South Asia’s nuclear journey started in 1974 when India conducted its first atomic test, code-named “Smiling Buddha.” Though India called this test a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), in reality, it marked the beginning of the nuclearization of South Asia. Pakistan, feeling vulnerable and threatened by India’s growing military capabilities, initially put forwarded various proposals, including a nuclear-free zone for South Asia, to keep nuclear weapons away from the region but India’s persistent refusal convinced policy makers in Pakistan to follow India’s path.
“Smiling Buddha” in 1974 began the nuclearization of South Asia, prompting Pakistan’s eventual nuclear response in 1998.
Pakistan successfully conducted nuclear weapon test in 1998 when India, yet again, demonstrated its nuclear capability in the same year. Pakistan’s nuclear test was the direct response to India’s nuclear tests. These tests established both, India and Pakistan, as nuclear weapons states and brought the region into a new era of nuclear deterrence.
Pakistan had previously advocated for declaring South Asia a nuclear weapon-free zone, but India’s nuclear test created a security environment that prompted Pakistan to reconsider its position. Pakistan presented a framework to denuclearize the region at the 16th annual United Nations Atomic Energy Conference session. However, India rejected Pakistan’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation proposals twice in 1970s.
Similarly in 1988 Pakistan also proposed a bilateral treaty banning the nuclear test and also in 1994 proposed the South Asia zero-missile zone. Unfortunately India refused to engage Pakistan meaningfully on all proposals. Even great powers did not take this issue seriously, yet Pakistan exercised restraint for nearly three decades, seeking a peaceful path toward a nuclear-free South Asia. Despite Pakistan’s several efforts, when International community didn’t share the same sentiment, Pakistan had no other option to ensure its security by conducting its own nuclear tests.
India and Pakistan have distinct Nuclear doctrines that shape their strategic posture. India’s declared nuclear doctrine emphasizes “No First Use” (NFU) and “Credible Minimum Deterrence” (CMD). However, the NFU is attached with lots of strings. Though NFU policy asserts that India will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation to a nuclear attack, however, there are certain conditions in which India’s NFU policy turns to First use. India will use nuclear weapons first in retaliation against Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons.
Furthermore, the doctrine does not specifically describe what constitutes a credible minimum deterrent, allowing for interpretation and potential expansion of the nuclear arsenal. Such ambiguities introduce a degree of strategic uncertainty, which can complicate assessment by potential adversaries and inadvertently raise the risk of miscalculation.
Pakistan proposed a nuclear-free South Asia several times, only to be rebuffed by India.
Pakistan follows a policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). Islamabad recently shifted to what it called a Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) strategy in order to respond India’s doctrinal as well as technological advancements. In conventional domain, India follows provocative “Cold Start Doctrine” which calls for a swift military response against Pakistan under the nuclear overhang. It suggests that India is exploring space for conventional war against Pakistan without escalating to a nuclear war.
India is fast developing its nuclear arsenal and its nuclear modernization program designed to bolster its deterrence posture and ensure a credible second strike capability. The development of modern nuclear weapons, including diversified delivery systems, and maritime nuclear developments particularly, the commissioning of the India’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant have further eroded delicate regional security dynamics. Furthermore, India possessed a sophisticated, two-tiered ballistic missile defense (BMD) system which is capable of intercepting incoming potential threats. Specially the Modi government’s priority to building up the India’s military industrial complex signals the uprising of arms race in South Asia.
With its conventional military developments as well as nuclear modernization, India wants to establish a new-normal along LOC and international boundary. It blames Pakistan for every terror activity in Indian occupied Kashmir but ironically, so far, India hasn’t provided any evidence to support its claims. In fact, India’s reckless behavior along the LOC is concerning given the volatility of the region towards military adventurism. Pakistan, indeed, has right to defend itself against Indian provocations along LOC and international boundary.
Major powers, particularly the United States and China, need to play a crucial role in the nuclear landscape of South Asia. The US has adopted a dual-track approach: while facilitating India’s access to civilian nuclear technology through the controversial 2008 nuclear agreement, despite India’s status outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has imposed restrictions on Pakistan’s missile and nuclear development. US has been offering India access to the cutting edge defense technologies. These developments have exacerbate Pakistan’s perceptions of strategic imbalance and led to a deepening of ties with China. China has emerged as a principal supplier of advanced military technology and weaponry to Pakistan, enabling it to sustain a credible deterrent against India.
India’s Cold Start and BMD developments challenge regional deterrence, prompting Pakistan’s shift to Full-Spectrum Deterrence.
The recent Indo-Pak crisis is a wake-up call for international stakeholders. The Trump administration has so-far played a crucial role in diffusing tensions in the region, but India’s refusal to accept President Trump’s mediation offer must wake-up policy makers in Washington DC. It is India that continuously oppose foreign intervention. Pakistan needs to highlight India’s aggressive behavior which is the biggest hurdle in any kind of meaningful bilateral engagement. Policy makers in New Delhi must realize that India’s new-approach of aggression is not only counter-productive but also degrading its relations with other regional actors, thus leading to Isolation of India in the region.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
