According to India’s military and political establishment, Operation Sindoor was a strategic inflection point in Indian deterrence policy. According to the proponents of this model, supported by the Indian strategic community, it is largely perceived that the Indian Integrated Deterrence, as a combination of military force, diplomatic, economic, and information warfare, would serve to prevent Pakistan’s use of sub-conventional aggression or aid of non-state actors. This is wrongly misjudged and misperceived. Yet, this story is convenient to miss many historical and present realities, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, this story contravenes international law and destabilizes the region and encourages state-sponsored terrorism in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan.

Operation Sindoor’s integrated deterrence failed to curb cross-border terrorism, escalating regional instability.

Integrated deterrence applied by India in Operation Sindoor has failed to curb the so-called cross-border terrorism; it has led to a rise in tensions in the region. The idea that calibrated aggression would deter Pakistan presupposes a simple, one-sided perspective on deterrence, which fails to take into consideration Pakistan’s ever-changing posture and strong response capabilities.

One of the foundations of India and its integrated deterrence is its reputed informational superiority, which is defined not by the actual information advantage but by narrative power. It has always used global media outlets to define the discourse of the events and subdue legitimate counter-discourse. Worst of all, is the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav, who is a serving officer of the Indian Navy, arrested in Balochistan in the year 2016 as he carried out his espionage and sabotage missions on behalf of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The denial of the presence of its intelligence officer in an operation on Pakistani territory reduces the moral credit of India and supports the claims by Pakistan that India sponsors terrorism in Pakistan.

On the same note, India has kept spreading unfounded allegations and information about the terror attacks in Pakistan without presenting verifiable information. Such a strategy of disinformation negates the integrity of its diplomatic activity and weakens trust in the region. Besides, the fact that India secretly sponsors terrorism in Balochistan.

Furthermore, Economic coercion as a form of so-called integrated deterrence through efforts to control the Indus Waters Treaty amounts to a blatant violation of international law as well. The Treaty of 1960 by the World Bank has survived the test of time, including the wars, and this is largely because water is not a weapon, but a common human commodity.  India is not only weaponizing a humanitarian resource but also creating the threat of an ecological and humanitarian disaster in the region by threatening to block water flows or speed up the hydroelectric projects against the will of Pakistan.

India’s narrative power often suppresses legitimate Pakistani perspectives and denies espionage activities like Kulbhushan Jadhav’s arrest.

A full spectrum deterrence within the ambit of credible minimum deterrence-based nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is an anchor of stability in the region. There have been provocations and provocative identification of doctrines, like India has on its part a doctrine referred to as the so-called Cold Start, yet Pakistan has so far shown restraint and strengthened deterrence through sound management of the nuclear arsenal.

On the other hand, India is developing its missile and nuclear program as fast as possible, with the intention of creating MIRV-capable missiles and the possibility of implementing hypersonic platforms. This change leads to significant concerns among security experts around the world. Without the credibility of a No First Use (NFU) policy, which has been pointed out by the observers at the Stimson Center to be more of a problem in India, specifically since under this policy, after the recent inflammatory political rhetoric, India has opened up a strategically ambiguous space and brought the possibility of instability as well.

Misconceived and hazardous is the thought that India can be capable of dealing with and control escalation, with regard to the nuclear overhang. The history and strategic logic indicate that in such a contentious region as South Asia, it is less of a promise than what one can say about escalation control. In a nuclearized climate, there are major dangers of miscalculation and accidental escalation that accompany limited war strategies, particularly those that entail cross-border incursions.

Furthermore, the idea of the “conditional clarity,” which is advertised by the Indian strategists, cannot give much confidence. It only passes the buck to Pakistan and empties the question of responsibility and diligence of the domestic fringe players within India, and the upcoming craze of Hindutva-induced home-grown terrorism, like mob lynchings, persecution of minorities, that may cause the next crisis.

The reality is that the concept of integrated deterrence pursued by India has less to do with fighting terrorism and more of coercing Pakistan by multi-domain pressure methods. Instead of bringing stability to the region, this doctrine is bringing greater volumes of instability to an already weakened regional environment. Far-fetched unilateralist position, abnegation of international law, financing proxy rebels in Balochistan and KP, and furthermore, the mismanagement of essential agreements all demonstrate a forceful, not a defensive, policy course.

Weaponizing the Indus Waters Treaty as economic coercion violates international law and risks humanitarian disaster.

The only next step out of this is a credible dialogue, mutual threat reduction, and rejuvenation of the diplomatic regimes like the Composite Dialogue Process, albeit the ultimate objective of peace and deterrence is really at the heart of the relationship. On numerous occasions, Pakistan has demanded meaningful encounters on the principle of sovereign equality and respect.

India has had a long illusion that the means of deterrence is domination in case something is in earnest to achieve the objective of peace. The real deterrence is a two-way net, and it is only sustainable when both sides realize that they should not only satisfy themselves that their security is taken care of but also agree to settle any differences through diplomacy, not through the diplomacy of violence.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.