The 17th BRICS Summit, tentatively scheduled for July 7 and 8 in Brazil, a country that originally initiated the grouping and has a history of surprising the agenda at the time, is shrouded in uncertainty. Some diplomats admit to a nervous curiosity, not least because the host city could become a stage for back-door bargaining that no one expected.

Several regional watchers claim that the meeting now serves as a tipping point for India’s broader foreign policy compass. In their terms, Delhi faces a fork: either it leans decisively inward and possibly consolidates its influence within the bloc, or it retreats and is left to weigh the fallout. The older Russia-India-China triangle, still couched as RIC even if the letters have begun to fray, has once again resurfaced in hallway chatter.

Sergey Lavrov just spoke in Moscow with a tone that sounded almost scripted for his upcoming Delhi stop, urging a firmer RIC bond and quietly putting Chinese policy back on New Delhi’s desk. Meanwhile, the term “Pakistan” has appeared in BRICS discussion papers in ways that earlier summits had previously omitted, suggesting a more open dialogue.

Pakistan’s entry into BRICS is no longer a question of if, but when and how.

Many analysts in Islamabad, closely reading these shifts, believe they signal more than cosmetic diplomacy; they suspect a slow, tectonic realignment in South Asian relations. If Sergei Lavrov sells his BRICS expansion plan, India’s ambition of quietly dominating every regional platform could be at risk of tumbling overnight. The government has claimed for a decade that only it speaks for South Asia, yet that single mandate now feels shaky as Beijing and Moscow offer fresh momentum to the grouping.

Analysts no longer frame the debate in terms of whether Islamabad joins BRICS; the real question is when and under what conditions. State circles in Delhi are whispering about whether they can stomach such news without blowing a gasket. Lavrovs’ talk of reviving the old RIC triangle echoes like a Soviet-era demand disguised as reassurance. The Kremlin does not leave much room for second-guessing, even if the paper trails look polite. Roughly translated, it means India had better think twice before drifting closer to the Quad.

Meanwhile, New Delhi keeps loading Russian crates of missile tech onto the tarmac while hosting American naval officers in the same week. Walking the tightrope has become a full-time, perilous occupation, and the rope is fraying at both ends.

When the war tore through Ukraine, the old diplomatic slack disappeared and left a raw, tit-for-tat landscape. Cornered in that tight space, the Kremlin has straight-up dismissed talk of easing its Beijing partnership, labelling the link a core security anchor rather than just a tactical side deal. For the Chinese leadership, the arithmetic is clear enough: a thickened BRICS still cannot shift the American net unless cities such as Islamabad, Tehran, and perhaps Ankara eventually board the train.

Bringing Pakistan fully into the fold is the obvious first step, almost a matter of counting rather than negotiating. In Beijing’s eyes, that move looks less like a favour and more like routine arithmetic. Pakistan has hardly perched on its hands, waiting for a shiny new BRICS badge. Inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, its envoys often push for consensus so vocally that even veteran Chinese delegates can seem coy by comparison. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor effectively combines steel-and-concrete projects with political rhetoric, linking the two capitals within an ecosystem of loans and contracts.

After the United States exited Afghanistan, Islamabad styled itself as a broker of temporary stability, hosting Western delegations while quietly demanding concessions rather than penalties. Set against that backdrop, the BRICS invitation hangs like low-hanging fruit, poised to significantly shift South Asia’s power balance away from New Delhi’s historic dominance. Moscow, for its part, is quietly on board, a vote of support that the Kremlin interprets as a diplomatic victory. At the same time, Islamabad sees it as validation of its regional stature.

The Kremlin prefers dealing with a South Asian state that maintains a steady posture instead of shifting between rival blocs. Scheduled military drills now crowd the calendar alongside discussions about the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline, which shifts the ledger labelled ‘future potential’ into the ‘actual’ column. Russian executives repeat in private what diplomats can only hint at in public: that dependability has monetary value far beyond grandiose statements.

India’s diplomatic balancing act between Washington and Moscow is fraying at both ends.

Islamabad steered through the Russia-Ukraine fallout with surprising dexterity. By publicly demanding dialogue while sidestepping outright censure, the government has leveraged its political capital, and Moscow appears inclined to capitalise on that goodwill by supporting Pakistan’s push to join BRICS.

New Delhi is not enjoying the same buoyancy. Officials who once took BRICS membership for granted now find that those plans are undercut by a deeper military alignment with Washington and an emerging tech compact that is fraying at the seams. American planners still view the bloc with suspicion, and their vision of encircling China in the Indo-Pacific is, ironically, boxed in by India’s willingness to sit at a table where Moscow and Beijing hold the gavel.

Political frictions within the BRICS orbit are expected to escalate in the coming days, a development that would underscore India’s ability to shape future diplomatic momentum decisively. Rumour is already ricocheting through Brasilia’s summit halls: informal side talks may soon address who gets a seat when the bloc next expands. China and Russia, participants claim, are insisting on firm timetables instead of polite flirtations, and Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Egypt reportedly head the shortlist of candidates.

New Delhi’s checklist is procedural; its watchword is still consensus, yet that argument is sounding steadily more isolated as timelines shorten. South Africa and Brazil, hungry to boost the group’s heft on the world stage, show a readiness to stretch the rules if newcomers can leverage real political weight. These two countries, as key members of the BRICS, are also seeking to enhance the group’s influence and are willing to accommodate new members if it strengthens the bloc’s position on the global stage.

India, meanwhile, balances on the diplomatic equivalent of a tightrope, Moscow and Beijing each applying their pressure. Lavrov is expected to float the prospect of a Modi-Xi encounter in Brasilia. This icebreaker would overshadow the Galwan skirmish and mark the first serious Sino-Indian thaw in years. If such a meeting materialises, it could lead to a significant shift in the Sino-Indian relationship, potentially easing tensions and opening the door for future cooperation. However, New Delhi will almost certainly tone down its public rhetoric on China’s border tactics and its expanding sway across the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean, which could be seen as a concession to Beijing.

Stepping carefully now presents a real headache for Narendra Modi. One softly spoken phrase about China could spark a flurry of domestic headlines and hand opposition parties the outrage they’ve been seeking. Yet, insisting on an outright snub to Xi may make New Delhi look childish while Beijing quietly claims the moral high ground. Imagine, just for a moment, the Prime Minister leaning across a conference table in Brazil and locking hands with Xi next month. That fleeting touch might suddenly unlock discussions about the high-altitude frontier or even shape the next BRICS agenda. The alternative of watching time tick by with crossed arms looks increasingly expensive with each passing day.

Through Islamabad’s lens, a loud entry into BRICS is less about the bloc’s paperwork than about brandishing status in a continent-stretching chess game. Pakistan is already latched on to China, inching closer to Moscow, and, oddly enough, still chatting with Washington and the Gulf capitals. That overlapping dance refuses to fit the neat Indo-Pacific versus Eurasian boxes some analysts keep scribbling. Riding with BRICS also hands Islamabad a chance to flip the regional storyline for a change.

A handshake in São Paulo could shift the trajectory of South Asian diplomacy for a generation.

India has recently taken centre stage in South Asia, representing the region at the G20, I2U2, and other high-profile forums. Pakistan, by contrast, is often visible only in the rear-view mirror, if at all. That pattern could shift a lone membership application away from October 2023 onward.

If Islamabad secures BRICS entry, the West’s diplomatic monopoly looks instantly frayed. New Delhi would no longer meet Pakistan as an outcast; the two would at least share a standard table and a common logo for once, and the photo-ops would be harder to ignore. Some analysts believe the grouping is already styled as an economic counterweight to Washington and Brussels, even if the voting majorities tell a different story. Whatever the label, Islamabad smells fresh oxygen and a route to sidestep the colour-by-numbers blocs the West keeps pitching.

A seat in this circle could attract new public and private capital for sluggish ports and power grids, open alternative trade lanes, and enable Pakistan to project a louder narrative on energy policy than it can muster at home. Officials in Islamabad have waited years for a venue where sovereignty earns serious dollars, not just polite applause. BRICS matches that hope exactly.

Diplomats from the Global South are weary of quick-fix loans with fine-print strings and of sitting quietly while richer states rewrite the playbook. They want an outlet where the daily talk isn’t about handouts but about on-ramp funding, shared technology, and the rules that turn promises into projects. For Pakistan, BRICS appears to be one of the last, best chances to initiate that conversation.

If an expanded BRICS truly acts on the agenda that Pakistan continually advocates, the grouping could transform wishful thinking into concrete policy. The benchmark now lies in whether each member arrives equipped with tools rather than mere talking points. How New Delhi makes its next diplomatic move may ultimately shape India’s status in an emerging multipolar order. Giving too much weight to short-term applause could marginalise the country.

In the corridors of South Block, officials are once again wrestling with the question of hegemony versus partnership. Modi alone controls that decision. A brief, possibly perfunctory handshake with Xi in São Paulo might nevertheless loosen the logjam around Pakistan’s membership application. The Prime Minister’s strenuous balancing act, which involves courting Silicon Valley one day and consulting with Moscow the next, will not remain a debate confined to brainstorming slides much longer.

BRICS now serves as the battleground for South Asia’s narrative, no longer India’s uncontested domain.

For Islamabad, the horizon looks distinctly malleable. With backing from both Beijing and Moscow, public entry into BRICS could present itself as a bold move to underwrite stable regional trade routes. Rawalpindi’s desk already holds draft commitments centred on peace dividends and economic overlap. How New Delhi chooses to react, whether it stands firm or settles for a workable middle ground, is likely to set the direction for South Asia’s foreign relations well into the next generation.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.