On 24 December, Pakistan’s airstrikes in the Burmal district of Paktika province reportedly killed forty-seven people, most of which, according to Pakistan authorities, belonged to the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The strikes took place at a training facility and a media centre. The strike came after the TTP, using Afghan territory, attacked a couple of days ago on an army outpost near the border with Afghanistan, killing 16 Pakistani soldiers.

This was the second Pakistani airstrike against TTP positions this year. On 18 March 2024, in response to the attack from Afghanistan, the Pakistan Air Force carried out two intelligence-based airstrikes on Afghanistan’s eastern border provinces of Khost and Paktika, killing eight TTP personnel. In between the above two airstrikes, the TTP attacked many times Pakistan’s posts along the border; many Afghan nationals were part of these attacks.

Kabul can’t and won’t sustain terror groups attacking neighbouring countries and the world at large 

Afghan Taliban know full well that those killed or injured in the attack were not Afghan nationals. The post-attack messages from the TTP cadres also confirmed that an accurate strike destroyed the TTP’s training and media centre. The concentration of over 50 men in one place was not a coincidence, as they were present with their arms, ammunition and suicide gear. Massive explosions at the attack sites further confirmed the presence of arms and explosives. Whether women and children were killed in the attack is still not clear, as the TTP militants largely inhabited the area.

One can appreciate the hurdles the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) may be facing in controlling the TTP and other terrorist groups, but dealing with the TTP is a much easier option than other terrorist groups such as ISKP.  There is a need to look into the challenges the AIG faces in establishing durable governance in the country. First, although the Taliban authorities may not say so in public, it is becoming obvious that the TTP is fast becoming a liability for the Afghan Taliban. For instance, over two dozen TTP factions are proof that its cadres are not part of a monolith but a divided house rooted in tribal preferences and prejudices. Thuggery is another aspect of the TTP to coerce the people; the common practice is to force a family either to pay money or contribute one person to the TTP for the cause of “Jihad”. A refusal may have dire consequences for the family. Even sober Afghan Taliban leaders have been conceding in confidence that they do not consider the TTP as “Mujahids” as most of their cadres indulge in “blackmail, extortion and forced marriages”.

Second, the power play within the Taliban hierarchy is keeping from an amicable solution to the TTP presence in Afghanistan. It is common knowledge that handing over the TTP personnel, especially their leaders, to Pakistani authorities would not be possible despite Taliban leader Mullah Haibtullah Akhund’s edict that “attacking Pakistan is haram (forbidden). Here, it is not Mullah Haibtullah’s edict but the Pashtun rawaj (tradition) or Pashtunwali (Pashtun code of conduct) which is cited as a reason that forbids the Taliban officials to address Pakistan’s demand and handover TTP personnel to Pakistan government.

Third, the rawaj (tradition) does not mean that the “guest” (TTP) may have the free hand to misuse hospitality and launch attacks on Pakistan from Afghan soil, especially when forbidden by the Supreme leader Mullah Haibtullah. Some TTP apologists argue that Mullah Haibtullah has not issued such an edict. In that case, the Afghan Taliban would be indulging in denigrating the status of their supreme leader by misinforming the Pakistani authorities that Mullah Haibtullah has declared an attack on Pakistan haram and that such a double speak would ultimately be harmful to the Taliban rule in future.

Haqqani Network can’t protect their family and financial interests in Pakistan by continuing support to TTP and other terror groups

 

Fourth, Afghan Taliban are in a denial mode when it comes to dealing with various terrorist groups are concerned. A UN Security Council report in July 2024 estimated up to 6,500 TTP fighters are based in Afghanistan. However, the same report admitted that “the Taliban do not conceive of TTP as a terrorist group”. Regarding Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Taliban consider them as enemies but at the same time deny their presence in the country despite their frequent attacks across the country. ETIM and IMU are other two organizations amongst over a dozen terrorist outfits operating from Afghanistan. When the Taliban are offered assistance to tackle these terrorist outfits, they not only reject such offers but boast about their capability to deal with these organizations. Unfortunately, the Taliban’s egoistic approach has aggravated the situation; the number of attacks inside Afghanistan and its neighbours, especially Pakistan, has only increased ever since the Taliban ruled Kabul.

Fifth, there is a visible pattern in the ongoing support that the TTP receives from the Taliban government. The TTP cadres are more aligned with the Haqqani faction in the Afghan government than the Kandahar leadership. The TTP leaders reside in Haqqani-controlled areas of greater Paktika and Khost regions. Ironically, Haqqanis are considered friends of Pakistan and maintain close relations with Pakistani officials. The entire Haqqani family’s business interests are concentrated in the Waziristan region. It should be a source of concern for everyone in Pakistan’s power circles how TTP cadres are conveniently using the Haqqanis’ shelters to attack Pakistan. Are Haqqanis running with the hare and hunting with the hounds?

The above factors are not favourable to smooth relations with the AIG, requiring the government of Pakistan to revisit the entire gamut of its relations with the Taliban regime. Afghan Taliban must be aware of the consequences of strained relations with Pakistan. They must also realize that they are no longer freedom fighters but a government with huge responsibilities towards its people and the outside world, especially its neighbours. No neighbours of Afghanistan will tolerate Afghan soil being used against them.

Therefore, in the coming days and weeks, the Taliban will have to decide the nature of their relationship with Pakistan—whether to choose TTP or Pakistan. Also, the AIG must determine whether it considers TTP’s struggle against Pakistan right or wrong. For the TTP, a viable path is available if it surrenders arms and owes allegiance to Pakistan’s Constitution. No organization can dictate its agenda with force or defy the Constitution. Other religious parties in the country conduct activities within the Constitution, and TTP is no exception. By supporting the TTP, the Afghan Taliban would not only interfere in Pakistan’s internal matters but also indulge in unfriendly acts with serious consequences