The rise of China and the resurgence of great power competition has created a new strategic environment where, unlike the Cold War era where rigid alliances prevailed, post-Cold War politics has opened more inclusive relations where partnerships took precedence over alliances. Marked by historical neglect and resource-rich trajectory, the countries of Global South – mainly located in economically less developed and historically marginalized Latin America, Africa, Oceania and Asia – are now getting greater attention. Major powers are now rushing to these nations to widen their sphere of influence and global presence. India, a relatively new competitor in the race, intends to expand its global presence while engaging with Global South as a part of its grand strategy to wield more influence across the developing regions to strengthen its diplomatic bargain for demanding more say in international affairs. This marks a pivotal moment in New Delhi’s aspirations for a greater role on the global stage.

India’s engagement with Global South is significantly increasing. Under the presidency of India, New Delhi convened and hosted three Voice for Global South Summits (VGSS) and assured 125 attending countries that their profound challenges will be made central to G20 summits. New Delhi has introduced several initiatives for Global South ranging from solar alliances to South-South Trade, from the formation of BRICS to convening VGSS, and from pharmaceuticals and vaccine sharing to infrastructure development.

Particularly with Africa, New Delhi declares it “India’s top priority”. It is widely believed that due to Indian lobbying, the African Union was included as a full member of G20.

It has unveiled a new conceptual framework for South-South engagement by the name of ‘Development Compact’ where it intends to offer an alternative path of development primarily focusing on technology sharing, capacity building, trade for development, grants and concessional finance. India is also among the countries offering quota-free and duty-free access to least developed countries to its markets.

Particularly with Africa, New Delhi declares it “India’s top priority”. It is widely believed that due to Indian lobbying, the African Union was included as a full member of G20 in September 2023. The India-Africa trade volume has grown 18 percent annually since 2003, reaching the benchmark of $103 in 2023. India’s engagement with Central American countries has also gained much attention. The policy community in New Delhi believes that it has long ignored and neglected this region. They also strongly believe that to emerge as a global power, India has to exhibit an international presence in such regions. In the past two years, Jai Shankar has visited eight Latin American countries, marking a burst of Indian diplomatic activities in the region.

Arguably, India’s engagement with developing countries is part of its broader grand strategy primarily set to achieve three strategic objectives. First. New Delhi aims to play a more influential role in the emerging multilateral order. Through such partnerships, New Delhi aims to increase its say in global institutions. India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar vocally speaks that New Delhi’s engagement with GS can strengthen its position in international governance and multilateral institutions, and it could also help it forge new strategic alliances with powerful nations like the US and Europe.

New Delhi sees the Global South as a massive export market that will help it consolidate its “Made in India” initiative.

Second, India also aspires to replace China in the Global South. Beijing is said to be the legitimate leader of the developing world, as legitimated by the Bandung Conference in 1955 and later by its efforts to transform the Global South through investment in the context of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India since then, has tried to be prominent through Non-Aligned Movement. Presently, in the ongoing power transition from the Western Hemisphere to the Eastern, India aims to balance the influence of China in the Global South. India criticizes China for promoting projects that do not meet international quality and transparency standards and propagates to offer more fair practices in political and economic relations.

Third, New Delhi sees the Global South as a massive export market that will help it consolidate its “Made in India” initiative. The resource-rich nations of the developing world not only boost exports of India but also supply resources that help develop indigenous industry. In 2022 alone, India imported 1.672 billion barrels of oil and 29.116 billion cubic meters of natural gas, while exporting $10.3 billion worth of telecom equipment and $18 billion worth of pharmaceuticals to the Global South.

Finally, India’s engagement with the Global South is in its infancy stage and is dwarfed by China’s substantial investments. Its financial constraints, inefficient bureaucracy and slow-moving government will definitely hinder its aspirations. So far, the US has supported India’s endeavors in the Global South as counter-balancing strategy to outweigh China’s influence which it has established through historical ties and massive investments through BRI. However, India will not serve the American interests as expected and would demand strategic autonomy. The US must realize that the ongoing tug of war in the Global South is not bilateral but trilateral. India will pursue its own ambitions that is to leverage American support to oust China and compete with the US where possible.