Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was proposed in 2013 and was often presented as a huge network of infrastructure, i.e. highways and coal plants, extended all over the Global South. The BRI faced a lot of criticism in its initial decade, with the criticism claiming that it was diverting a lot of funding to fossil-fuel investments in other countries.

Chinese contractors closed nearly $11.8 billion in new energy-sector contracts in 2024, most of which comprised renewable investments.

In another study conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2017, close to 91 % of Chinese energy lending to BRI countries went to oil, gas, or coal projects. There is increased international criticism, and to dispel this image, the Chinese government has been trying to rebrand it. In a 2021 speech, President Xi Jinping promised to have China would not build any new coal-fired power installations overseas.

This has prompted authorities to introduce the next cycle of the BRI as low-carbon and of high-quality instead of being overwhelmingly driven by carbon. The biggest issue that faces global climate governance is: will the green claims made by Beijing recently translate into concrete performance, or will it prove to be just a publicity stunt?

The latest BRI white paper, published in October 2021, presents a bold program: the capital says that it will continue to adhere to the framework of the connections based on openness, environmental friendliness, and sustainable progress, which is called in the relevant departments, open, green, and clean cooperation. To implement this vision, China has created multilateral platforms that include the Belt and Road Green Development Coalition, meant to organize environmental protection and enable green finance.

According to empirical findings, this discourse is providing tangible project resolutions. Most significant of all is the striking increase in clean-energy investment associated with the BRI in 2024: Chinese contractors closed nearly $11.8 billion in new energy-sector contracts (a 60 % jump compared with the previous year), most of which comprised renewable investments.

The discussed year can be characterized by the spread of solar energy and wind-based constructions with the support of China, expanding as far as Chile and Pakistan. There are such standout cases as the Whoosh electric, high-speed railway in Indonesia, a project planned to use only renewable energy, and the vast Noor Abu Dhabi solar facility. At the same time, Sri Lanka has transformed one of its major ports to solar-assisted shipping.

Collectively, these projects highlight how China insists on a green orientation under the BRI 2.0, as evidenced by the increased levels of domestic participation of firms, including State Grid and Sinopec, in global wind, solar, and even hydrogen projects, in recent years.

China will become the single biggest contributor to climate action by employing manpower and investment overseas.

As climate diplomacy has been initiated in China, the Chinese government has pursued the foregrounding of the South-South coalition to enhance the relationship among the developing states. When COP28 took place in Dubai in the same year, Chinese representatives held events there to emphasise the supposed leadership position of China as a country that makes use of green and low-carbon energies.

Ministries representing the Global South in general and Beijing in particular identified with Beijing since the city assured its technological and financial support, with one official announcing that China will become the single biggest contributor to climate action by employing manpower and investment overseas. China has also launched a RMB 8.2 billion (1.2 billion) South-South Climate Cooperation Fund, which provides funding to clean-energy infrastructure as well as adaptation schemes in less-developed countries.

At the ministerial level, beneficiaries of this assistance point out that such efforts comply with the principle of the United Nations regarding a common differentiated responsibility where richer developing nations, including China, provide resources to finance and knowledge base to enable the reductions among the most marginalized communities to decarbonize and deal with the effects of climate change.

The Chinese efforts to tackle climate change should not be viewed as applying solely within Chinese borders, as indeed the climate strategy of China flows into that of the fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and newcomers), whose 2025 summit at Rio reaffirmed the consensus view on the need to enhance global response to climate change emerging on the back of sustainable development.

The parties agreed to establish a new multilateral fund, the Tropical Forest Forever Facility, at COP30, underscoring the significant role of Beijing in forestry and biodiversity finance. Along the same lines, China has organized BRI forums with ASEAN and African partners to support green development and announced dozens of clean-tech pilot programs in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America in collaboration.

Together, these efforts aim to ensure the reconstitution of China (and BRI) in the Global South: rather than being discussed as predominantly competitive actors, Beijing is rebranding itself as a helpful participant in low-carbon development.

Despite the announcement by Beijing to stop financing coal plants abroad, it continues to construct coal mines and coal export terminals.

Several caveats prevail. Safe Use: understanding Commonly placed analysis parameters. As recently as 2020, CSIS reported and cautioned that China was issuing its green BRI initiatives as far less mandatory and opaque, and duplicative of them, problems that persist. Despite the announcement by Beijing to stop financing coal plants abroad, it continues to construct coal mines and coal export terminals, which lock in emissions over the long run.

In the 2024 investment report, it was recognized that Chinese companies continue to sign coal-related infrastructure contracts in some countries, and oil/gas projects reached new all-time highs, primarily in the Middle East. It is also not very transparent: little data exists on the amount of carbon produced by BRI projects, independent of project developers.

Such policy briefs that illustrate the complexity of this so-called win-win sustainable development, even despite the rhetoric China harps on, were up to date, manifested by the fact that local pollutants, social dissatisfaction, or debt pressure frequently shadow BRI projects as it has done before. In a nutshell, just by stating that any initiative is green does not mean that the results thereof are sustainable.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.