In the complicated political landscape of South Asia, the Bay of Bengal has become more than just a body of water; it has become a symbol of changing power dynamics.  A subtle but strong fear in New Delhi’s strategic circles is at the heart of this change. This fear is based on Bangladesh’s rapid economic growth and increasing geopolitical power.  This is most obvious in India’s push to change regional connectivity through the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project (KMMTTP) and related highway networks. These are being called “regional integration,” but they also seem to be part of a quiet race to get around Bangladesh altogether.

Bangladesh is no longer the backwater that India thought it was.

The main goal of the Kaladan project is to connect the Indian state of Mizoram to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar. This will give people in Mizoram a way to get to the Bay of Bengal that isn’t the crowded and dangerous Siliguri Corridor (also known as the Chicken’s Neck).  India wants to cut down on its reliance on Bangladesh for connections by linking Kolkata Port to Myanmar’s Sittwe Port by sea. From there, it will connect to India’s northeast by land and waterways.  This looks like a smart way to spread out your investments.  But there is a deeper geopolitical game going on behind the strategic subtext.

Nobel Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, who is also the temporary moral voice for Bangladesh’s global image, has said that Bangladesh is the “guardian of the Bay of Bengal.”  It is a statement that shows how confident Dhaka has become.  Bangladesh is no longer the backwater that India thought it was. It has one of the fastest GDP growth rates in Asia, beats India on several human development indicators, and is becoming a global manufacturing hub, especially in the garment industry.

But New Delhi has seen this rise.  The Indian foreign policy establishment, which has long been the uncontested leader in South Asia, is now in uncharted territory.  Bangladesh’s growing ties with China, which has spent billions on its ports and infrastructure, have made India’s regional calculations even more urgent.  When you look at it this way, the Kaladan project seems less like a smart business move and more like a way to avoid dealing with other countries.

India no longer sees Dhaka as a safe way to achieve its geostrategic goals.

The timing of this strategy change is what makes it so interesting.  The Kaladan project had been stuck for years because of problems with the government and problems with getting things done.  But in the last few months, India has brought the project back to life with great haste. They are even speeding up road building in Myanmar’s dangerous terrain, despite local insurgencies and logistical problems.  At the same time, India has put trade restrictions on about 42% of commodities coming from Bangladesh. Analysts see this as a way for India to show that it is angry about the situation.

These things are not happening in a vacuum.  Scholars call this the “politics of regional hegemony,” and it helps to put them in a bigger picture.  As a regional power, India has always tried to keep a concentric model of influence in South Asia, where its neighbors revolve around its strategic center of gravity.  But Bangladesh is progressively breaking free from that orbit.

There is also a political side to this.  The northeastern states of India, which have long been seen as neglected and cut off from the rest of the country, are now very important to the central government’s Act East Policy.  New Delhi can use projects like Kaladan to show that the country is coming together and the region is doing better by not going via Bangladesh.  But this kind of bypassing also sends a message: India no longer sees Dhaka as a safe way to achieve its geostrategic goals.

This strategic distance is not helpful.  In the last few years, Bangladesh has given India generous transit access, help with sharing water, and help with fighting terrorism.  But instead of strengthening these diplomatic ties, India’s growing ties with Myanmar, a country in political crisis and military control, show that it would rather deal with uncertainty than depend on others.  This could be India’s biggest mistake.

This small-minded regionalism is not what a country that often calls itself a ‘Vishwaguru’ should do.

The message is obvious for Bangladesh.  India’s worries are both a problem and an opportunity.  The problem is dealing with a neighbor whose relationship with you is becoming more transactional, even if they used to talk about how they shared history and culture.  But the chance is there to make its strategic importance clearer.

Bangladesh is at a geopolitical crossroads right now.  China wants to be friends with it, the West respects its development model, and it is strategically important to both India and ASEAN.  The country controls not only how close it is to the Bay of Bengal, but also how the political and economic stories about it are told more and more.  Bangladesh is not only reacting to strategic currents; it is helping to shape them. The blue economy, maritime security, and port access are becoming important determinants in regional geopolitics.

To keep its influence and stability in the area, India needs to change how it does things.  Instead of constructing around Bangladesh, it should build alongside it.  You can’t accomplish regionalism by leaving people out, after all.  The Kaladan project should not replace India’s land and rail links with Bangladesh; instead, it should add to them.  Also, putting up trade barriers just makes Bangladesh more willing to look to the east and west, which makes it less dependent on India economically and more diverse diplomatically.

India seems to be playing geopolitics like a zero-sum game, but it’s not.  The concentration on circumvention shows more concern than planning—it’s a response to Bangladesh’s development, not a way to work with it in a positive way.  This small-minded regionalism is not what a country that often calls itself a “Vishwaguru” or global mentor should do.

You can’t accomplish regionalism by leaving people out.

India’s shift in infrastructure away from Bangladesh is more than just preparing ahead; it shows that India is more worried about Dhaka’s growing confidence.  But framing Bangladesh’s ascent as a threat to security is short-sighted and won’t help.  This kind of thinking goes against the common goals that have historically defined cooperation in the region.  If India keeps seeing a strategic partner as a strategic problem, it could cut itself off from the area it wants to lead.  The only way to make the Bay of Bengal genuinely connected is via constructive interaction, not frightened avoidance.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.