The Western mindset prevails on the divide-and-rule policy. Recently, a leaked memo from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) sparked debate among policy circles. The memo allegedly described China as a “covert enemy” and detailed cases of Chinese espionage within Russian academic, military, and digital sectors. This revelation publicized primarily through Western media outlets like The NewYork Times, raised questions: Does the FSB memo reflect authentic internal security concerns, or is it part of a broader calculated information operation intended to fracture the strategic cohesion of the Dragonbear?

The FSB memo may be a psychological operation aimed at disrupting Sino-Russian strategic trust.

The Dragonbear is the geopolitical mirror of what President Nixon and Kissinger tried to prevent in the early 1970s- a Sino-Russian Axis. The U.S. saw an opportunity then to exploit the Sino-Soviet split that had deepened because of the clashes of 1969. When Washington pursued Beijing, it added pressure on Moscow; the logic was clear then, and the logic is clear now: Never let two main adversaries become allies. Today, the U.S. sees China as its primary challenger to American dominance, and so by re-engaging with Russia, the Trump administration is hoping for a reverse Nixonian arrangement: to pull Moscow away from Beijing.

The masters of the U.S. grand strategy based U.S. primacy on the premises like the U.S. must have no peer competitor, especially in Eurasia (this stems from the Mackinder, Spykman logic); That global rules are set within the standards of liberal institutions and alliances must be managed solely by the U.S. And of course, the global order depends on division of regional powers and not their consolidation. The  Dragonbear scenario is a nightmare for any master strategist in the West.

Even as a loose but durable axis, the Russia-China partnership undermines all three pillars of the U.S. grand strategy by creating a eurasian core, devoid of western leverages, it is proceeding as a challenger of rules, instead of being a taker, and it is using the fragmentation to create coordination through platforms like BRICS+, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, etc.

The Dragonbear, as Velina Tchakarova explains it being “a comprehensive China-Russia modus vivendi of systemic coordination in various strategic areas,” threatens the very architecture through which the U.S. functions on the global stage, and this loose thread between the two is enough to cause frenzy in the strategic circles of Washington.

The Dragonbear partnership challenges Western global dominance despite lacking formal alliances.

Russia plays into the grayzone conflict experiences, the disruptor, or as the Chinese may say, “stabilizer,” in the realm of security, deterring the Western security architectures. Meanwhile, China plays out the economic and infrastructure layouts across the globe, challenging the Western hegemony of tech and innovation. Without any ideological cohesion or formal alliance, both countries have effectively challenged Western primacy across domains. Despite this brilliant division of labour and synergy, one can’t help but nitpick on the asymmetries that exist, and that is exactly what the Western world, led by the U.S. is working on.

A few weeks back, The New York Times published a thrilling story on the alleged FSB memorandum, as a “leaked internal document,” characterizes China as a covert adversary conducting intelligence operations across Russian infrastructure. The memo references surveillance via Chinese research institutes, digital platforms like WeChat, and infiltration of Russia’s STEM sectors. It also claims that Chinese state-linked actors have attempted to recruit Russian defense scientists and gain sensitive Arctic and energy-sector data.

However, it is the timing and mode of disclosure that warrant further analysis. The memo surfaced amid growing scrutiny of China’s indirect role in supporting Russia’s defense industry, particularly its drone production. Multiple reports by NATO and Estonian intelligence in early 2025 confirmed that Chinese intermediaries were facilitating the transfer of Western components to Russian drone programs. The leak of a Russian document portraying China in adversarial terms may conveniently align with Western interests in diplomatically isolating Beijing and weakening the narrative of Sino-Russian convergence.

Perception warfare is now a key instrument of strategic statecraft. In this context, the FSB memo may serve as a psychological operation (PSYOP) aimed at disrupting the strategic trust between Russia and China. While the document’s contents may be accurate or partially so, its targeted leak through Western channels suggests a secondary agenda: to sow doubts about the depth and durability of the Dragonbear partnership.

The strategy is coherent. If China is seen as untrustworthy by even its closest Eurasian partner, it weakens Beijing’s appeal as a global alternative to U.S. leadership. It also complicates China’s position in forums like BRICS, the SCO, and Global South partnerships. For Russia, such a leak may sow paranoia within its strategic planning circles, especially if amplified across regional media ecosystems.

Perception warfare now rivals battlefield outcomes in shaping global geopolitics.

Moreover, the leak plays into the existing narrative fault lines between the two powers. In Central Asia, China’s BRI and Digital Silk Road compete with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and CSTO influence. In the Arctic, China’s ambitions under the Polar Silk Road increasingly overlap with Russian strategic zones. Publicizing internal mistrust can widen these cracks. This is where perception warfare enters the equation. In today’s era of hybrid conflict, shaping global opinion is as important as battlefield outcomes.

For a state like Pakistan, situated within the broader Eurasian security matrix and increasingly engaged with both Russia and China, the implications are significant. Firstly, the FSB leak should not be interpreted as a collapse of the Dragonbear. Rather, it highlights the complexity and layered nature of contemporary strategic partnerships—particularly those outside the traditional alliance structures of the West.

Pakistan should use such developments to refine its information warfare doctrine. Understanding how selective narratives are amplified to shape global perceptions is crucial for formulating national media strategy, diplomatic engagement, and strategic communication frameworks. The Global South, especially nations engaged in multilateral forums with both Russia and China, must develop resilience to third-party narrative warfare.

Pakistan must strengthen resilience to narrative warfare in Eurasian strategic dynamics.

Third, this is a moment for Pakistani think tanks and academia to deepen scenario-building around Sino-Russian dynamics. Where might synergies strengthen? Where could they break down? How do regional theaters like Central Asia, the Arctic, or the digital economy shape the next phase of Dragonbear evolution? These are vital questions for forecasting regional power shifts. The Dragonbear remains an operational reality in 2025. From Pakistan’s vantage point, it is evident that great power competition is no longer just about territory or trade. Rather, it is now increasingly a contest of perception, narrative, and information dominance.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.