John Bolton, Donald Trump’s national security adviser during Trump’s first term, testified in his memoirs that the idea of a peace treaty between South and North Korea took up a lot of President Trump’s workspace, who wanted to go down in history as a peacemaker at all costs. It did not work out then for various reasons. This year, Trump has a good opportunity to re-enter the Oval Office of the White House as the host. Will Trump continue his peacekeeping mission, using the war in Ukraine as an object of peacekeeping?

Politico recently reported that Trump’s priority after winning the US presidential election in November will be to end the war in Ukraine. In May of this year, Trump even made public statements on this issue, claiming that he would end the war very quickly. Given his statements, we can try to draw up the contours of this peace plan.

Trump pledges to swiftly end the Ukraine war if re-elected.

So, Trump will use the plan developed by Henry Kissinger in December 2022 – with separation along the front line, with buffer zones along the front line and borders, and with post-war security guarantees that have already been provided to Ukraine by about 20 countries, including the United States.

This is Trump’s plan, some details of which have been previously voiced by the Chinese leadership and even the Pentagon, when Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley offered Ukraine, against the backdrop of successes on the battlefield in Kharkiv and Kherson regions in September-November 2022, to sit down at the negotiating table from a position of strength and stop the fighting. The author of the plan is former US Secretary of State, and former National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, who first voiced it in December 2022, then followed it up in July 2023, and at the age of 100 flew to Beijing to visit President Xi Jinping.

Henry Kissinger’s peace plan resurfaces as a blueprint for Trump’s Ukraine strategy.

How does Trump differ from Biden in his rhetoric on the war and Ukraine? Trump speaks frankly about ending the war because it is his topic – during his first term, his idea was a peace treaty between the two Koreas and friendship with the leaders of both Koreas. He didn’t have enough time then.

So he no longer has the patience to start his peacekeeping mission. He knows how to keep the hawks in Europe, and not only in Europe, if there really are any, quiet, and they know it too: by demanding a sharp increase in European defense spending, a reduction in the presence of US troops in Europe, and the fate of Russia’s nuclear deterrent, the US nuclear bombs in Europe. Trump is likely to do this in November without waiting for his inauguration in January.

Security guarantees for Ukraine from NATO countries is also Henry Kissinger’s idea. Ukraine’s path to the EU, as a way for the EU to be involved and responsible for Ukraine’s future, is also his idea, which is why the EU is opening negotiations right now. Foreign Affairs, a leading geopolitical publication, recently tried to predict Trump’s foreign policy after winning the November 2024 election. Ending the war in Ukraine will indeed be a priority for Trump.

Trump’s foreign policy: Prioritizing peace in Ukraine post-election

The results of the recent debate between Trump and Biden only serve to boost Trump’s confidence and give him even more hope of winning the November election. Trump feels confident. He manages to do this even when he avoids facts. Biden is insecure even when he operates with facts.

This is the main conclusion of the foreign media regarding the recent debate between Trump and Biden. On the eve of the debate, Trump’s lead in the polls was 5-6%. After the debate, the difference between Trump’s and Biden’s support became catastrophic for the latter – 67% vs. 33% of voters’ support in favor of Trump. Thus, Trump’s position on the war in Ukraine is clear: he plans to resort to forcing peace on those participants on both sides who disagree with its end and the subsequent political resolution of the sport. He will have a wide range of tools.

Below there is a very useful historical parallel how geopolitics work in complicated circumstances.  In 1990, the question of a united Germany joining NATO depended on whether Lithuania would renounce its declaration of independence or not. If it did, Gorbachev would support Bush’s decision on Germany and NATO. In the middle of these two issues was the lifting of the Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania and the West’s provision of large financial aid to the USSR. Lithuania said no for a long time.

Debate outcomes bolster Trump’s confidence in peacemaking ambitions.

But when such important issues were at stake… in his memoirs, President Bush said in just one sentence that on June 29, 1990, Lithuania reversed its decision on the declaration. At the same time, Bush said nothing about who and how forced Lithuania, with a powerful lobby in the United States, as Bush himself said, to do so and to withdraw. History usually does not record such episodes because the methods of coercion to peace and the corresponding decisions are far from democratic. In this case, it will be the same, because the issue is much more important.

Biden’s situation is much more complicated. On the one hand, he publicly declares his support for Ukraine for as long as it takes, although he does not say what the goal of support is – whether it is the 1991 borders, the collapse of Russia, or independence with sovereignty. At the same time, privately, National Security Advisor Sullivan is seeking negotiations with Russia, i.e., a room to extend the nuclear treaty between them, with the issue of ending the war in Ukraine on the agenda. This has been repeatedly stated by Russian representatives. It is obviously difficult for Biden to play such a double game at the same time.

It is much easier for Trump – he has no need for a non-public dialog on ending the war, as he has never announced any plans for the war other than to end it. It is obvious that if Biden does not have time to complete the non-public dialogue and end the war before November, the US presidential election, Trump will do it publicly, and he will start immediately after the election, without waiting for the inauguration in January 2025.

In the 1990s, Bush and his advisor Scowcroft, and later President Clinton and his advisor Talbot, formed the view that everything possible should be done to prevent a war between Ukraine and Russia, because it would be very difficult to pull Ukraine, that is, Ukrainians, out of the war, because of the powerful national idea and, accordingly, expectations about the outcome of the war. That is, it will be necessary to resort to outright coercion to peace.

Biden’s Dual Approach: Publicly Backing Ukraine, Privately Negotiating with Russia

Now, their foreign policy colleagues in the United States have probably formed a continuation of this thesis: If the war does take place, the main task is to do everything possible to prevent a split within the country and its society, as a result of asymmetric expectations about the end of the war and as a result of high moral asymmetry in society, against the background of a powerful national idea in Ukraine, because the split itself could lead to a social revolt, which would be much more difficult to resolve than the actual end of the war.

Both theses are urgent tasks for the West, and the second is more difficult than the first. These tasks should be fulfilled, because otherwise the entire security structure in Europe could collapse as a result of a prolonged war due to its possible escalation like a house of cards. Therefore, the West will use both carrots and sticks to lead the participants to peace. Coercion to peace successfully applied to end the war in Korea in 1953 would be a case to follow. It is very likely that Trump, as the likely next US president, will take these carrots and sticks into his hands to be fixed by history as a peacemaker.