and amplification made possible by digital tools and synthetic biology is novel. Using inexpensive genetic editing techniques to produce or modify viruses in small-scale labs is becoming more and more possible. The World Economic Forum claims that throughout the past 20 years, the cost of genome sequencing has decreased by more than 99%, creating opportunities for both innovation and abuse.

The capacity to employ synthetic biology to rebuild viruses, alter their transmissibility, or create new strains is a worrying development that is currently outside the purview of government labs. Even if these technologies have a lot of positive applications, such as the creation of vaccines and the elimination of diseases, they also give bad actors the ability to collaborate with harmful agents without the need for state-level resources.

Pakistan has shown that it understands this difficulty and is working to increase its capability. It has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and frequently presents the UN with measures aimed at fostering confidence. Pakistan has distinguished itself from a number of larger powers that have opposed such control by maintaining an official stance in favour of a legally mandated verification methodology. This indicates more than just compliance; it shows a proactive approach to biosecurity governance.

Bio threats pose risks to more than just human health. In the UK, the Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in 2001 led to the killing of more than 6 million animals and caused losses of more than £8 billion. Importantly, although FMD poses no threat to people, it is a great choice for biological sabotage due to its contagious nature and financial implications.

In an era of invisible threats, readiness is a strategic necessity.

An agro-terrorism incident might have catastrophic economic effects in Pakistan, as agriculture employs around 38% of the workforce and contributes more than 19% of GDP (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2024).

The actual threat is where bandwidth meets biology. For days, a biological agent that is softly released into a community could remain undiscovered. But in conjunction with a cyberattack that targets communication networks, public health databases, or hospital systems, the reaction may be severely weakened, surveillance may be deceived, and public anxiety may increase.

This situation isn’t hypothetical. More than 200,000 systems across 150 countries, including numerous healthcare facilities in the UK, were rendered inoperable by the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017. Despite not being a biological occurrence, it demonstrated the vulnerability and interdependence of health systems in a cyber environment.

Pakistan has recognised these digital problems and has implemented many capacity-building initiatives through the National Cyber Security Policy 2021, as well as the establishment of the National CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) inside the Ministry of IT. But biological and cyber security continue to be separated, which is a problem that many states face. The “bio-cyber fusion” approach, which treats cyber infrastructure and health security as intertwined cornerstones of national defence, is necessary for the future.

Pakistan provides a pertinent example of resilience under duress in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC), which was swiftly built by the government, is now a widely acknowledged platform for public communication, resource distribution, and real-time data coordination. Pakistan has received praise from international organisations such as the WHO and UNDP for its effective vaccination distribution, contact tracing, and digital integration.

This ability to respond to emergencies in a coordinated manner can be expanded to include possible biological phenomena. The scope needs to be expanded from pandemics to deliberate biological occurrences, and from public health alone to multi-sector resilience. This is not a reinvention.

An external player may not always be as threatening as a skilled worker who has access to infrastructure, data, or sensitive items. An insider was thought to have exploited official access to send lethal spores through the mail during the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, killing five people and igniting widespread terror. There are numerous bioscience facilities in Pakistan, such as public health organizations, vaccination labs, and academic research centers.

Most follow safety and ethical standards, but there is a gap because there isn’t a national framework for evaluating suitability, such as the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) used by the FBI in the United States. But this is a problem that can be resolved. Without limiting scientific research, it would be simple to implement a centralised biosecurity registry, regular staff assessments, and safe data handling procedures.

Pakistan has consistently advocated for global methods to biological non-proliferation rather than acting alone. The nation has participated in cooperative simulation exercises with regional partners under the SCO framework and is an active member of the OIC Standing Committee on Science and Technology.

Pakistan also has the scientific foundation to make a worldwide contribution. Organisations such as the National Institute of Health (NIH) are conducting advanced studies in immunology, disease modelling, and molecular biology. These could develop into local knowledge bases for reaction and early-warning systems.

Integrating these technologies into a larger global biosecurity network is urgently needed, where danger attribution, disease reporting, and digital surveillance are communicated in real time across country boundaries. Pakistan can be a vital link between the frameworks for bio-cyber security in the Global North and the Global South because to its advantageous position and responsible stance.

Pakistan can bridge Global North and South in bio-cyber security frameworks.

To be resilient against cyber-biological threats, three changes must occur simultaneously: a shift in policy that prioritizes bio-cyber threats as national security issues; an institutional change that unifies intelligence, digital, and health systems; and a cultural shift that encourages scientific responsibility at all societal levels.

Perhaps the future wars will never be proclaimed. A tampered genome, a tainted health database, or a covert intrusion into digital infrastructure may be the first. This makes being ready a strategic necessity rather than just a protective one.

Pakistan has a strong foundation to handle this problem because of its responsible international behaviour, quick learning during the pandemic, and expanding institutional capability. In an era of invisible threats, Pakistan may set an example of responsible preparedness by combining cyber defence, biosurveillance, and international cooperation. By doing so, it will not only safeguard itself but also significantly contribute to global stability.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.