After decades of dominance in the Middle East, Tehran is at a moment when it must rethink its equations. With the fall of the Assad family in Syria, Iran lost its only state ally in the region.

This happened while the Israeli bombing last fall significantly set back Hezbollah – Iran’s most trusted and influential armed group. Iran is now in a weak position and in need of a strategic review.

Syria and Hezbollah were the fulcrum of Iran’s resistance axis project. The alliance with Assad was vital to securing Hezbollah’s land corridor of funding and arms. Since the 1980s, Iran has spent heavily on this project as part of its defense policy to prevent Israeli and American attacks on its territory.

While Iran sometimes seemed to have the upper hand, the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, set off a chain reaction that led to the disintegration of the resistance movement. There are four scenarios ahead of Iran:

• Rebuilding the Axis of Resistance: A Renewed Frontline Strategy

Tehran could put rebuilding the axis of resistance on its long-term agenda and, to continue the fight, pressure its Shiite allies in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen to be on the front lines of the fight against Israel.

This would reduce Lebanon and Syria’s chances of post-war reconstruction. The outcome of such an approach would likely be bloody for Iran’s remaining allies and could give the Israeli government stronger pretexts for a direct attack on Iran.

• Retreating from the Axis: Shifting Toward Domestic Military Strength

Iranian leaders may conclude that the axis of resistance has run its course and no longer provides the necessary deterrent. The removal of Assad could be a sign that Iran has accepted this reality. The Syrian rebels reached Damascus at lightning speed without any army to defend.

Given the heavy blows inflicted on Hezbollah, Tehran saw no military solution to save Assad. If Iran’s leaders decide to retreat from the axis of resistance, they will certainly invest more heavily in conventional weapons—especially missiles and drones—to deter Israeli and U.S. military strikes.

If Iran moves away from the axis of resistance and instead focuses on its domestic military capabilities, the world should anticipate both the opportunities and the potential risks. As part of a new deterrence strategy, Iran could take the costly step of transforming itself from a state on the brink of nuclear weapons to a nuclear-armed state.

Suppose Trump gives the green light for a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program or escalates the U.S. maximum pressure campaign against Iran without offering a real diplomatic solution. In that case, those within the Iranian power structure who want to weaponize the nuclear program will gain more power.

• Diplomatic De-escalation: Engaging Gulf Monarchies and the US

In this context of regional disputes, Tehran’s leaders may pursue a de-escalation path out of the current crisis through diplomacy with the Gulf Arab monarchies and the incoming Trump administration. Even before losing Syria, the Iranian government had been sending signals to test the possibility of direct diplomacy with Trump and accelerating the process of improving its relations with Riyadh. In Lebanon, Iran is unlikely to cut ties with Hezbollah.

However, Tehran may pledge not to obstruct the establishment of a new governance framework in Lebanon, one in which Hezbollah’s political, economic, and military power would be significantly reduced.

Ultimately, Iran’s regional failures provide a stronger case for direct negotiations with the Trump administration, negotiations that would seek to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the easing of necessary sanctions.

At a time when Iranians are struggling to make ends meet at home and are demanding accountability for the extravagant expenditure in the region, Iran’s leaders must deliver tangible economic and political benefits to the people.

Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has promised to focus on this priority. His strategic advisor, Javad Zarif, has explained that new regional dynamics have allowed Iran to pay more attention to its people, who are its primary source of strength.

• A Hybrid Strategy: Combining Resistance, Diplomacy, and Domestic Priorities

But there is also a fourth possibility: combining all the scenarios. With the experience I have gained about the ideology and governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran, I believe the Iranian leaders will combine all the aforementioned scenarios and pursue all the scenarios by dividing tasks among their affiliated and trusted organizations.

That is, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government will seek direct negotiations with Trump. Through the National Security Council, they will seek to deepen relations with the Persian Gulf countries.

Through Mr. Pezeshkian’s government, they will seek to meet the people’s demands in various economic, social, and cultural sectors. Last but not least, they will seek to rebuild the axis of resistance in the medium and long term through the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.