India’s rising influence in South Asia is increasingly marked by a troubling pattern: the manipulation of historical treaties, the strategic revival of dormant disputes, and the politicization of border and water conflicts to assert regional dominance. From the high Himalayas to the Indian Ocean, New Delhi’s conduct reflects an approach rooted less in cooperative regionalism and more in coercive diplomacy. The revival of the Katchatheevu Island dispute with Sri Lanka is only the latest example of how domestic politics and nationalist narratives are weaponized to serve a larger expansionist ambition.

India’s revival of the Katchatheevu dispute is rooted in electoral politics, not legal grievance.

The Katchatheevu issue, previously settled through the 1974 Indo-Sri Lanka Maritime Agreement, has been rekindled by Indian political parties, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Chief Minister M.K. Stalin’s DMK, facing electoral pressures, has made populist appeals to revoke the agreement, even as fringe elements push the dangerous idea of a separate Tamil nation.

Though the ruling BJP officially distances itself from separatist rhetoric, it tactically supports nationalist sentiment, thereby stoking tensions. Prime Minister Modi’s recent defense pact with Colombo, which was interpreted as a betrayal by Tamil political forces, further inflamed the matter. Yet what these narratives overlook is a key legal reality: Indian fishermen have routinely violated the maritime boundary established by the 1974 and 1976 agreements, entering Sri Lankan waters with impunity and triggering naval confrontations. This is not an isolated grievance but part of a wider regional pattern.

India’s aggressive behavior extends across its borders. In Nepal, the construction of a road through the disputed Lipulekh region, unilaterally undertaken by India, sparked a diplomatic crisis. Kathmandu, asserting its sovereignty, released a new political map claiming the territory. India refused bilateral negotiations, opting instead to assert its claim through military and cartographic means. This unilateralism undermines bilateral diplomacy and erodes trust in India’s intentions.

In Bangladesh, a long-standing impasse over the Teesta River water-sharing agreement continues to strain bilateral ties. Dhaka has repeatedly called for equitable water distribution, especially during dry seasons, but New Delhi has stalled the deal for years. Simultaneously, border tensions persist as India’s Border Security Force (BSF) has been repeatedly accused of using lethal force against unarmed Bangladeshi civilians. These actions signal a disregard for neighborly restraint and suggest that water and security are tools in India’s strategic arsenal.

New Delhi turns water into a geopolitical weapon, delaying deals and violating treaties.

To the north, India’s militarization of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China has contributed to repeated clashes, including the deadly Galwan Valley incident in 2020. While India presents itself as a victim of Chinese aggression, it has engaged in aggressive posturing in contested territories like Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Compounding this is India’s opacity regarding its dam projects on the Brahmaputra River, which have direct implications for downstream flows into China. Lack of transparency only heightens mistrust in a region already brimming with volatility.

India’s relationship with Pakistan is perhaps the most emblematic of its regional strategy. Hydropower projects on the Kishanganga and Ratle rivers, both in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty, have raised serious concerns in Islamabad over water security. Rather than seeking resolution through neutral arbitration, as outlined in the Treaty, India has blocked mechanisms for third-party adjudication, effectively rendering a legally binding agreement ineffectual. Water is not just a resource; it is being turned into a geopolitical weapon.

In Bhutan and the Maldives, India’s coercive tendencies manifest in different forms. Bhutan has seen a flood of Indian investment in hydropower, which, while beneficial economically, also creates deep dependency. Questions about policy autonomy and debt sustainability are becoming more prominent in Thimphu.

Meanwhile, the Maldives has witnessed mass protests over India’s military presence, with citizens demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops stationed under the guise of strategic cooperation. Far from fostering security, India’s presence has been interpreted as a form of occupation by many Maldivians.

India’s military presence in the Maldives is seen locally as an occupation, not cooperation.

Across the board, India’s regional behavior suggests a desire not merely to lead, but to dominate. Whether it is through reviving settled disputes like Katchatheevu, militarizing border zones, delaying water-sharing agreements, or entrenching military assets in smaller states, the message is clear: India seeks to shape South Asia on its terms. This posture undermines regional peace and violates the sovereignty of neighboring countries. For a state that aspires to global leadership, such conduct reveals an alarming dissonance between its rhetoric and its actions.

The implications for South Asia are severe. By undermining legal agreements and stoking nationalist flames, India not only destabilizes the region but also erodes the possibility of collective regional development. A peaceful and prosperous South Asia requires mutual respect, legal adherence, and restraint. India’s current trajectory runs counter to all three.

If New Delhi is truly serious about regional stability and leadership, it must abandon the politics of provocation and engage its neighbors in good faith, before the cost of dominance outweighs the dividends of peace.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.