Starting this review by quoting a relevant verse in regards to the context of the subject from the Holy Quran, “If you must punish an enemy, do so only in proportion to the harm done to you. But if you choose patience, it is better for those who remain patient.” (Quran 16:126)
Dr. Zia Ul Haque Shamsi’s “Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan” (Peter Lang, 2020) offers a serious study of the nuclear security relations between two age-old South Asian rivals. Having served the Pakistan Air Force as an officer directly involved in the military operations and strategic planning related to nuclear security, Shamsi is a real insider. The author of the book, which looks at how nuclear weapons have altered the conflict environment, argues that the Indo-Pakistani conflict environment has evolved into a “No War-No Peace” environment that has avoided total war, but allows for limited war. This book was published after India’s move in 2019 where India revoked the special status of Kashmir. It is published at an important time that is considered one the most dangerous nuclear flashpoints in the world.
Shamsi alternates the prevailing assumptions on nuclear stability in the South Asian region to alternative resolutions of the conflict rather than its management
Shamsi’s endeavour is distinct from existing work on South Asian security because it advances a novel analytical framework to differentiate between the theoretical possibility, and practical probability, of war. This method enables him to sidestep the limitations of conventional deterrence theory when applied to regional nuclear competitors with an unresolved territorial agenda. The book looks at all past conflicts, territorial disputes and crises events since nuclearization in detail and analyses how nuclear weapons have shaped decision-making and military strategies in both countries. In this way, Shamsi alternates the prevailing assumptions on nuclear stability in the South Asian region to alternative resolutions of the conflict rather than its management.
To start, one can perhaps think about the spiritual dimension of change and agency before beginning with the strategic decision-making theories. In the Holy Quran, Allah says, Allah does not change the condition of the people until they change what is within themselves. (Quran 13:11)
Shamsi takes a multilayered theoretical approach to international relations. He draws primarily on realist traditions using decision theory and constructivism. At the heart of this is what he designs as the ‘Possibility-Probability (P2) Model’ which is a novel dual axis model to cognise the probabilities of conflict occurring between NWS. The model identifies what can theoretically be done (possibility domain) and what is likely to be done (probability domain) through a matrix of capability, capacity, sustainability, political will and exit strategies.
This distinction gives Shamsi a way of explaining the disequilibrium between political demands and military responses that have marked multiple Indo-Pak conflicts
The P2 Model operates at two distinct levels. The first dimension of the P2 Modelling is realised when policy makers function in the possible domain which means that decision making takes place which is desirable, preferable, favorable and based on political will. The P2 Model functions in the “probability domain” for military strategists where assessment will be relying on capability, capacity to launch and absorb un-acceptable damage, sustainability regarding duration and intensity, and available exit strategies. This distinction gives Shamsi a way of explaining the disequilibrium between political demands and military responses that have marked multiple Indo-Pak conflicts.
In his methodology, Shamsi applies a historical case analysis (major crises of Kargil 1999, Twin-Peak Crisis 2001-02, and Pulwama/Balakot 2019) to test theoretical propositions. He uses decision theory by applying Graham Allison’s Rational Actor Model (RAM) and Governmental Process Model (GPM) to extract the decision-making processes of both states. In strategic doctrines, he examines the Cold Start Doctrine of India and Full Spectrum Deterrence of Pakistan to understand the security environment to the evolving nuclear postures of both states. In territorial disputes, he conducts detailed analysis of “doable disputes like Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek” crisis to explore pathways towards resolution. In personal insights, he includes his military experience and observations, particularly those on civil military relations of Pakistan and operational planning. The book continues, through serious theorising, over determining India and Pakistan’s identities. He labels India as an “offensive realist” state that wants regional hegemony. Pakistan is a “defensive realist” state primarily concerned with survival. This framing helps understand historical and future scenarios.
Nuclear deterrence has succeeded in preventing horizontal escalation but has failed in preventing vertical escalation on several occasions
Shamsi argues that nuclear weapons in South Asia paradoxically prevent total war, while enabling more frequent limited wars among states in the region. Nuclear weapons made the Cold War superpowers not fight with each other. But, India and Pakistan have had several limited conflicts since 1998 when they became nuclear weapons capable countries. The author argues that nuclear deterrence has succeeded in preventing horizontal escalation but has failed in preventing vertical escalation on several occasions.
Shamsi points out how conflict management is different from conflict resolution. He says now it has become “conflict deferral.” Nuclear deterrence allows both countries to manage the crisis but not resolve the crisis. There is what he calls a ‘No War-No Peace’ situation, which causes instability. Shamsi believes that the only way for Pakistan and India to resolve a conflict at all is if they voluntarily concede to each other by solving their respective disputes.
Shamsi thinks this “strategy of pendency” is advantageous for India’s offensive realist goals, while making Pakistan’s security competition unsustainable
Shamsi describes India’s approach toward its territorial disputes with Pakistan by the term “strategic pendency”. India is choosing not to resolve the areas of disputes in Siachen or Sir Creek which can be easily solved. Strategic pendency is actually carried out for furthering success in negotiations. Shamsi thinks this “strategy of pendency” is advantageous for India’s offensive realist goals, while making Pakistan’s security competition unsustainable.
The author calls Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons (termed by Shamsi “Low Yield Weapons” or LYWs) a reaction to India’s Cold Start Doctrine and growing conventional asymmetry. Shamsi claims that the purpose of these weapons is to shut down India’s space for limited war which India believes exists under the nuclear threshold. But he agrees that the development creates a dangerous “stability-instability paradox” of strategic stability but tactical instability.
All agreements must be respected and honored if nations are to sustain peace over the long-term. As Allah mentions in the Holy Quran, “ O you who have believed, fulfill [all] contracts. (Quran 5:1) In his most forward-looking argument, Shamsi engages in a Contention Resolution Framework based on “Mutually Agreeable Voluntary Actions” (MAVA), which has been influenced by Osgood’s GRIT Strategy. This strategy stresses taking things slowly and moving with confidence and implies that the easy to settle dispute first be worked out, before moving towards the more complex issue like Kashmir. The MAVA framework is based on voluntary offers and mutual accommodation, not coercive diplomacy or third-party intervention.
While assessing strengths and weaknesses of approaches, the importance of unity which keeps the national power intact needs to be remembered: Allah says in the Noble Quran that, And do not dispute and [thus] lose courage and [then] your strength would depart (Quran 8:46).
Since Shamsi is a senior Pakistan Air Force officer, he provides valuable insights into the military decision-making process rarely available to scholars. Through his own experience, he sees that the Pakistan Air Force was ready to go to war at critical moments of the Kargil Conflict. This perspective lets the reader pin down the military thinking behind the strategic decisions which formed the India-Pakistan clash.
This framework explains why limited war does not get deterred but total war does get deterred which is a key puzzle in South Asian Security Studies
The P2 Model is a possibly novel conceptualization of regional nuclear deterrence. Shamsi separates the two domains (possibility and probability), which distinguishes his analytical tool from existing ones and explains contradictions in deterrence outcomes better. This framework explains why limited war does not get deterred but total war does get deterred which is a key puzzle in South Asian security studies.
The author has done an outstanding job in terms of technicalities and geography, law, and military of Sir Creek and Siachen Glacier. The negotiations regarding the Sir Creek and Siachen Glacier have been precisely dealt with through their geographic, legal and military aspects in the book. Because of this, his policy suggestions climb up from theoretical abstracts to doable ones.
The book explains in-depth how civil-military coordination (or lack thereof) matters for strategic outcomes, especially where Pakistan is concerned. Shamsi’s critique of the disconnect between civilian policy making during the Kargil Conflict and military strategy implementation is quite discerning, pointing out how this disconnect created strategic gaps. The P2 Model for Decision-Making that he proposes addresses this issue by clarifying the space of civilian policymakers and military strategists.
Shamsi’s framework of conflict resolution moves from tackling disputes which are doable before moving on to complex disputes
Shamsi’s framework of conflict resolution moves from tackling disputes which are doable before moving on to complex disputes. His detailed plan to resolve disputes like Siachen and Sir Creek by starting with confidence-building measures is a welcome change from such theory and is highly practical.
Describing India as an “offensive realist” and Pakistan as “defensive realist” provides a consistent bias that sometimes undermines the objectivity of the analysis. Differently explained in history, similar actions are interpreted differently depending on whether the country is India or Pakistan. In other words, it is claimed India’s 1984 Siachen occupation demonstrates aggressive expansionism, while Pakistan’s 1999 Kargil operation gets described mainly in terms of strategic miscalculation.
Insufficient attention has been paid to the role of non-state actors in Indo-Pakistan tensions, especially on Kashmir and cross-border terrorism. While he acknowledges Indian accusations regarding Pakistan having “Kashmiri freedom fighters” on its payroll, Shamsi does not meaningfully engage with the issue of how non-state militant groups have contributed to crisis escalation and complicated deterrence calculations. Ignoring this is the major flaw in his analysis.
Shamsi’s portrayal of “strategy of pendency” as an essential aspect of Indian strategy endows a greater degree of strategic planning and consistency on Indian policy than is warranted. This description assumes that there is long-term strategic thinking behind things that could otherwise be seen as bureaucratic inertia, domestic political limits, or legitimate security concerns. The idea that India maintains disputes purposely to keep Pakistan on its toes is too simplistic.
Shamsi’s hopefulness regarding voluntary initiatives goes against his own realist examination of the competition’s structural features in the security domain
The MAVA framework counts a lot on the voluntary concessions of both parties with a particular emphasis on Pakistan conceding first given its conventional weakness. This approach may underestimate the domestic political pressures which make unilateral concessions of either country extremely difficult. Shamsi’s hopefulness regarding voluntary initiatives goes against his own realist examination of the competition’s structural features in the security domain.
Though the book recognizes economic differences as a cause of the conventional India-Pakistan asymmetry, it does not elaborate much on how economic factors influence military planning and security priorities. Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional arms buildup is not taken seriously enough economically, although it is essential to understand long-term strategic choices.
In addition to the specific content weaknesses, there are broader limitations that affect the book.
The legal-historical context of Kashmir, discussed in the book, largely conforms to the Pakistani official position
Even though Shamsi mentions his Pakistani perspective, at times, the book projects Pakistani official stances as objective analysis. The legal-historical context of Kashmir, discussed in the book, largely conforms to the Pakistani official position. The book’s effectiveness at convincing a non-Pakistani reader suffers due to a lack of engagement with Indian narratives.
The book makes significant use of secondary sources for Indian perspectives and policies, relying on these to a greater extent – and citing the authors less – than Indian military and strategic documentation, and in particular Pakistan’s. Sometimes the book makes guess work assertions about Indian strategic thinking which may not survive checking with Indian strategic minds.
Even though Shamsi constantly uses realist ideas, he doesn’t really get involved in other international debates. The book would benefit from greater explicit engagement with existing scholarly debates around deterrence theory, security dilemmas and nuclear strategy, especially concerning regional nuclear dynamics as compared to superpower ones.
Though the book was published in 2020, it captures developmental details up to 2019 and misses late developments. The book does not address the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for security priorities or regional dynamics or changes in policy under the Biden administration regarding South Asian security.
The book shows tension between its critical realist framework and its prescriptive notes. Shamsi’s policy suggestions often are built on peaceful ideals and voluntary concessions, which appear inconsistent with the competitive realist dynamics that he so meticulously demonstrates. This gap between diagnosis and prescription weakens the practical applicability of the policy recommendations.
Shamsi’s work does have its limitations but it has made important contributions to the literature.
Shamsi provides a powerful rebuttal to the universal applicability of Cold War deterrence models by demonstrating how nuclear weapons have failed to deter limited conflicts between India and Pakistan
Shamsi provides a powerful rebuttal to the universal applicability of Cold War deterrence models by demonstrating how nuclear weapons have failed to deter limited conflicts between India and Pakistan. His analyses also adds to a new literature on “regional nuclear dynamics” based on a realization that territorial disputes, historical hostilities and asymmetric capabilities generate different conditions for deterrence than superpowers.
The P2 Model is a novel contribution to methodology in security studies which breaks down the potential for conflict into two levels – possibility and probability. This framework can be used for other regional nuclear or conventional rivalries outside South Asia in which the threshold of escalation is analytically difficult.
Shamsi’s study of the impact of civil-military coordination on strategic outcomes provides interesting case studies of use to defense policy and military affairs scholars. His analysis of the Kargil Conflict’s decision-making process provides some particularly fruitful material for understanding how institutional arrangements shaped strategic choice in nuclear-armed states.
The technical detail provided in the book relating to a couple of territorial disputes and resolution mechanisms suggested that it can provide scholars and policymakers with concrete options for confidence-building measures. Shamsi’s extensive discussion of the options for resolution of Sir Creek and Siachen adds practical suggestions to the literature on settlement of territorial disputes.
The book talks about post-Pulwama/Balakot changes and the abrogation of Article 370 (Kashmir’s special status) which many essays have not taken cognizance of. Shamsi’s work is very relevant to understanding current regional security challenges and emerging deterrence dynamics.
Shamsi’s writing is scholarly and lays emphasis on readability for a non-specialist audience. The book is well organized and divided into three key parts. They are: development of the theory; global historical conflicts and disputes; and some proposals related to the genesis and resolution of conflict resolution in future. Each chapter logically builds on the previous ones to analyze the subject.
The text contains very useful illustrations, especially when preparing the P2 Model and territory disputes. Maps showing the Sir Creek boundary tussle and the Siachen Glacier scuffle help the reader understand the issues better. Illustrative tables presenting the Indian and Pakistani positions on important disputes will help the readers understand the complicated claims better.
Shamsi has gone to the extent of explaining technical military and strategic terms adequately for non-specialist readers. The endnotes of the book mention all sources and do not interrupt the narrative. At times, there is a noticeable repetition of the same argument that India is depicted as offensive realist across the chapters due to the density of information.
By using both chronological and thematic base, the reader is made to understand the historical progression of the events and the pattern embodied by Shamsi
The organization of the book is chronological and thematic as i focuses on an eventful history along with key analytical themes. By using both chronological and thematic base, the reader is made to understand the historical progression of the events and the pattern embodied by Shamsi.
“Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan” is a valuable contribution to the security dynamics of nuclear South Asia. Shamsi’s different P2 Model, insider military view and detailed view on the territorial disputes are useful for scholars and policymakers. The book shows how nuclear deterrence has not stopped total war in the region. But, it has created room for limited war. This flies in the face of earlier scholarship which had suggested nuclear stability.
The most interesting contribution of the book is its re-framing of the security dilemma of India and Pakistan as a choice between endless management and authentic resolution of the conflict. The current situation of ‘No War-No Peace’ is more dangerous and it has grown dangerous because of increasing conventional asymmetry. It may reduce the incidence of war. But it does not mean miscalculation will stop. Rather, it may increase miscalculation in the light of nuclear deterrence. The proposed MAVA framework, however perhaps an overestimate of voluntary concessions, may nevertheless conceptually unpack pathways beyond the current deadlock.
His insider perspective is a strength, so long as it is understood in that context, as it offers insight into Pakistani strategic thinking that a western or Indian analyst could not provide
While it shows perspective biases that reflect Shamsi’s Pakistan Air Force background, that should not detract from its overall academic value. His insider perspective is a strength, so long as it is understood in that context, as it offers insight into Pakistani strategic thinking that a western or Indian analyst could not provide. If readers go into the text knowing its perspectives, they will find a nuanced analysis that does not take it for granted what nuclear deterrence will do in the regional context.
Scholars of international security, South Asian politics and nuclear strategy will find the work both theoretically innovative and empirically rich. Readers focussed on South Asian stability would find insight into prospects for conflict resolution. In a part of the world where nuclear threats continue to exist, Shamsi carefully examines the limits of deterrence and the possibilities for resolution in ways that will benefit academics and policymakers.
To conclude this review, one should ponder over Allah’s guidance in the Noble Quran as Allah said: “And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war to terrorize the enemy of Allah and your enemy. And others besides them whom you do not know [but] Allah knows them.” Whatever you spend for the cause of Allah, will be paid back to you in full, and you will not be treated unjustly. (Quran 8:60)
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
