The Ukraine war has taken a drastic change since Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region of Russia in early August 2024. Kyiv has now made fresh requests to the US to allow using long range NATO supplied weapons against the targets located deep inside Russia. Though this appeal was declined, a large ammunition depot of Russian forces situated in Treves region, which is about 470 kilometers from Ukraine-Russia international border, was attacked by a drone. The storage facility, three kilometers in length and a kilometer in width, was completely destroyed. It provoked a reaction from Moscow which responded in the form of a new updated doctrine of Russian nuclear arms.

Also read: Ukraine War: Failed Interplay Of Russia’s Hybrid And Hard Power?

Recent changes suggested by President Vladimir Putin specifically refer to Russian nuclear doctrine, mentioning the nuclear “triad,” which has three elements: ICBMs based in land, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. The posturing of Russia’s nuclear triad of strategic forces has seen some major changes.

Expanded use of nuclear weapons has emerged the most vivid change in Russian nuclear doctrine changes.

He also said that the nuclear triad constitutes “the most important guarantee” of Russia’s security. As such, there is a commitment to maintaining and modernizing these three elements for establishing an effective deterrence against currently perceived threats.

Expanded use of nuclear weapons has emerged the most vivid change in Russian nuclear doctrine changes. The updated doctrine allows for the potential use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional military threats, especially if such threats are considered critical for Russia or its allies, including Belarus. This, in fact, suggests a more general interpretation in terms of when nuclear force could be justified, thus lowering somewhat the threshold for their use.

What is odd here is that the military doctrine of Belarus explicitly stipulates the use of nuclear weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Belarus by Russia. Of course, this represents a somewhat new turn in Belarusian military policy and is closely aligned with strategic interests of Russia.

Changes in response to missile threats also illustrate the manner in which this nuclear saber-rattling by Russia is threatening regional and world peace. New proposals comprise consideration for nuclear responses upon the detection of a “massive launch of missiles or drones” crossing Russian borders. This adjustment itself points out a readiness as well as the willingness to respond with nuclear force in the face of conventional military actions.

The new doctrine labels aggression by non-nuclear states, especially when abetted and aided by nuclear states, as a form of joint attack on Russia.

Overall, there seems to be an emphasis on non-nuclear aggression apparently by a NATO state. The new doctrine labels aggression by non-nuclear states, especially when abetted and aided by nuclear states, as a form of joint attack on Russia. This might increase the aggressiveness of international behavior and push the tensions higher with NATO and other military coalitions.

Although certain details regarding modernization were not disclosed, this attention suggests that the development and credibility of the country’s nuclear triad are continuous in the pursuit of maintaining a salient state of every part of the triad as threats evolve over time.

Putin’s new doctrine speaks of a “significantly lowered threshold” for nuclear weapons use.

The shift in the nuclear doctrine of Russia may have significant strategic implications for the global security dynamics. Through reinforcement of the role of the nuclear triad and extension of circumstances under which nuclear weapons are permissible, Russia is thus declaring its willingness to move more aggressively in areas where it perceives its sovereignty to be under threat. This naturally brings miscalculations and escalatory risks to the fore in an already tense geopolitical environment. Some key concerns leading from these modifications are:

• Putin’s new doctrine speaks of a “significantly lowered threshold” for nuclear weapons use. He said Russia could respond with nuclear force to conventional attacks that present a “critical threat” to its sovereignty, a vague term that could embrace a broad range of military actions. This shift may result in seemingly minor conflicts blowing up to become nuclear wars if taken as a “threat” by Moscow.
• The new doctrine expands what it has classified as aggressive to include the attack on a non-nuclear state, especially with the support of a nuclear state. Putin had warned that this would be included under a “coordinated assault on Russia”, therefore, bringing in other countries under hypothetical nuclear war conditions. Thus, this position warns the Western world of what it perceives as Western support for Ukraine and that military aid will invite a nuclear attack by Russia.
• These changes become a kind of ‘amber light’ for the West, but specifically against backing Ukraine. It has explicitly made it clear that the Kremlin considers any conventional attack on it, especially if it has the nuclear powers of the world behind it, a valid reason for the use of nuclear attacks. Therefore, these changes do not just escalate the risks associated with the ongoing war in Ukraine but also give a wake-up call about some other emerging security dynamics between NATO and others on the planet.
• The new doctrine also extends Russia’s nuclear umbrella over Belarus, meaning Russia can use nuclear force if it feels such an ally is being threatened. This further adds to the regional instability and may become a catalyst towards further militarization in Eastern Europe since the way security has been approached and strategized may be reviewed under these shades of threat perception.

In total, Putin’s new nuclear doctrine presents a “very dangerous escalation” of rhetoric and policy that increases the opportunities for military tensions and miscalculations on the international arena. The implications of these are deep and profound, with the potential to shift the very fabric of international relations and significantly increase the risk of a nuclear conflict in this already increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape.

Again, some have argued that this updated nuclear doctrine of Russia may also be part of its diplomatic efforts to convince Kyiv about a possible deal as per Russian aspirations which says Ukraine must not be allowed to join NATO. But it is less likely as this new approach happened when the Ukrainian president was in US with his ‘victory strategy’ against Russia; an update which vividly tells us that Ukraine is not going to think of any kind of negotiated settlement of this prolonging conflict. Both sides must take heed of those who are warning about what may turn into an imminent human crisis before it’s too late!