Pakistan Wars: An Alternative History, by Tariq Rahman, was published in 2022 by Folio Books, Lahore. The book revisits the wars fought in Pakistan taking a subaltern approach where the people with no power i.e. foot soldiers, spouses, porters, ordinary civilians, etc., were interviewed. Their recollection of the events helps the readers to understand the wars fought in Pakistan.

The book revisits Pakistan’s wars through the eyes of those with no power—foot soldiers, spouses, and ordinary civilians.

In the introduction, the author describes the purpose of the book is to bring an alternative history to Pakistan’s wars and to rectify the mainstream narrative surrounding it; explaining to the readers, who may not necessarily have a background in history, what a subaltern approach in history is. The book also delves into research methodology, specifically interviews, that were carried out to write the content.

In the following chapter, readers are immersed in the military decision-making process and how decisions are made to wage war. Unilateral views against India (motivated by the martial race theory), personal glory, honor, and respect for the institution are explained as the main factors in the decision-making with little room for rationality and cost-benefit analysis. The role of the clique (military) is also explored where the entirety of the armed forces doesn’t need to be informed or supportive of various decisions made in the closed quarters.

Chapter three focuses on the Kashmir war (1947 – 1948) fought between Pakistan and India and tries to answer the questions of what caused the state to be split and whether the decisions taken by the decision makers posed a risk to the newly formed state. The chapter explores the case of the use of non-state actors in initiating the war, the role of the clique which consisted both of the civilians and the military with an eventual fall down of the former. It concludes with the Pakistan high command excluding the civilian decision-makers in the subsequent wars that occurred.

Decisions to wage war in Pakistan were often made by a small clique, driven by personal glory and martial race theory, with little room for rational analysis.

Meanwhile, chapter four discusses the decision-making process that led to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965; from the use of non-state actors in Operation Gibraltar to the Indian response on the border. Operation Gibraltar was the product of the overconfidence in the success of the Rann of Kutch and the belief that India would not respond, and even if they did, they would not stand to Pakistan. Besides the personal motivations of different individuals, the 1965 war established a system that did not allow dissenting opinions to be expressed.

Both chapters five and six discuss the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, with the former discussing the Pakistani experience of the war whilst the latter focusing on Bengali. On the Pakistani end, the civilian cabinet was not consulted and instead of carrying out a cost-benefit analysis, like the previous wars, a small clique of generals decided to suppress the Bengalis through military action.

The decision was well known amongst the West Pakistanis, who lent their support, without knowing the consequences of the action and the actual amount of suffering the Bengalis were facing. The few who did express opposition to the decisions were arrested by the military dictatorship of Yahya Khan. Although Pakistan did not learn much from the 1971 war, it had lost the moral right to rule over its east wing.

Taking from the Bengali experiences, in chapter six, the author traces the history of Bengali resentment towards West Pakistan from the inception of the country in 1947 to the 1971 war which was marked by the Bengali Language Movement, protests in the constituent assembly, and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s six points. The author discusses the long-term effects the war had on the relations between Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India to this day which remains sour.

The 1971 war saw the exclusion of civilian decision-makers, leading to a military-led suppression of Bengalis with disastrous consequences.

The chapter also highlights the Pakistani turn towards religious fundamentalism as a result of West Pakistan prisoners of war finding solace and passing time with religious materials, which, in the long run, assisted General Zia-ul-Haq’s s quest for political and moral legitimacy with an appeal to religion accepted at least among former servicemen. Lastly, the war promoted vengeance amongst Pakistanis which took shape in training non-state actors in Kashmir in a similar fashion as India trained the Mukti Bahini to fight Pakistan.

Although India took the aggressive step to initiate war in Siachen as described in chapter seven, the Kargil War of 1999 was another case of a clique (of four generals) deciding to fight despite the risks of escalating to a full-scale war without consulting the civilians’ sectors. The decision was also criticized by other military officers. The Kargil War was treated as a formal decision by Pakistan rather than a covert gamble by a clique; the international community considered the state itself risk-prone and irresponsible. Hence, the peace process between Pakistan and India couldn’t take place.

The low-intensity operations, the ones that are not as major as the wars fought between Pakistan and India are discussed in the following chapter. The author discusses the impact of the Afghan War (1979-1989) on the local populace including the military officers, who were exposed to the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The religious fundamentalists were given funds, weapons, and training for the war. After the war, with the Soviets withdrawing, the fundamentalists were still patronized despite annoyance and pressure from the United States, as a counter to India’s influence.

As far as Kashmir was concerned, the author shares his sentiment stating that India had lost the “moral rights to rule the Vale”. Pakistan, on the other hand, employed the same policy as it did in the 1965 war employing non-state actors, this time being jihadists instead of tribesmen. The decision was taken by the top military officers and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Due to it being confidential, it could not be discussed meaningfully in the media, the civilian government, or the intelligentsia.

The Kargil War was treated as a formal decision by Pakistan, leading the international community to see the state as risk-prone and irresponsible.

Chapters nine and ten explore the relationship of war and gender with the former exploring the relationship of war with women while the latter with men. Women have played an active role in the war as either medical staff, helpers, or cheering for men in the war. They soon also got combat roles. However, like all wars, women’s experience has mostly been of losing loved ones, violations against themselves or other women in the family, trauma, anxiety, stress, and displacement.

The author notes that women do not necessarily follow the jingoistic narratives as compared to their male counterparts; they condemn the very institution of war, especially amongst the wives of military officers. The subaltern women take to the streets in their condemnation of war. Although the women were not included in the decision-making of the war, they did not show any form of support for the decisions in their capacities as family members.

The men suffered like the women did, however, their sufferings depended on their socioeconomic class. The author points out that the elite suffrage was comparatively less than the subaltern groups given the number of resources they had as well as their network of connections. The subaltern groups are marginalized, and their sufferings remain silent and unrecorded. As far as the war affected an individual soldier, the soldier displayed signs of panic, shock, and extreme anxiety; however, they were stigmatized by their colleagues for being ‘cowards’. Those who did show heroism in the war suffered from trauma, and although they were not shunned, they endured pain in silence or the hospital with their family and friends.

The second last chapter discusses the humanitarian side of the soldiers and others, despite being from the opposing side, by giving examples of how they try to keep human rights violations to a minimum and going as far as helping others at their own risk and personal well-being. The author notes that this is common among everyone regardless of background, and certain compassionate impulses manifest the idea of resistance to war and cruelty, fueling efforts for global peace, especially in South Asia. Despite the dominance of pro-war and anti-peace factions in the region, ongoing peace initiatives persist, offering hope for future success.

This book provides an insight to the readers into how decisions to enter wars are carried out by a clique driven by their interests and their unfounded beliefs concerning India. The book also provides first-hand accounts of those who were affected by the decisions of the clique and is kept in simple language, without much jargon, suited for mass readership. It also scrutinizes the power dynamics between the civilian administration and the military institution in decision-making. Lastly, the book provides, as the title states, an alternative view of Pakistan’s wars that deviates from the mainstream narrative.

The book calls for introspection from decision-makers, urging respect for international laws and caution against future conflicts.

Although the book covers most of the wars Pakistan engaged itself in, it briefly mentions the War on Terror which rose Pakistan to prominence. Language can be overlooked but as it is written in English, its reach to the non-English readers is limited, the intended audience, placing the book at a disadvantage. It can be translated, however, after one has seen what happened with the Urdu translation of The Case of Exploding Mangoes (2009) by Mohammad Hanif which got shelved, the expectation for it to reach the public is limited. The length of the book poses an issue for readers who are committed to their respective businesses. It could have been split into two or three books or volumes.

The book concludes with the last words from the author, who calls for introspection from the decision-makers regarding the risks of engaging in another war or conflict and that international laws should be respected.