In the wake of the Russian-Ukraine war, Europe has vowed to sever its energy dependence on Russia. It is being viewed as morally and strategically important to Europe, however, there lies a reality that cannot be overlooked. Europe’s energy policies have created severe economic pressures, damaged industries, and it failed to cut reliance on Russian resources to a very great extent. While countries like Hungary and Slovakia are struggling for affordability, Germany is challenged by soaring costs to maintain its competitive industries. Also, western sanctions have proven to be a theatrical performance rather than actual countermeasures. Despite Europe’s aggressive posture, the economic and strategic realities render energy independence from Russia only as a myth, a dream that comes at a great cost.

It is true that Europe’s reliance on Russian energy has turned out to be its strategic weakness, at the same time this energy is also necessary for the smaller economies

It is true that Europe’s reliance on Russian energy has turned out to be its strategic weakness, at the same time this energy is also necessary for the smaller economies. Hungary’s 85% of the energy needs are met by Russian oil. As of 2025 when Ukraine halted the Russian supply lines passing through its territory, Hungary begged it to resume the pipeline. Even after the EU’s ban on Russian energy, the price caps by the government keep gas and electricity bills low in Hungary, but it may still require EU bailouts to cover its budget deficits. Similarly, Slovakia, once an important transit hub for Russian gas is now battling for scarce LNG supplies and costly pipeline reversals.

The rising energy costs have shocked Europe’s industrial giants. Germany, the manufacturing powerhouse of Europe, has experienced a plummet in its production sector; its chemical sector also experienced an 8.7% decline in 2024

Moreover, the rising energy costs have shocked Europe’s industrial giants. Germany, the manufacturing powerhouse of Europe, has experienced a plummet in its production sector; its chemical sector experienced an 8.7% decline in 2024 which it is expected to recover in 2026. It also achieved a significant milestone in green energy by making its renewable energy 52% of the total electricity production. However, the cost of importing LNG from the US is still four times higher when it reaches Europe compared to the price at US ports; the prices could further double in 2025 and 2026 due to excessive LNG supply by the US. As a result of energy shock, German industries have considered shifting their industries in the regions outside of Europe due to higher energy costs and the fear of weakening competition with other regional industries.

Not only Europe’s energy interests, but also its security interests are interconnected with Russia. Therefore, it is not pragmatic to see Europe, anytime soon, as independent from Russian energy

Let us assume that Europe is independent of all the Russian gas and oil imports. It would still not guarantee its freedom from Russian manipulation of European economics, as Russia would still be responsible for almost half of its uranium imports. About 23.5% of Europe’s Uranium comes from Russia and 21% from its ally Kazakastan, which is heavily influenced by Russia, as it runs Kazakstan’s major mining operations. This tells us that not only Europe’s energy interests, but also its security interests are interconnected with Russia. Therefore, it is not pragmatic to see Europe, anytime soon, as independent from Russian energy.

Surprisingly, the sanctions against Russia also expose a flaw in the Western geopolitical strategy: economic self-interest takes precedence over collective strategy

Surprisingly, the sanctions against Russia also expose a flaw in the Western geopolitical strategy: economic self-interest takes precedence over collective strategy. While the governments of Europe and the United States denounce the Russian militancy in Ukraine, their companies use legal loopholes, covert agreements, and lenient sanctions to fund Moscow’s economy. Perhaps the most shady example of this hypocrisy is the sale of tankers owned by the West to Russia’s shadow fleet. Russia has earned more than 800 billion euros from the export of fossil fuels since the conflict in Ukraine began; a major portion of the revenue comes from its “shadow fleet” that evades sanctions and continues the oil trade through intermediaries like China and India.

The West portrays a robust strategy of blocking Russia’s legitimate trading routes, but it indirectly supports Russian energy exports by blacklisting very few Russian vessels; strangely, these sanctioned ships are operating openly.  Also, the G7’s price cap on Russian oil was intended to destroy Moscow’s earnings, but it has lost its significance because Russia reroutes exports to China, India, and the Middle East, where the oil is processed and sold back to Europe. The US and Europe imposed further sanctions on Russian vessels that decreased the volume of Russian oil imports by India, but the trade resumed. Ironically, these activities are also legal due to flaws in Western regulations. The result of this is a “sanctions regime” that is more like a political theatre than an effective counter to Russian aggression.

The EU has expanded its energy resource network, and the transition does not come without an enormous price. The measures amplify inflation, aggravate disparities, and negatively impact the competition of native European industries with other regions

Europe tries to champion energy independence only in theory, while the complex picture we discover by analyzing the economic and strategic realities shows an entirely different picture. The straining economies of the weaker EU nations, the rising costs of energy, and the constant purchase of Russian energy through indirect channels point towards the vagueness of the EU’s strategy. While the EU has expanded its energy resource network, and the transition does not come without an enormous price. The measures amplify inflation, aggravate disparities, and negatively impact the competition of native European industries with other regions.

All things considered, if Europe actually wants to secure its energy sector in the long-run, it needs to adequately address the loopholes within its sanctions, and must sufficiently consider the geographic nuances and needs of the poorer members to ensure the economic harmony of the Union. Otherwise, it would have to reconsider peaceful dialogue with Russia or learn to live with the rifts within the European Union.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

Author

  • Ahsan Khan Niazi

    The author is a young graduate with a degree in International Relations from SZABIST University, Islamabad, with a keen interest in Russian geopolitics and European energy policy.

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