Proposed by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP), later renamed as a vision, is a comprehensive framework to promote the internationalization of Japan. Without jeopardizing economic gains, it focuses on addressing regional security gaps amid declining U.S. interests in multilateral frameworks. Creating a conducive environment for Japan’s leading role in Southeast Asia’s regional economy is one of its key objectives.
Japan’s FOIP is predominantly a geopolitical project aimed at countering the growing influence of China in the region.
The concept, though developed during the first term of Abe, was officially announced in the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development in 2016. Since then, debates have started regarding the nature and implications of FOIP. Proposed by President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in contrast, is China’s flagship geopolitical and geo-economic project aimed at connecting different regions through maritime and land routes. Interestingly, most of the BRI projects overlap with FOIP, making both states strategic competitors of each other in the region.
Initially, Japan and the U.S. agreed to the principles of FOIP. But the United States developed its version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, which predominantly focused on the containment of China. While Japan advocates for rule rule-based, norm-oriented, multipolar power balance in the Indo-Pacific region, China criticizes it for its geopolitical realist posture. Experts argue that FOIP is an ideological project aimed at attracting like-minded democracies to counter China, led by anti-liberal internationalism.
However, both projects are perceived differently in ASEAN, and neither of these has secured full-fledged support from any state so far. Instead, Indonesia’s proposed version of the Indo-Pacific is a central focus of ASEAN in its dealings with Japan and China. In short, strategic autonomy, ASEAN’s centrality, and localized deals are the primary focus of ASEAN. This research aims at a party-centric analysis of FOIP and BRI and explores the following questions: What are the primary objectives of BRI and FOIP? How do China and Japan view each other’s plans? What are the challenges and opportunities of their implementation in ASEAN? And above all, is cooperation and coexistence possible between FOIP, given the changing geopolitical global environment and the China-Japan rapprochement?
As prominent from the initial Abe’s remarks, referring to China as a hostile, anti-liberal, and existential threat to regional and global peace, Japan’s FOIP is predominantly a geopolitical project aimed at countering the growing influence of China in the region. Though socio-temporal causes of China-Japan rivalry can be traced back to the end of World War 2, assertive behavior of China in the South and East China Sea (SECS), extra-territorial claims over Japan’s administered Senkuku Islands, and emergence as an economic power are the key reasons behind the recent diplomatic standoff between the both states.
BRI is a connectivity project aimed at facilitating trade, infrastructure buildup, and investment in the host states, which has been a problem in Japan’s regional vision. In order to tackle this issue, FOIP operates at two levels: Geopolitical and geo-economic. Geopolitically, at the regional level, it excludes China and aims to balance its influence. Japan is significantly concerned about the security of its Sea lanes of communication, as these are the most important element in the stability of its trade.
China’s grey zone tactics and ambitions to convert ESCS into Beijing Lake have provoked the then administration of Abe in 2012 to take proactive steps to protect the interests of Japan. To address the issue, Abe proposed a plan in his article “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” in 2012, where he referred to his earlier speech at the Indian parliament, arguing for the maintenance of freedom, stability, and navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans by formulating a group of like-minded states. This formed the basis of the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or QUAD, encompassing India, Australia, the U.S., and Japan.
ASEAN’s centrality, strategic autonomy, and localized deals are the primary focus of ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific engagement.
The multilateral approach of Japan to counter China was supplemented by its additional security ties with the other member states. For instance, in 2014, a “Special Strategic Partnership” was formulated among Japan, Australia, and India. Similarly, Japan has increased its ties with India using the String of Pearls narrative. The then foreign minister of Japan, Tara Koro, emphasized the importance of the rival of QUAD and the regular high-level meetings that were earlier ineffective since the withdrawal of Australia from QUAD in 2008. In this realm, one cannot deny the geopolitical dimension of FOIP to counterbalance the rise of China via multilateral and bilateral security networks.
However, FOIP does not block the geo-economic cooperation. Given the changing global order, Abe soon realized the potential benefits of hedging with China amidst the uncertain policies of the United States under Trump 1.0. For the first time after seven years, Abe visited China and agreed with Xi to enhance cooperation in the economic domain, maritime traditional and non-traditional security, the revival of high-level exchanges was affirmed, and support in the regional and international affairs was ensured.
Following this, Abe and Chinese Premier Keqiang signed 12 different memoranda to diversify the areas of bilateral collaborations. Even Abe changed the name of the FOIP strategy to FOIP vision to project its inclusive and win-win dimension for China. Many times, Japanese think-tanks and government officials have directly or indirectly differentiated the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific doctrine from that of Japan. In another meeting, Xi and Abe agreed to three principles: shifting the foreign policy towards collaboration, working with each other as a partners, not competitors, and the development of a free and fair trading system for mutual benefits.
Although the interpretation of these principles varies, this breakthrough played an important role in the Japan-China engagement, and the cooperation extended beyond state state-level bilateral sphere to encompass the private business engagements in the other countries of South East Asia. During the last days of Abe in office, Japan committed limited and gradual partnership in the BRI in the mutually agreed-upon areas. In this sense, one cannot deny the complex interdependence between Japan and China despite geopolitical tensions.
When it comes to ASEAN, it lies at the cusp of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is geopolitically a significant part of both FOIP and BRI. Though individual states are not much significant in terms of their economic contributions, the combined economy of ASEAN stands out as the 5th largest in the world, with a continuous growth rate over the past few decades. For China, ASEAN is an important region because of its geographic location, incorporating the Strait of Malacca, and important sea lanes. For Japan, the growing economy of ASEAN is promising.
Japan’s FOIP engages ASEAN in multiple ways. For instance, it provides Official Development Assistance (ODA) to ASEAN states to ensure capacity-building in the region. ASEAN states are among the nine out of fifteen states that are the official recipients of Japan’s capacity-building assistance via the Ministry of Defense (MOD). According to Tomahiko Satake, ASEAN is the main target of Japan’s connectivity projects because of the ideological similarities: respect for international law, norm and rule-based order, and the growing urge of multi-polarity in the region.
Despite tensions, Abe’s visit to China and the signing of 12 memoranda signified a shift towards economic cooperation.
Importantly, the majority of the ASEAN states are functional democracies where human development, economic growth, education, and quality infrastructure projects are the key areas of Japan’s FOIP focus. Moreover, Japan’s economic assistance, technological collaboration to mitigate the catastrophic impacts of climate change, natural calamities, and floods, anti-piracy operations, cyber and maritime security, anti-terrorism support, and other collaborations in non-traditional security areas provide a rhetoric of a win-win situation to all the parties involved.
Yet, a discourse analysis is required to understand the internal trends and perceptions regarding these transnational connectivity projects. Central to ASEAN’s long-term localized goals, ASEAN’s community building, consisting of politico-economic, security, and socio-cultural factors, is important. Announced in 2009, and further institutionalized in the lateral years, it encompasses infrastructure networks, such as railways, roads, transportation system, and maritime routes, and soft-connectivity programs, such as people-to-people and cultural ties, primarily focused on the equal development of the region, particularly CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) which joined ASEAN late.
After multiple meetings and final allocation of budget, ASEAN’s master plan connecting the region via highways, rail networks, and the development of ports was operationalized even before the announcement of BRI. This plan was further revised in 2016 to incorporate 7 key areas in Vision 2025. While it sounds promising at a glance, these projects require a lot of budget, centralized planning, and hectic execution to produce desired outcomes. China’s BRI provided a hope for the already defined connectivity plan in ASEAN due to the excessive availability of funds and planning.
Even China’s connectivity projects were highly supported by ASEAN before the BRI. Immediately after the announcement of BRI, in a joint statement of the ASEAN-China summit in 2016, ASEAN leaders appreciated the project and showed willingness to join the China-led BRI. In this way, ASEAN has been connected with BRI since its inception.
There are some limitations involving both of these projects. BRI is being perceived as a debt-trap since the lease agreement between China and Sri Lanka was formulated. Public perception, media campaigns, and social media outreach in the host states is not in China’s favor nowadays. All the major surveys, either online or physical, showcase the negative trends. Many leaders have objected to the non-transparent and undisclosed policy of the BRI agreement with individual states.
Malaysia, particularly after Mahathir Muhammad came to power, revisited several agreements with China. Moreover, most of the states have territorial disputes with China and have faced the aggressive attitude of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in recent years. The excessive dependence on Chinese infrastructural loans limits the capability of the state to pursue independent foreign and domestic policy, something fundamental in the ASEAN charter. This highlights the negative aspects of BRI. FOIP, in contrast, is often viewed negatively due to the over-dependence of Japan on the U.S.
The participation in the project may lead to a perception of choosing a site between China and the U.S., something that ASEAN cannot afford at this stage, as it enjoys cordial relations with both China and the U.S., and failure to balance can lead to a significant cost. Moreover, ASEAN fears its centrality as U.S. Indo-Pacific policy puts importance on the individual states instead of ASEAN as a whole, and it even excludes Myanmar. States fear that if a local government does not align with the broader goals of the U.S., the economic collaborations will fade away. Though Japan time and again has restated the separation of its vision, the historical imperial memory and pragmatic ties with the U.S. are still a hindrance to the trust-building measures with ASEAN.
The excessive dependence on Chinese infrastructural loans limits the capability of states to pursue an independent foreign policy.
Despite all these problems, there is hope that peaceful coexistence is possible between BRI and FOIP, and the feasibility of both projects can be ensured given the evolving situation in ASEAN after the Trump inauguration in 2024. The active participation in the regional initiatives and future visions, particularly under Ishiba’s administration, such as the trilateral summit between South Korea-China-Japan, the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will help reduce the trust deficit between China and Japan. One promising return seen so far is the revival of a memorandum of cooperation between both states in third-country markets, and the softening of diplomatic language. Moreover, Sino-Japanese military cooperation, modeled after Japan-Austria engagement, can reduce the historical grievances and imperial memory.
High-level visits, as are planned for 2025, and bilateral limited engagement in mutually agreed areas, instead of a non-cooperation posture, can be a significant breakthrough. Moreover, in contrast to geopolitical and geo-economic focus, these projects should be labelled as regional order-building efforts, ensuring ASEAN’s centrality, sovereignty, and independent engagement beyond the power transition narrative. Apart from that, FOIP’s value-oriented approach, often viewed as the implementation of Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (AFP), needs to soften in the ASEAN context to engage China for mutual benefits. Above all, Indonesia’s Free and Open Pacific strategy could be a milestone as it addresses the ASEAN reservations regarding connectivity projects.
It can be concluded that FOIP and BRI are historically projected as countermeasure projects. The changing political scenario enables both China and Japan to reconsider their historical approach towards each other to promote regionalism. ASEAN is the main and immediate target of both projects. So, it is important to address the reservations of the ASEAN states for its proper and timely implementation. If the present discourse under Xi and Ishiba continues, one can hope that peaceful coexistence is possible between both projects.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
