Security has been a multifaceted problem in this region. For a long time, South Asia has been a zone of terror and insurgency, from the protracted conflict in Afghanistan to militancy in Kashmir, also from sectarian violence in Pakistan to the sporadic insurgencies of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Religious extremism, ethnic separatism, cross-border infiltration, and wretched state institutions develop within such complexifications an environment conducive to the propagation of terrorist organizations. No wonder then that the countries in the region have adopted different counterterrorism (CT) strategies, with mixed results, to allay cross-border terrorism.

South Asian terrorism is a term that is inappropriate, if terrorism is taken to mean the acts that vary in motivation and scope as well as organization

South Asian terrorism is a term that is inappropriate, if terrorism is taken to mean the acts that vary in motivation and scope as well as organization:

1. In Afghanistan, conflict lives on, and the Taliban acts as the de facto government while ISIS-K is busy with its lethal activities.
2. In Pakistan, activities of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are causing much anxiety along with sectarian groups and Baloch insurgents.
3. India, therefore, faces threats from terrorist groups based in Pakistan, especially Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, besides the left-wing extremists (Naxalites).
4. Bangladeshi Islamist extremist groups have attacked authors and religious minorities considered threats to secularism.
5. Sri Lanka, the last to defeat LTTE in 2009, soon witnessed the 2019 Easter bombings carried out by Islamist radicals, indicating a resurgence of violence.

Despite these difficulties, the region has confirmed substantial successes in counterterrorism:

The military success over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) triggered the real turning point in counterinsurgency

The military success over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) triggered the real turning point in counterinsurgency. Combining military force with intelligence coordination and political strategy, Sri Lanka dismantled the mightiest of terrorist organizations in the world. However, the model above came at an extremely high human rights cost.

Following the brutal attacks in Mumbai in 2008, an imaginative series of reforms changed the state of India’s intelligence and coastal security architecture. Indeed, citing also the creation of the National Investigation Agency (NIA), Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), and, among other things, modernization of police forces made the state fortified in terms of detecting and disrupting terrorist activities.

Pakistan launched civilian military operations all over the tribes, mainly against the Taliban Tehrik-e-Pakistan (TTP) and their affiliates. These operations harmed the groups environment with terms of safety and networks, but critics comment that such operations primarily focused on anti-Pakistan activities rather than anti-Indian or anti other regional groups.

While limited, there have been efforts at cooperation through channels like the SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) and BIMSTEC’s attempts at enhancing intelligence-sharing and joint training

While limited, there have been efforts at cooperation through channels like the SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) and BIMSTEC’s attempts at enhancing intelligence-sharing and joint training.

Following the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack, Bangladesh initiated “Operation Thunderbolt” and other assertive counterterror operations. This neutralized important jihadist leaders and degraded domestic terror cells.Though there have been successes, South Asian counterterrorism has also experienced serious limitations and failures:

Suspicion between South Asian countries—most importantly, between India and Pakistan—has weakened regional CT initiatives. Intelligence-sharing is still very low, and political tensions frequently undermine collaborative efforts.

Allegations of state complicity in sheltering or abetting terrorist organizations—especially in the case of Pakistan—have eroded CT legitimacy. Organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Haqqani Network have traditionally had some level of protection or tolerance.

Top-down military approaches and security laws (e.g., AFSPA in India, Prevention of Terrorism Act in Sri Lanka) have tended to lead to civilian casualties and abuses and promoted radicalization instead of preventing it.

Numerous South Asian nations lack the legal and institutional capabilities to prosecute terrorism cases adequately. Trial delays, inefficient evidence collection, and weak conviction rates undermine deterrence.

Terror outfits have increasingly used digital media for recruitment, propaganda, and funding. The majority of South Asian states do not have advanced cyber capabilities to match this emerging threat paradigm

Terror outfits have increasingly used digital media for recruitment, propaganda, and funding. The majority of South Asian states do not have advanced cyber capabilities to match this emerging threat paradigm. In some instances, governments have employed counterterrorism as a mechanism to stifle opposition or disenfranchise dissidents. This politicization undermines the legitimacy of CT efforts and polarizes societies.

To develop a stronger and more sustainable counterterrorism system in South Asia, reforms at both the national and regional levels are necessary.

A South Asian Counterterrorism Center under UN or impartial supervision might be an option worth exploring

Reviving and energizing forums such as SAARC and BIMSTEC to address terrorism in particular, share intelligence, and engage in cooperative training can generate confidence and foster resilience across boundaries. A South Asian Counterterrorism Center under UN or impartial supervision might be an option worth exploring.

Inclusion-focused, development-oriented CT efforts emphasizing education, economic opportunity, and participation may limit the influence of extremist philosophies

Poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, and political disenfranchisement may trigger radicalization. On the other hand,  inclusion-focused, development-oriented CT efforts emphasizing education, economic opportunity, and participation may limit the influence of extremist philosophies. To combat terrorism we must adhere to democratic ideals and human rights norms. Accountability, transparency, and community engagement may improve legitimacy and minimize backlash.

Investment in artificial intelligence, big data analytics, and cyber intelligence is vital to monitor online radicalization and pre-empt attacks. Joint cyber defense units and regional information grids can also help in this regard. Countries should design programs aimed at de-radicalizing former militants, integrating them into society, and preventing recidivism. Bangladesh and Malaysia offer useful models in this regard.

Governments must resist the temptation to politicize terrorism for short-term gains. A bipartisan and region-wide commitment to eliminate terrorism in all its forms is essential.

Strict enforcement of FATF guidelines, better financial monitoring, and regional coordination on tracking illicit flows can choke terrorist funding. Enhanced coordination between financial intelligence units is crucial. In particular, collaboration with international partners such as INTERPOL and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) can boost technical expertise and tracking of transnational financial networks.

There have been important successes—such as Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE, India’s post-Mumbai reforms, and Pakistan’s military operations— still the overall picture is one of fragmentation and inconsistency

Counterterrorism in South Asia still remains a formidable challenge, shaped by regional rivalries, ideological battles, and institutional limitations. While there have been important successes—such as Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE, India’s post-Mumbai reforms, and Pakistan’s military operations—still the overall picture is one of fragmentation and inconsistency. The persistence of safe havens, ideological indoctrination, and political opportunism undermines the strategic coherence of CT efforts.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia