The recent shift in Japan’s strategy towards China is caused by uncertainties in the existing global geopolitical and economic landscape. Historically, Japan and the United States share common ideological, economic, political, and diplomatic interests. Japan is a part of nearly every bilateral and multilateral group that aims at the containment of China. However, the recent U.S. elections, followed by the MAGA effect and Trump’s tariffs, have significantly shaken the decades-old friendship between the United States and Japan. Above all, Trump has questioned the security guarantees and defense pact that have restricted the military buildup and indigenous defense production in Japan.
Japan is manipulating and exacerbating China’s threat to amend its constitution to go offensive.
On the other hand, post-Abe domestic political shift in Japan and the election of Shigeru Ishiba as Prime Minister from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have significantly impacted Japan’s foreign policy discourse. This article addresses the following central questions: What are the key challenges hindering the Japan and China relations? Why have these issues gained prominence with the rise of China? What policy options has Japan adopted towards China? Is there any continuity in these policies, or strategic shift occurred due to Trump? Are there prospects of normalization of the ties under Ishiba’s doctrine? Is Japan reviving liberal deterrence or pursuing the double strategic hedging?
The WW-II left tragic impacts on all the regions around the world. East Asia was no exception. The horrific memories of the war, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the independence of Japan after the San Francisco conference of 1951 redefined the trajectory of China-Japan relations. Broadly, the Sino-Japanese engagement can be divided into two phases: pre- and post-Sino-U.S. rapprochement.
During the first phase, till the 1970s, the aftershocks of World War II and Cold War dynamics dominated the thought process of policymakers in Beijing and Tokyo. The pacifist constitution of Japan, unwavering support for Taiwan, and alignment with the United States were the key barriers in Sino-Japanese relations. On the other side, the Japanese atrocities during World War 2 (e.g., the Nanjing massacre and invasion of Manchuria), coupled with reluctance to offer a formal apology to China for the previously committed war crimes, complicated the situation.
Furthermore, ideological deviation, historical distrust, Japan’s support for Seoul, and its stance on the U.S. led Vietnam War further hindered the development of bilateral ties. The stance of the Chinese government was very clear: Japan is a host country facilitating the imperialism of the United States in Asia. As said by Ezra Vogel, “Until the early 1970s, both China and Japan operated under strong ideological conditions which made mutual trust almost impossible.”
After the Sino-Soviet split, the United States approached China. The official visit of Henry Kissinger in 1971 was followed by Nixon’s visit the next year. The Sino-U.S. normalization paved the way for Sino-Japan relations. In 1972, Zhou Enlai and Kakuei Tanaka signed a joint communique. It marked the beginning of official relations between China and Japan. This bilateral agreement declared the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as mainland China, paving the way for bilateral trade, diplomatic, economic, and political ties. However, this normalization is often criticized for not addressing the mutual historical grievances, the status of Taiwan, and the disputes over Senkaku Island.
The logic of liberal deterrence is that the economic cost of any conflict is much higher than the expected gains from aggressive behavior.
Following this, another agreement was signed in 1978. Named as the Treaty of Friendship, it facilitated the provision of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the PRC, which comprises more than 3.65 trillion Japanese yen over the next four decades. This aid helped the industrial growth, infrastructure development, and economic revival of China after the failed communist experiments. Apart from assistance, the bilateral annual trade volume surpassed $20 billion in 1978.
Overall, Japan played a critical role in the modernization and development of China. However, neither side tried to resolve bilateral tensions, making this transition merely a pragmatic necessity instead of reconciliation. As said by Teufel Dreyer, “The 1972 normalization was a geopolitical necessity born out of Nixon’s China initiative, not a resolution of historical or political mistrust”. Here arises an interesting question: Despite normalization, why does strategic rivalry exist in the current discourse of China-Japan relations? There are four possible factors in this realm.
The first and foremost is the Power transition in the region. Ever since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), its economic growth has surpassed many regional economic giants, including Japan. For instance, in 2001, China’s GDP was $1.3 trillion. In contrast, Japan’s GDP was around $3.4 trillion, three times more than that of China. However, in 2025, China’s GDP is the second highest in the world, crossing $19.2 trillion. Japan’s GDP, on the other hand, has stagnated over time and has remained fixed at $4.1 trillion. This tremendous economic shift over time cannot be viewed in a vacuum.
Instead, it has geopolitical implications. For instance, with the growth of its economy, the Chinese military budget has surged to 1.9 trillion yuan, only second to the United States. This helped China pursue its international objectives using military muscle, particularly in the East and South China Seas. The military modernization, formation of artificial islands, navy drills, and surveillance over disputed territories cause psychological trauma for Japan. Moreover, China’s diplomatic outreach and support have increased, given its regional and international connectivity projects, including BRI. This power transition, theoretical, can be understood by the models of Jacek Kugler and Organski, which provide the best explanation of the changing regional dynamics.
The second factor in the Sino-Japanese rivalry is that of leadership style. As advocated by Robert Jervis, the leaders react to the self-perceived reality, instead of the objective one. The historical distrust, strategic rivalry, and psychological bias of the leaders of both states have contributed to the deterioration of the relationship. Since 2001, the generational change in the leadership style has resulted in identity politics and nationalism. Instead of flexibility and compromises that were seen in the late 1970s, each side is trying to pursue a zero-sum advantage. Japan, for instance, is manipulating and exacerbating China’s threat to amend its constitution to go offensive.
Ishiba, known for his moderate view on China, is trying to balance between the United States and China.
This trend has been prominent during the era of Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and Fumio Kishida. The Russia-Ukraine War provided further support for the diplomatic maneuvering. PM Kishida famously said, “Ukraine today might be the East Asia of tomorrow”. It depicts the distrust and threat perception against China. Hu Jintao, on the other hand, had presented 5 points under his famous “New Thinking” policy, but Xi’s assertive posture has replaced it over time.
The third factor is the changing regional security environment. Given the fall of the Soviet Union, the economic rise of China, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea, the United States has shifted its focus towards the Indo-Pacific. The core purpose, as prominent in its Indo-Pacific strategy and proposed Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization (2023), is the containment of China. Beijing views Japan’s participation in bilateral and multilateral security networks such as the U.S.-Japan defense Pact and QUAD as a threat to China’s security and sovereignty. China rejects the Cold War-style alliance and the revival of Japan as a “normal power”. Japan, in contrast, given its strategic ambiguity over the Taiwan Strait and extended grey zone situation, does not provide a promising environment for negotiation, as these issues lie at the forefront of China’s policy.
Above all, the public perception in both states is another hindrance to normalization. Marked by historical animosity, the threat of infiltration by the Chinese nationalists, and media coverage of sensitive issues, adds fuel to the fire. Neoclassical realism best explains how these domestic factors play an important role in shaping the foreign policy of both states towards each other.
As said by Dr. Yoichi Fundabashi, “A rising China will induce critical, painful, and psychologically difficult adjustments in Japan’s foreign policy. Japan has not known a wealthy, powerful, confidant, and internationalist China since its modernization in the Meiji Era”.
In the present context, given the changing U.S. policies under Donald J. Trump, Japan has started re-considering its stance on the historical issues. Two theoretical models, Double Strategic Hedging and Liberal Deterrence, can be used to trace the continuities and changes in Japan’s China Policy under PM Ishiba. The concept of liberal deterrence, as proposed by Joseph Nye and Keohane under the broader umbrella of Complex Interdependence and further developed by Dr. Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, can be utilized to best explain the situation. The logic of liberal deterrence is that the economic cost of any conflict is much higher than the expected gains from aggressive behavior. In contrast, expected gains from economic collaboration, trust building, and rule-based order are much higher and mutually beneficial for all parties.
Japan has historically adopted this approach for over four decades in its dealings with China. For instance, the treaty of friendship focused on mutual areas of cooperation. It has provided billions of dollars to China in ODA and supported its membership in the WTO to compel it to follow international norms and rules. Yet, the expected results have shocked Tokyo multiple times. For instance, in 2010 and 2012, China showed assertive behavior towards Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands.
Though Japan clarified its policy, China did not accept it and sent warships and boats to surround the disputed Island. Moreover, the rejection of the decision of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration in 2016 has further put Tokyo in skepticism over the effectiveness of its doctrine. More recently, the naval exercises, excessive support to North Korea and Russia, and political and economic offense, ban on Japanese seafood over the Fukuyama incident, and suspension of mineral deals with Japan, showcase the failure of the so-called Liberal Deterrence.
The major breakthrough was witnessed during the Sixth China-Japan High-Level Dialogue conducted in Beijing in March 2025.
Prime Minister Ishiba, hence, has shifted Japan’s diplomatic approach towards China. He is adopting a strategic hedging approach in his dealings. Though different explanation of the terminology exists, the use of the concept by Jaclyn Alexandra Kouleas offers situational applicability in the given context. In a nutshell, Ishiba, known for his moderate view on China, is trying to balance between the United States and China. On the other hand, the goodwill gesture by Beijing projects similar trends as the post-COVID fragility, the Russia-Ukraine War, and above all, Trump’s tariffs have deteriorated the economic progress of both states.
In this regard, attempts were made by Japan even before Trump’s inauguration to normalize the diplomatic ties with Beijing. For instance, MOFA Japan used the words “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” after 9 years in its 2024 diplomatic booklet to describe China-Japan ties. The major breakthrough was witnessed during the Sixth China-Japan High-Level Dialogue conducted in Beijing in March 2025.
The following areas were discussed with immediate impact: Bilateral cooperation in the non-traditional security domain, multilateral cooperation in regional and international organizations, restoration of trade of aquatic products, economic cooperation in the private markets of third countries, Green Energy, and the relaxation of visa policies. Following this, alongside the APEC meeting in Seoul in May 2025, both Xi and Ishiba aimed to increase bilateral ties in multiple domains, and high-level visits are expected in the following year.
So, it can be concluded that the recent shift in Japan’s China policy is more of balancing its dependence on the United States instead of pursuing Liberal Deterrence against China. A similar pathway is being followed by Beijing to balance the uncertainties and fluctuations involving trade relations with the United States.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
