For India geographical decoupling is impossible, and geopolitical and economic decoupling may prove to be self-defeating. In its quest to become the voice of the Global South, India seems to exclude China from the Global South since it cannot compete with it and take a shift from shared neighborhoods to distinct friends. Its shifting instance on the Ukraine-Russia and Hamas-Israel conflict and drift from the global south to the west, especially the US, may alienate the Global South and alter its strategic and security calculations.

If a country has a trade surplus, including India, it imposes tariffs irrespective of the country. And if a country has high defense spending, the US just has another customer to sell military hardware

Conversely, for the US, even though India is underweight to China, it is an important customer to buy military hardware and enrich the US defence industry.

Recently, US President Trump imposed 100% tariffs on three countries, including India, with effect from 2 April, by saying, “India charges us 100% tariffs: the system is unfair”. Trump further added that “if they use non-monetary tariffs to keep us out of their market, then we will (also) use non-monetary barriers to keep them out of our market”. Indian PM Modi’s recent visit to the US was hailed as a major success because of the signing of several key agreements by the former to buy military hardware from the latter. However, some analysts suggest that Modi’s visit “to strike a deal and stave off tariffs has been unfruitful”, by and large.

Likewise, it is generally known that President Trump starts most of his briefing with two important agendas: trade deficit/surplus with any country, and defense spending of that country, including its allies. If a country has a trade surplus, including India, it imposes tariffs irrespective of the country. And if a country has high defense spending, the US just has another customer to sell military hardware. India counts on both: it has a trade surplus with the US, so it invites tariffs, and it has one of the highest defense spendings in the world, so it would attract the US military-industrial complex (MIC).

Article 9 of the Sino-Russia Treaty says, that when a situation arises in which one of “the parties deem that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression”, both the parties shall hold “contact and consultation” to “eliminate such a threat”

China and India seem distant from fighting an American war against each other, a war of their fighting on the Himalayas would be more challenging for India than for China. Because India does not have a legally binding treaty with the US obligating it to assist in an armed conflict. The only option for India is to depend on its capabilities which may fall short compared to China`s military might. In addition, India has a Friendship Treaty with Russia (1971) and Russia has a similar Treaty of Friendship with China (2001), both the defense pacts share a common article.

Article 9 of the Russia-India Treaty says, “Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party” and in the event of either party being subjected to threat, both high contracting parties shall enter into consultations “to remove such a threat and take measures to ensure peace and security of both countries”.

Similarly, Article 9 of the Sino-Russia Treaty says, that when a situation arises in which one of “the parties deem that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression”, both the parties shall hold “contact and consultation” to “eliminate such a threat”. Given this Triangular entanglement, India’s de-coupling and engagement with the US has severe constraints on its strategic partnership with the latter.

The one-sided agreements India has signed have increased its susceptibility in terms of interoperability and the risk of sensitive information leakage

India’s Stance on the global divide between the South and the North is that “It is neither non-Western nor anti-Western”. In attempting to bridge this divide- sitting on the fence and navigating complexities- India is increasing its interdependence, further heightening its sensitivities and vulnerabilities accordingly. This shift represents a departure from its Nehruvian policy of non-alignment towards becoming less-non-aligned by bandwagoning the US.

Moreover, under the guise of diversification, its security and economic relations further entangle India between the West and the Rest. In addition to the challenges of growing vulnerability and sensitivity associated with this interdependence with the US, the one-sided agreements India has signed have increased its susceptibility in terms of interoperability and the risk of sensitive information leakage. These challenges, so far, have also impeded the transfer of technology (ToT) by the US to India.

For India, the US is an unreliable partner, while for the US, India is the shaky one when it comes to supporting US efforts in ensuring international peace and security. India’s primary goal of achieving prestige, through US support, attached to the UN Security Council permanent membership, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) designation of a Nuclear Weapons State, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) full membership has faced utter disappointment so far. On inclusion in the NPT and the UNSC, the US has been clear with two “without” caveats: India can join, according to the US, the NPT without its nuclear weapons, and the UNSC without veto power, while the NSG-wavier short of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) Technology is mere lollypop.

The frictions may arise from eroding religious freedom, human rights violations in India, its descent into an illiberal democracy, and transcontinental terrorism

In short, India’s decoupling is marred with uncertainties. When it comes to its partnership with the US, there is a greater divergence between both than convergence. The skeptics in the US suggest that this partnership is fundamentally fragile, while some skeptics in India assert that it is moving from estrangement to engagement, which could potentially lead to entanglement. The frictions may arise from eroding religious freedom, human rights violations in India, its descent into an illiberal democracy, and transcontinental terrorism. These factors may significantly affect the future of India-US relations.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia