Recently, advisers to the newly elected US President Trump made a statement that the Ukrainian authorities should reduce the age of conscription from 25 to 18. The argumentation of Trump’s advisers is that Ukraine needs to level the front line, and this requires people, even those as young as 18, to do so.

Trump’s advisers propose lowering Ukraine’s mobilization age to 18, raising concerns over rapid military readiness and political implications.

At the same time, while Trump’s advisers have previously stated that Trump will strive to end the war in Ukraine in 100 days, the question arises: How can young people be mobilized and taught basic military skills so quickly that the front line can be leveled in 100 days? This is a very difficult task or even hardly possible to achieve within such a timeframe.

In addition, there is the question of how to properly equip these hundreds of thousands of new soldiers with military weapons. Where will Ukraine get so many weapons so quickly? It seems that the proposal of Trump’s advisers to reduce the age of mobilization in Ukraine to 18 years has a completely different goal than leveling the front line in Ukraine. What is the goal?

Part of the public discourse on this issue, both in Ukraine and in the world, explains this proposal as Trump’s desire to improve Ukraine’s negotiating position before the talks to end the war. The question here is worth asking: Whose bargaining position is this proposal supposed to improve? The US? Its bargaining position is effective sanctions against Russia’s oil fleet because China is already thinking about where to buy oil once these sanctions are introduced.

It was recently that the US significantly increased the number of tankers on the sanctions list transporting Russian oil – from 40 to 200.

The chart above shows the number of Russian oil tankers that have been sanctioned. The number of tankers carrying Russian oil that are under US sanctions is highlighted in blue. Please note how the number of tankers under sanctions increased dramatically on 10 January. This is a political move by the Biden administration that will be very useful to Trump.

How will Trump use this sanctions decision? For Trump, the goal is to put pressure on Russia, i.e. it is a tool to force Russia to make peace, as well as a way for the US to put pressure on Russia on other issues. This is usually done before negotiations in order to have a better negotiating position. This is about the negotiating position of the United States, i.e. Trump.

U.S. sanctions on 200 Russian oil tankers highlight America’s position of strength in negotiations under Trump’s proposed peace framework.

Sanctions are Trump’s position of strength, and Trump does not deny Biden’s sanctions on Russia’s oil fleet. Trump’s position of strength and Reagan’s position of strength, with America first, are two different positions of strength. Reagan significantly increased defense spending during his first term. Is Trump talking about it now? No. But in any case, what does the lowering of the Ukrainian draft age have to do with the US position of strength in negotiations with Russia? Will Trump not act as a negotiator in the process and hand over the entire negotiation initiative to Ukraine? No.

So, then, what is this hint of lowering the mobilization age about? This is about forcing peace on Ukraine because this is a very difficult decision in society, and on someone who could be accepted by Trump and lead him by the hand to peace. And Trump’s advisers will set out their negotiating position with Russia using other tools.

Moreover, there are other issues in the negotiations between Washington and Moscow besides the war in Ukraine, which means that there are other tools for a position of strength towards Russia. Trump is leading both parties to the war to peace from a position of strength. His strength, putting them in uncomfortable situations. This creates the conditions for Trump to do what he likes to do best – make deals.

What does Trump like best in politics? Making deals. This is the conclusion of a recent article in Foreign Affairs. The author compares Reagan and Trump with their ‘Make America Great Again’ and propensity to make deals.

Reagan consistently built a position of strength from which the US could put pressure on the USSR. This was the task of his first term in office. A position of strength”: What are we talking about here, given Reagan’s experience in the 1980s?

‘First, Reagan intensified the arms race with the Soviet Union; US defence spending increased by 54% between 1981 and 1985. He deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, launched the Strategic Defence Initiative missile defence system in 1983, and armed the mujahideen in Afghanistan, who inflicted heavy losses on the Soviet forces that invaded in 1979. In general, Reagan did not hesitate to use American military force when he saw a threat to American interests.’

Trump’s strategy emphasizes coercion and deal-making, contrasting Reagan’s systematic strength-building during the Cold War.

In this way, Reagan formed a position of strength that allowed him and his successor Bush to conclude relevant agreements with the USSR during his next term to the maximum extent possible to their own and their partners’ interests.

Trump also likes to make deals, but the difference is that it is an endless show and Trump is in no hurry to spend effort on building a position of strength, as Reagan did for years. The show around a deal is important to Trump, and if it is a show around a possible deal with the North Korean dictator on a peace deal with South Korea that he dreams of making, or a deal on peace in Ukraine, or some other deal, then that is Trump’s goal – to make deals and turn them into a show. Of course, the deal with China is the key one. That is the show around the deal. That will be yet to come. At the very least, the show. Here’s an excerpt from Foreign Affairs.

‘Trump is seeking to avoid dragging the United States into new ‘perpetual wars’ and, above all, to prevent a third world war. In his memoirs, John Bolton, who was Trump’s third national security adviser, describes how the president repeatedly deviated from his planned talking points during meetings with Xi because of Trump’s desire to make a ‘great deal’ with Beijing – ‘the most exciting, greatest deal in history,’ as Trump described it.

To this end, he was prepared to give China a break in the US-China technology war by easing measures against Chinese firms such as ZTE and Huawei. For the same reason, according to Bolton, Trump did not want to pressure China on issues such as the suppression of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong (‘I don’t want to get involved in that. We have human rights issues, too’) and the repression and mass imprisonment of Uighurs in Xinjiang (which Trump endorsed during his conversation with Xi).

In Trump’s view, a ‘grand bargain’ may be the only way to avoid having to start a war that the United States may not win. ‘One of Trump’s favorite comparisons,’ Bolton recalls, ’was that he would point to the tip of his Sharpie and say: ‘That’s Taiwan,’ and then he’d point to the Resolution desk [in the Oval Office] and say: ‘This is China.’ It wasn’t just the size difference that bothered him. ‘Taiwan is two feet from China,’ Trump told one Republican senator. ‘We are 8,000 miles away. If they invade, there’s nothing we can do about it.’

‘Whatever members of his national security team imagine, a deal with Xi should remain Trump’s ultimate goal in his second term.’ Trump remains a president for whom deals are a pretext and the goal is a show. Therefore, Trump is not Reagan, who had it all backward. Interestingly, the author of the article concludes that Trump’s deals may not only be about the show, but also about results, which may seem strange, but….:

While Trump’s peace efforts may appear show-oriented, history suggests surprising outcomes from seemingly improbable strategies.

‘In 1980, many would have scoffed at any predictions that Reagan would end the Cold War – that he would indeed secure peace by force. Today, the argument that Trump could accomplish a similar feat would seem absurd to many. But part of the wisdom of history is to remember how unlikely epoch-making events seemed, even a few years before they happened. Success in foreign policy can reshape a president’s reputation beyond recognition. It happened to Reagan. It could happen to Trump.’

Thus, the almost simultaneous sanctions against Russia’s oil tanker fleet and the statement about the need for the Ukrainian authorities to reduce the mobilization age to 18, which may be a sacrifice of their political ratings for the Ukrainian authorities, are not accidental – they are coercion to peace between Russia and Ukraine, i.e. what Trump likes to do most of all – to make deals, preferably on his terms.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.