During the 2025 India-Pakistan war, questions arose about deterrence dynamics between Pakistan and India: Did deterrence fail? Weren’t nuclear weapons supposed to deter all types of military violence between the two countries? The answers are no, deterrence did not fail, and no, nuclear weapons cannot fully rule out all military violence between states.

The 2025 Pakistan-India conflict exemplifies the stability-instability paradox, a concept which underscores the counterintuitive relationship between nuclear weapons and conflicts, emphasizing that while nuclear weapons deter full-scale wars, they can increase the likelihood of limited-scale conflicts at lower levels. However, the explanation of this concept is often oversimplified, and its designation as “paradoxical” might not be entirely accurate.

The 2025 Pakistan-India conflict exemplifies the stability-instability paradox.

Paradox involves inherent contradictions and implies that conflicts at the lower level are inevitably or automatically triggered by adverse circumstances. In a nuclearised environment, paradox would occur only if conflicts at the lower level escalate to full-scale wars, potentially leading to a nuclear exchange—an outcome that fundamentally contradicts the goals of deterrence. Fortunately, we have never witnessed such an event, and hence no paradox.

Conflicts at lower levels are also not inevitable, nor do they arise automatically. They are anticipated and can even be deliberate or premeditated, with states assuming they can exercise a degree of control over them. This leads to concepts such as escalation control and escalation dominance. Essentially, conflicts at the lower level arise by choice, as at least one party believes it can control and dominate the resulting escalation.

The stability-instability dynamic between India and Pakistan is neither paradoxical nor automatic. In the present context, it stems from India’s assumption that it can achieve military objectives against Pakistan through limited-scale conflicts while retaining control over escalation and maintaining dominance. There has been much talk in Pakistan that there is no space for limited-scale conflicts.

Discourse following the development of the nuclear-capable battlefield-range ballistic missile Nasr has often voiced this sentiment. However, what Nasr appears to have done is provide Pakistan with substantial leverage in escalation control, discouraging India from intensifying limited-scale conflicts, but it does not eliminate the possibility of such conflicts, and perhaps does not intend to do so.

Conflicts at the lower level arise by choice, as at least one party believes it can control and dominate the resulting escalation.

Limited scale conflicts are in Pakistan’s favour, provided it can control the escalation. It can be argued that one of the purposes of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is ensuring more favourable conditions for engaging India in military conflicts. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has effectively neutralised India’s conventional military advantage, compelling India to engage on more balanced terms in conflict scenarios.

Development of certain conventional capabilities, such as Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles, demonstrates that Pakistan not only anticipates conflicts at a lower level but is prepared and even willing to fight them if conventional deterrence fails. However, during the 2025 conflict, India did not show appreciation for Pakistan’s preparedness and willingness to fight such conflicts and failed to predict the scale of its response.

India’s miscalculations largely seem to arise from perceived technological superiority. Before the conflict, Indian policymakers and policy-influencers dismissed Chinese and Pakistani-origin military technologies as inferior to India’s European, Russian, and Israeli systems.

The French-made Rafale fighter jets were particularly championed as the strategic differentiator for India against both Pakistan and China. It appears that Operation Sindoor was centred on the Rafale to establish punitive deterrence, a strategy involving the threat or application of punishment to dissuade undesirable actions by an adversary. If that was the case, one is left perplexed exactly whom India was trying to punish? The so-called terrorists? Or the State?

Punitive measures are generally ineffective at deterring non-state actors, making India’s justification for strikes against alleged terrorists inside Pakistan both flawed and precarious. Such actions fail to guarantee the cessation of non-state activities and risk setting a dangerous precedent, where public pressure may compel the Indian government to take military measures in similar scenarios. Moreover, state-level punitive actions frequently backfire when the targeted nation rejects the punishment, retaliates, and escalates the conflict, as evidenced during the 2025 war. Instead of bolstering deterrence, India’s approach emboldened Pakistan to respond forcefully.

At the onset of the conflict, the PAF shot down several of the IAF’s fighters, including three Rafales. The impact on India was significant, but Western observers were equally astonished by how Pakistan’s Chinese-origin weapons, particularly J-10C and PL-15 air-to-air missiles, augmented by advanced electronic and network-centric warfare and improved air-to-ground coordination, outmatched the IAF’s Western platforms.

Rafales were the IAF’s Centre of Gravity, and their shooting down imbalanced the IAF operations, forcing the IAF to suspend its operations and move some assets to a safer distance. This sequence of events highlights how the PAF achieved deterrence by denial in the air, effectively dissuading the IAF from pursuing further aerial engagements.

Operation Sindoor was centred on the Rafale to establish punitive deterrence, but punitive deterrence against whom?

India subsequently shifted to its non-contact warfare strategy, employing drones and cruise missiles against Pakistan’s air defences and airbases. Pakistan countered with Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, transitioning from deterrence by punishment to the QPQ+ strategy, which responds with equal or greater force. Pre-conflict tests of Fatah-series missiles signalled Pakistan’s capabilities and willingness to escalate, but India dismissed these signals, compelling Pakistan to raise the costs of aggression to protect its deterrence credibility.

The downing of IAF’s frontline aircraft had already intensified the costs for India. However, its leadership hesitated to disengage without asserting escalation control and projecting victory. Pakistani response involved coordinated strikes by Fatah series missile and drones on Indian airbases and military assets, alongside a SEAD/DEAD operation by PAF that targeted India’s S-400 systems. While the S-400 batteries remained operational, their command units and radar antennas reportedly suffered damage, though conclusive evidence is pending. Pakistani bases also suffered hits, notably Bholari airbase.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s response appears to have shifted the escalation balance in its favour. A state can reestablish deterrence by increasing the cost of aggression. Some have argued that Pakistan’s response restored deterrence, leading to a ceasefire. However, it is too early to conclude that long-term deterrence has been achieved. The ceasefire decision was also mutual, influenced not only by the rising costs and escalation risks, but also by the American mediation.

However, on the diplomatic front, India’s acquiescence to American intervention contradicts its long-standing policy of resisting third-party mediation and undermines its aspirations for global power. Additionally, this conflict marked a significant first for Pakistan, which relied heavily on Chinese, Turkish, and indigenous technologies instead of American ones, signalling reduced American influence on its battlefield decisions.

Deterrence without dialogue is inherently fragile.

The pressing question now is: what comes next? While the reestablished deterrence appears to hold for now, its longevity is uncertain. Should either side believe it can control the escalation, instability at lower levels is likely to persist. Yet, if conflict at lower levels is a matter of choice, then so can peace be. Both nations can leverage the stability afforded by nuclear deterrence at higher levels to explore avenues for fostering stability at all levels of their relationship. Deterrence without dialogue is inherently fragile. It is, therefore, imperative for both states to revive discussions on strategic stability. Without such dialogue, the mutual deterrence could deteriorate into mutual destruction.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.