Controversies shrouded the killing of Khalil ur Rehman Haqqani – the minister for Refugees and Repatriation in the Taliban Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the second most important leader of the once dreaded Haqqani network.

Haqqani was killed at his highly secured office in the Darul Aman neighborhood of Kabul by a suicide bomber masquerading as a needy destitute person with a bandaged hand wherein he was hiding the explosive materials.

The Islamic State of Khurasan Province (ISKP) – Afghanistan chapter of ISIS – has accepted the responsibility of killing Khalil Haqqani, however, those who knew the senior Haqqani as an outspoken member of the IEA cabinet and important leader of the Haqqani Network close relations with TTP (Pakistan-specific terrorist outfit) have doubts over the ISKP claims.

Khalil Haqqani was killed in a suicide bombing disguised as a destitute visitor at his Kabul office.

The body of the slain Haqqani was not yet buried when the Islamic Emirate started pointing fingers at a neighboring state–   Pakistan – where, they believed the execution was planned. Speaking at the funeral ceremony, IAE interim Minister for Foreign Affairs Amir Khan Muttaqi without mincing words accused ‘neighboring countries’ of having hands in the murder.

In the last seven months, ISKP carried out seven terror attacks in Afghanistan and Muttaqi claims the Afghan intelligence has confirmed reports that six attacks were planned and designed outside Afghanistan. “We will investigate this attack (killing Haqqani) to ascertain where it was planned. And we urge these countries to stop giving safe havens and nurturing Daesh terrorists under your sleeves.”

Next was the spokesman for Kabul police and Ministry of Interior Khalid Zardran who posted on his X page saying, “ISIS operatives carried out 7 attacks in past seven months, 6 of which were planned and designed in a ‘foreign country’ based on accurate intelligence investigations.” A reference to Pakistan as the Afghan interim government has long long-standing position on ISIS operating from safe havens inside Pakistan.

Contrary to these wild claims and implicit accusations, the Afghan Taliban powerful faction – known as the Kandahari group – has also shared in the blame for Haqqani’s murder. Those who understand like the back of their hands the milieu of the meaningless decade-long internecine wars have plausible reasons to see the hands of the Kandahari faction of Taliban in the blood of Haqqani. The growing perceptions are that Haqqani might have become a victim of the Taliban’s internal factional power struggle.

The senior Taliban leaders including powerful religious personalities targeted by ISKP following the fall of Kabul were mostly those who were very critical of the Kandahari faction’s extremely conservative policies and interpretation of Islam and shari’ah.

ISKP claimed responsibility, but internal Taliban factional struggles are suspected in Haqqani’s assassination.

Sheikh Rahimullah Haqqani the senior Taliban leader believed to be an ideologue of the movement was targeted by ISKP in Kabul at his mosque. Mawlawi Mujeeb u Rehman Ansari was another influential voice criticizing the policies of Taliban reclusive leader – Mulla Hibatullah Akhund – particularly the ban on womens’ education and employment was targeted at his mosque in Herat.

Like Khalil Haqqani, both Shiekh Rahimullah Haqqani and Mujeeb Ansari were influential religious scholars with large following, very vocal and not shy of publically expressing their opinions standing out against those imposed by the regime.

Haqqani too was pleading moderation in policies with regard to womens’ education and dealing with the opponents. He was a strong advocate of getting recognition from the international community by responding to its concerns and sensitivities. He was believed to be one among very few within the government system capable of speaking his mind in the presence of Mulla Hibatullah Akhund.

The Taliban interim regime acting Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Kabir speaking to the funeral procession has said that in a recent meeting of the cabinet held in Kandahar, Khalil Haqqani spoke very boldly with a strong sense of honesty in the presence of the Taliban supreme leader Mulla Hibatullah Akhund asking for shunning extremist policies towards women and the opposition.

Undoubtedly, the Haqqani is the only group threatening the influence of the mighty Kandaharis’ Taliban and resort to the non-Kandahari Taliban.

Besides, their positions on women and recognition of the international community, another controversial demand of the Haqqanis was seeking revival of the Shura – in charge of appointing and selecting the amir (the supreme leader). The same shura was disbanded by Mulla Hibatullah Akhund immediately after his appointment as supreme leader of the Taliban.

The elderly Haqqani was the head of the Haqqani family – of whom he became the 52nd martyr. He was a rock behind his nephew Siraj u Din Haqqani – the current interior minister and head of the once dreaded Haqqani Network. His death will definitely have significant impacts on the camp of non-Kandahari Taliban and Haqqani network. He was a strong force on the back of his nephew – Sirajuddin Haqqani – a trusted adviser and supporter in the Taliban leadership structure.

Those close to Sirajuddin believe that as an elder of the Haqqani family and experienced jihadi commander, he was playing an intermediary role for Sirajuddin in the time of crisis. Siraj – as a shrewd politician – often used the services and position of his uncle to raise sensitive issues or forward proposals he could not bring up directly for discussions.

Khalil first came into the limelight when led the first batch of Taliban soldiers and entered Kabul with the collapse of Dr Ashraf Ghani’s government. As a veteran of Afghan jihad and tribal elder, he played a very crucial role in securing former jihadi commanders, political leaders, and members of the former democratic regime who did not escape with the fall of Kabul. Khalil Haqqani soon invited them to his office and given assurance of not to be harmed. Those including Hamid Karzai, Gulbadin Hikmatyar, and Dr Abdullah who did not come due to fear of prosecution, Haqqani personally visited their homes.

However, unaware of his fate the elderly Haqqani became the target of his weapon – the suicide bombing strategy pioneered by the Haqqanis in Afghan wars. The network was popular for launching the most dreaded attacks using a squad of suicide bombers euphemistically called Fidayeen in the two decades of struggle against US and ATO forces.

He was also accused of being instrumental in the killing of former Afghan President Ustad Burhan u Din Rabbani by fitting explosives materials in the turban of a visitor masquerading as a peace representative of the Taliban. Haqqani became the victim of the same strategy wherein the ISKP sent a suicide bomber – masquerading as a disabled destitute refugee – with explosives substances wrapped in the bandage of a seemingly fractured hand.

Haqqani’s close ties with TTP have led to Pakistan facing accusations over his death.

Pakistan is accused of having hands in Khalil Haqqani’s murder because of his close relations with Tehrik Taliban Pakistan – declared Khwarij by Pakistan. He had reasons for being grateful and indebted to TTP. In 2007, the elderly Haqqani was imprisoned in Pakistan. The TTP founding leader Baitullah Mehsud abducted around 230 Pakistani security persons one of the demands was the release of Khalil Haqqani in return.

In Afghanistan, the Haqqani network is known to be providing strong support to the TTP and is accused of using the terrorist outfit as a proxy against Pakistan. The Haqqanis are believed to be managing funds for the terrorist network, feeding and keeping their families, providing training facilities and even resolving its internal problems. In the recent past when TTP was suffering from internal differences with divisions in groups it was the Haqqani leaders who had made the patch-up and encouraged small groups both in Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the main TTP.

Due to the backing of Haqqais, the TTP members are enjoying free movement across Afghanistan however; its fighters are majorly concentrated in areas like Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and Ghazni – the strongholds of Haqqanis in Afghanistan.

The terror outfit is using these regions to enter Pakistan and launching attacks across the border in the southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa particularly North and South Waziristan, Kurram, and Khyber Districts. His death will no doubt leave impacts on the movements of TTP in near future and will reduce their support base.

Haqqani’s death will impact Taliban dynamics, TTP movements, and Afghan security measures, increasing public hardships.

The Taliban interim administration might also resort to major administrative measures, particularly on the security front. The leaders of the puritanical militia will become more careful and security conscious and might adopt big restrictions and protocols while interacting with people or moving around in public. This will no doubt lead to compounding problems for ordinary Afghans who are already facing a multitude of problems.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.