The most recent military flare-up between India and Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack has once again exposed how brittle and underdeveloped South Asia’s security architecture remains. Despite the existence of the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM), created in 2006 to allow both countries to exchange intelligence and investigate terrorism jointly, the mechanism has remained dormant, overtaken by political suspicion, competing national narratives, and a preference for unilateral action over cooperation. The recent events underline not only a regional security failure but also a larger political failure to imagine and maintain institutional pathways that can endure moments of crisis.
Dialogue mechanisms are not rewards for good behavior; they are necessities for managing tensions and mistrust.
The tragedy is that JATM was not a perfect instrument, but it was designed precisely for moments like this, when emotions run high, media narratives intensify, and national security establishments feel the pull to act alone. Past JATM meetings after the Samjhota Express bombing or the Kabul embassy attack showed that, at minimum, the mechanism could serve as a diplomatic “shock absorber,” allowing both sides to signal intentions, exchange evidence, and manage crises without escalation. Today, however, both governments seem increasingly uninterested in reviving or modernizing such frameworks, even though the regional environment has only become more complex.
Pakistan’s proportional military response, Operation Bunyan Marsus, was framed within the rights of self-defense under the UN Charter, signaling an intent to demonstrate deterrence without reckless escalation. At the same time, India’s Operation Sindoor was presented as a precise counterterror operation, justified by security needs but carried out without engaging existing bilateral mechanisms like JATM.
Both sides justified their actions, but the larger picture is one of mutual distrust, hardened by years of political signaling, media-fueled rhetoric, and a rising securitized posture on both sides of the border. This is not a matter of one side being more at fault; it is a shared regional failure to invest in mechanisms that could make conflict less likely and cooperation more possible.
Both India and Pakistan miss the strategic point by conditioning cooperation on ideal conditions that never come.
Meanwhile, climate-related vulnerabilities are intensifying the risks both countries face. Pakistan’s signing of the four-year Global Green Growth Initiative (GGGI) in late 2024, its new National Carbon Market Policy, and its ambitious National Renewable Energy Policy aiming for 60% renewable energy by 2030 show a country trying to align with global climate goals. India, too, has positioned itself internationally as a renewable energy leader.
But, both countries sit among the world’s most climate-vulnerable, with Pakistan ranked in the top ten of the Global Climate Risk Index 2024 and India not far behind. The shared risks from floods, heatwaves, glacial melt, and water scarcity are not abstract; they are daily realities for millions of citizens. But climate security and human security cannot be fully addressed without regional cooperation, particularly over shared river basins and cross-border disaster responses.
In this context, the failure to revive JATM is more than just a security lapse; it is a signal of a deeper political paralysis. Pakistan has consistently called for the reactivation of the mechanism, while India has insisted that talks must be preceded by verifiable action against terrorist networks. Both positions reflect legitimate grievances, but both also miss the strategic point: dialogue mechanisms are not rewards for good behavior; they are necessities for managing bad behavior, tensions, and mistrust. Waiting for ideal conditions before reviving cooperation only ensures that conditions will never improve.
South Asia’s security is no longer just about missiles; it’s about building institutional and diplomatic resilience.
It is also critical to recognize the role of domestic politics. India’s leadership faces strong domestic incentives to appear tough on Pakistan, especially in an election season, while Pakistan’s leaders struggle with internal political fragmentation and a powerful military-security apparatus wary of appearing too conciliatory. But long-term strategic thinking requires leaders to see beyond short-term political gains. JATM was never meant to be the final solution to South Asia’s terror problem; it was meant to keep communication alive precisely when political and military pressures threatened to close doors.
The broader lesson is clear: South Asia’s security is no longer just about tanks, missiles, or counterterror operations. It is about building institutional resilience, diplomatic, environmental, and economic, that can absorb shocks and reduce the likelihood of catastrophic escalation.
JATM’s dormancy signals a dangerous political failure, not just a missed security opportunity.
JATM, or a reformed successor, needs to be treated not as a symbol of weakness or concession, but as a strategic tool for managing an increasingly volatile region. This requires political will on both sides, but also a commitment to seeing each other not only as rivals but as neighbors who share interconnected risks. Without this shift, South Asia will remain trapped in cycles of provocation and retaliation, hostage to the very threats both India and Pakistan claim they want to defeat.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
