Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the US during Donald Trump’s second term has underscored a bipartisan consensus in Washington on deepening strategic engagement with India and positioning New Delhi as a counterbalance to shared Chinese assertions while simultaneously reducing New Delhi’s historical reliance on Moscow.

India-US ties strengthen with military sales, trade expansion, and cooperation in emerging technologies and space under Trump’s second term.

The two sides have agreed to expand US military sales to India, double bilateral trade within a record five-year period, increase sales of US oil and gas, and cooperate closely in emerging technologies and outer space. The visit highlights India’s importance in Washington’s grand strategy amidst growing challenges to the US dominance and New Delhi’s alacrity to leverage from Trump’s reckless initiatives ,which are perceived to jettison western order. How will the renewed engagement evolve?

While India and the US share a strategic convergence in countering the perceived Chinese assertiveness, their interests diverge in several key areas. Even on balancing China, the ways, means, and ends are quite different of both sides due to India’s economic ties with China, which remains its largest trading partner. Second, India’s sheer emphasis on strategic autonomy in its conduct, especially when engaging with the great powers.

Also, it is a pertinent reason that makes New Delhi less reliable for Washington. For instance,  the Indian diaspora, Ashley J. Tellis, a senior fellow and inaugural chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has already warned Washington that American efforts to utilize India as counterbalance against China is nothing less than ‘a bad bet”, as New Delhi will pursue its independent course of actions amidst Sino-US confrontation.

Furthermore, India’s longstanding ties with Russia and its reliance on Russian military exports and fossil fuels will also test the resilience of this renewed engagement. As of January 2025, Russia remains India’s largest oil supplier, accounting for approximately 1.58 million barrels per day. The Kremlin also remains India’s largest arms supplier despite India’s continuous efforts to build its indigenous arms industry and to diversify its arms imports.

During the Russia- Ukraine war, despite Western pressure, New Delhi did not condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and kept importing Russian oil. Given India’s asymmetries with China, another reason New Delhi is unlikely to antagonize Moscow is Russia’s potential role in diplomatically influencing China in India’s favor in any possible Sino-Indian confrontation.

Despite alignment against China, India’s economic ties with Beijing and strategic autonomy limit Washington’s influence over New Delhi.

Similarly in the Middle East, New Delhi has key strategic interests which diverge with the US. India signed a 10-year agreement with Iran for the operation of Chabahar Port. Under the agreement, India is to invest $120 million in the development of the terminals of the port. New Delhi signed the deal to increase trade with landlocked Central Asian nations, including Afghanistan.

India might achieve a number of other objectives by outfitting and leasing the Chabahar port, such as bypassing China, competing with Pakistan’s neighboring Gwadar port, and exerting influence over Afghanistan. However, Tehran is under American sanctions due to its nuclear program that prohibits any country from effectively engaging with Iran. Since the return of Donald Trump, his administration has intended to impose additional sanctions on Iran to end its nuclear program and curtail its ballistic missile program.

There is also friction on India’s surplus trade and New Delhi’s high tariffs on American goods. As of 2024, the US reports a goods trade deficit of $45.7 billion with India, positioning India among the top ten countries with which the US has the largest trade deficit. Even worse, New Delhi has levied high tariffs on American goods, causing Trump to criticize India as the “tariff king” and urging New Delhi to lower its tariffs; otherwise, a failure to do so would result in reciprocal tariffs by the US.

However, The Times of India notes that Trump’s reciprocal tariffs on Indian exports will have little impact, giving India a hedge to stagnate the deficit in its favor. Finally, The Hindu notes that the US has consistently raised concerns about India’s bureaucratic hurdles, arguing that they can create significant barriers for American business and investors, and urged India to foster an ‘attractive and reliable’ investment environment.

India’s continued reliance on Russian oil and arms challenges US efforts to reduce New Delhi’s dependence on Moscow.

In sum, the American efforts to engage India cannot serve its long-term strategic interests against China, given a number of divergences in their bilateral relations. However, such concessions to India will affect South Asia’s geopolitical environment in two possible ways. First, it will prevail a sense of insecurity in Pakistan and increase Pakistan’s threat perceptions. As a result, it will further push Islamabad towards China and increase Beijing’s footprints in the region. Second, the US will end up having no credible partner or ally in South Asia.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.