The debacle of East Pakistan is a momentous incident gripping the entire subcontinent with differing perspectives leading to biased and confused discourse covering Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Certain myths, historical distortions, and concocted narratives need to be debunked to give a clear picture of the whole issue.

The partition of the subcontinent resulted in widespread violence and displacement, with millions of people forced to leave their homes and migrate to the newly formed countries. The scars of this division continued to affect the relationship between India and Pakistan, shaping their political dynamics and hindering efforts for peaceful coexistence. India’s consistent dream to undo Pakistan fuelled their support for the Bengali unrest in East Pakistan right from the inception of Pakistan.

The fall of East Pakistan was shaped by internal political disconnect and India’s exploitation of language and resource crises.

One of the early challenges was the decision on the capital of Pakistan. Karachi was chosen as the capital by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and later on, Islamabad was declared to be built as the capital. There is a wide media perception that the people of East Pakistan thought that since they formed 55% of the population of the country, Dhaka should have been given the status of the capital of Pakistan.

The language controversy further deepened the divide. Urdu was chosen as the national language of Pakistan. That was allegedly another reason that created the rift between East and West Pakistan, as Bengalis felt that their mother tongue was being deliberately ignored.

Economic disparities played a significant role in fuelling the discontent.  As per the historical accounts, Bengalis were also not happy with the distribution of resources. Foreign exchange, for instance, a vast sum of which was earned from the sale of jute from East Pakistan was spent on developing the infrastructure of West Pakistan, instead of eradicating poverty in East Pakistan.

Similarly, the issue of representation of civil and military bureaucracy contributed to grievances. Bengalis believed that they were systematically prevented from getting slots in civil and military bureaucracy, which were predominantly occupied by individuals from West Pakistan, further exacerbating the sense of marginalization.

The final tipping point came after the 1970 general elections when Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rahman secured a landslide victory. The delay and reluctance in transferring power to him as the rightful leader deepened mistrust, ultimately pushing East Pakistan toward separation.

It is important to consider, however, the broader context of some decisions that later became points of contention. For instance, Quaid’s view of the respective relevance of Urdu and Bengali was obviously shaped by two factors: First, Urdu as a lingua franca was spoken far more widely across the northern parts of South Asia (including parts of India, such as Bihar, UP, etc.) and particularly in parts of West Pakistan could serve as a binding strength for a vulnerable new nation-state.

Claims of genocide and mass killings by Pakistan Army are exaggerated and used as tools of propaganda by India and Mukti Bahini.

Second, to promote Urdu as a lingua franca for intercommunication between the various provinces of the state. Moreover, Karachi being more developed and having adequate infrastructure to accommodate and smoothly run the nascent country was more plausible compared to Dhaka at that time.

The assertion that Bengalis were deprived of influential political and bureaucratic positions is also flawed as notable politicians having served as Prime ministers and other political assignments hailed from Bengal, these include Khawaja Nazim Uddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Sikander Mirza, etc. all hailed from Bengal. Moreover, despite being in number in the military in 1948, a large number of them were inducted till 1970 i.e. 300 above officers including MM Alam, Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqul, etc.

Building on this, the claims of mass killings and misconduct by the Pakistan Army during 1971 also warrant a closer examination.  The Pak Army, which has a culture of professionalism and discipline, does not engage in mass killings of civilians, as evidenced by its operations in the War on Terror. The Pak Army fought bravely and honorably in the 1971 war, despite facing enormous challenges and disadvantages.

The logistical problems faced by West Pakistan in supplying and reinforcing its troops in East Pakistan were immense, given the distance and the hostile Indian territory in between. The Pakistani troops also had to contend with the enemy’s superiority in both numbers and firepower, as well as the insurgency and sabotage by the Awami League and its supporters.

The Pak Army resisted the Indian aggression and defended the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan with courage and sacrifice. The allegation of the Genocide of three million Bengalis is a gross exaggeration and distortion of the facts, and a blatant attempt to vilify the Pak Army and Pakistan.

Taking this further, the Awami League and India concocted Operation Searchlight as a cover for their separatist scheme, while Sheikh Mujeeb incited his adherents to wreck the infrastructure and plunder the resources of the country, compelling the intervention of the Pak Army to re-establish order. Furthermore, for nearly three decades, the Western press remained silent about the rapes perpetrated by Indian troops and rebel militia. The number of Pakistani troops was inflated. The actual number was 34,000, with 11,000 police, rangers, scouts, and militia. This made the total number of combatants 45,000.

India’s role in supporting insurgency and manipulating international narratives was pivotal in East Pakistan’s disintegration.

In a published letter, RAW Officer R.K. Yadav made a startling revelation that India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Parliament, RAW, and armed forces acted in tandem to dismember Pakistan’s eastern wing. The confessions in his letter are corroborated by B. Raman’s book The Kaoboys of R&AW. He reminded the Indian Parliament to pass a resolution on March 31, 1971, to support insurgency.

Indira Gandhi had then confided with Kao that in case Mujib was prevented from ruling Pakistan, she would liberate East Pakistan from the clutches of the military junta. ‘Not only intelligence officers but also officers of armed forces are employed to carry out subversion and sabotage inside Pakistan.’

This aligns with the findings of Sarmila Bose, whose book Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War exposes the exaggerations, fabrications, and distortions surrounding the casualties, troop strength, and broader narratives of the conflict. Many people in responsible positions had repeated unsupported assertions without a thought; some people seemed to know that the nationalist mythologies were false and yet had done nothing to inform the public.

Mujeeb ur Rehman’s electoral victory did not mean that people wanted to break away from Pakistan, but rather that they felt neglected by the government. However, not everyone supported Mujeeb, as more than 40 percent of the population did not.

She went on to reject the Indian and Bangladeshi allegation that three million Bengalis were killed by the Pakistani Army, calling it a “huge lie”. She estimates the death toll to be between 50,000 and 100,000, and argues that numbers can be manipulated for political purposes, as in the case of the Holocaust.

This perspective is echoed by Archer Blood, an American career diplomat, who documented: “Indian soil was made available training camps, hospitals and supply depots for the Mukti Bahni (freedom fighters)” and Mukti Bahni had a “safe haven to which it could retire for rest, food, medical supplies and weapons”. Additionally, according to Yasmin Saikia, thousands of Bihari women were raped and tortured by the Mukti Bahini (Women, War and the Making of Bangladesh, page 41).

India’s role in fomenting insurgency is evident. India has disseminated many myths to besmirch Pakistan’s image. Some of these myths have been debunked by Sarmila Bose and Praveen Swami. India officially sanctioned the invasion of East Pakistan, yet the United Nations failed to declare it as an aggressor. The situation in occupied Kashmir is direr than it was in East Pakistan (custodial deaths, fake encounters, rapes, arson, and so on). Even children and women are detained hidden during cordon-and-search operations. Doesn’t this situation warrant Pakistan’s intervention?

Similarly, it is important to revisit the real genocide that occurred within the Bihari community, carried out by the Mukti Bahini. More than 500,000 people were ruthlessly killed, with their deaths wrongly attributed to the Pakistan armed forces by India and Mukti Bahini. Even today, the Urdu-speaking Bihari community remains stateless, living in ghettos with limited rights and recognition.

In a similar vein, a twisted media campaign then defamed and isolated Pakistan internationally. Indira Gandhi used the democracy card to mislead the US and the Western world that Pakistan was under brutal military rule and dictatorship. And for the Muslim countries, which did not have elected governments, she used the so-called genocide card. She used her electronic and print media to exaggerate stories of the mass killing of men, women, and children in East Pakistan by the Pakistani Army.

The Bihari community faced real genocide by Mukti Bahini, with over 500,000 victims, largely ignored in global narratives.

This strategy of manipulation and falsehood continues today under the BJP-led government in India, as it continues to harm Pakistan through proxies and distorted media campaigns targeting regions such as Balochistan, former FATA, and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). It is time we should not let our youngsters be indoctrinated against the ideology and spirit of Pakistan and thwart the evil design of our enemies. We sincerely appreciate the sacrifices of our fallen soldiers who got martyred while fighting in the most difficult war of 1971.

It is a sobering reality that the Muslim League could not fulfill the aspirations of the people of East Bengal. India cleverly exploited the language crisis, which erupted soon after independence. The disintegration of Pakistan began well before December 16, 1971. The true rupture occurred when no political party from West Pakistan secured any seats in East Pakistan, and vice versa. This political disconnect, compounded by both internal failures and external interference, laid the groundwork for the tragic separation of East Pakistan and the subsequent creation of Bangladesh.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.