The Betting of the Iranian Opposition continues! When Donald Trump entered the White House in 2019, the Iranian opposition settled outside Iran, mainly in the United States of America, claiming a heightened need for sanctions against Iran under the guise of patriotism, supporting the maximum pressure campaign.

Again, with the onset of the unrest in 2022, they advocated for intensified sanctions to facilitate regime change and even military action. However, despite wrapping these statements in a veneer of loyalty to the nation, it quickly became evident to the Iranian people what lay beneath.

Maryam Memarsadeghi and other opposition figures openly advocate for military action against Iran, aligning with Zionist and Western interests.

In the past year or so, these opposition figures have openly aligned with Zionist interests, defending military strikes against Iran, particularly after the events in Syria.

From members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) to supporters of the Pahlavi dynasty, they have rallied and claimed to have viable options for the future of regime change, all while adopting the guise of civil and political activists. Their efforts lack genuine support among the Iranian populace, yet they strive to maintain a role in the competitive landscape for funding and influence.

Maryam Memarsadeghi, director of the anti-Iran think tank Tavaana, with strong ties to Zionist factions, recently discussed the necessity of a military attack on Iran, stating in an article that “it is now time for a comprehensive air campaign by the United States against the Islamic Republic, an operation that would weaken it to the point where the Iranian people could overthrow it.” She asserted that sanctions were no longer effective and that military intervention targeting Iran’s infrastructure was the best path forward.

This prompted an uproar among Iranian expatriates, who condemned her remarks as harmful to their people. Memarsadeghi attempted to clarify that her focus on infrastructure was intended solely for military installations. She justified her stance by arguing that there is no contradiction between supporting military action against a repressive regime and a nonviolent popular movement.

This repeated refrain echoes a year’s worth of rhetoric from their Zionist benefactors, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who, while professing to seek the destruction of Hamas, leveled Gaza and claimed the lives of more than 50000 individuals. Memarsadeghi’s past statements reveal a consistent advocacy for sanctions aimed at undermining Iran.

Notably, she was among the signatories of a 2016 anti-Iran letter to Trump demanding increased sanctions. Throughout the years, she exploited every opportunity to weaken Iran. Even during the COVID-19 crisis, she urged the U.S. government not to ease drug sanctions against Iran. Such actions naturally require funding and fiscal backing, particularly since opposition figures often reveal each other’s financial corruption when their respective agendas are at stake.

For instance, during the “Iran Disinfo” project in mid-2018, overseen by the U.S. State Department to conduct anti-Iran media initiatives, Memarsadeghi received nearly $2 million, yet she ultimately faced dismissal due to underperformance contrary to the designated budget.

Recent revelations from various anti-Iran figures’ social media platforms suggest that Memarsadeghi’s renewed calls for military intervention indicate access to fresh funding and projects aimed at exerting pressure for military action against the Iranian populace.

Now, opposition figures, adopting the guise of civil society activists, have begun publishing articles and papers in English-language media to promote military action against Iran. Memarsadeghi’s remarks were not the only ones supporting militaristic intervention.

Internal disputes and competition for funding have discredited Iranian opposition groups among both expatriates and the Iranian populace.

Maryam Rajavi similarly asserted in her published note that “thousands of members in an organized resistance network” are prepared to establish a “six-month transitional government” and draft a constitution within two years.

Rajavi refers to the members of the MEK who, over the past four decades, have not shied away from actions against the Iranian people. During the Iran-Iraq War, they provided substantial military and intelligence assistance to Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime against Iran, and they have similarly taken their anti-Iran actions online during the recent unrest, conducting military training for disruptive projects, including the construction of homemade bombs and Molotov cocktails. Thus, whenever there has been unrest or threats to Iran, the influence of the MEK has been apparent.

Today, as they misjudge the potential for military action against Iran as part of their long-standing dream of regime change, it is necessary to note that the developments in Syria have led them to mistakenly believe such scenarios could repeat in Iran. However, the more pressing reality is their frantic competition for funding and resources.

This scenario was openly manifest during the autumn uprisings in Iran, when, contrary to the narrative perpetuated by Persian-language media showcasing widespread violence, the streets of Iran were relatively calm.

The opposition figures were busy disputing over leadership roles and funding, a situation reminiscent of past discord now resurfacing, albeit with a significant shift: the Iranian populace has developed a more discerning understanding of the exiled opposition than it had two years prior.

Reza Pahlavi, positioning himself as a leader of the opposition, has emerged prominently in this competitive landscape. His presence at the “Israeli National Council Conference,” along with his repetition of his Zionist employer’s phrase about needing to “strike the snake” and attack Iran, showcased his eager compliance with Netanyahu and Trump.

Even TRT Turkey reacted to Pahlavi’s attendance by labeling him the self-proclaimed heir to Iran’s defunct throne. He sought to change the regime with the support of the West and Israel while asserting that his “imaginary kingship only exists on social media.” Continuing along this path, Pahlavi released videos claiming to address the Iranian people while still advocating for military action against Iran.

Reza Pahlavi’s self-declared leadership and alignment with Israeli interests further erode his credibility among opposition factions and Iranians.

In one of his videos, Pahlavi introduced himself as the “leader of the transitional period.” Before Maryam Rajavi, Pahlavi stated in a video message that he would not allow a power vacuum in Iran after the regime’s fall. Before this claim caught users’ attention in Iran, it was ridiculed by exiled opposition figures.

One opposition member characterized him as engaging in “self-leadership,” and a former member of the Imperial Guard asserted that Americans do not value Pahlavi, who only aligned with Netanyahu’s statements after they were made.

Following the events in Syria, Pahlavi supporters mistakenly believed this scenario could be replicated in Iran. This assumption was echoed by an advisor to Pahlavi, who claimed in an interview, “If a major collapse occurs within the government, there is a possibility that Iran will meet the fate of Assad.”

However, Ali Saleh, a professor at the National University of Australia, countered these claims, stating, “The conditions in Syria are vastly different from those in Iran… I doubt the groups wishing for Iran to resemble Syria will succeed… Iran’s defense policies are based on a missile system and nuclear doctrine.”

How many times will they bet on a losing horse? The opposition aims to play a role in this context; the critical point is that the Americans once bet on these losing horses and know they are not only unacceptable to the Iranian people but hold no real significance following the events of autumn 2022.

They are merely discredited groups that even Iranian expatriates no longer count on. Nevertheless, they refuse to let go of the opportunity for influence and funding.

The situation of the opposition figures has drastically changed compared to two years ago; they have yet to resolve their numerous internal disputes, let alone hide them. While the regional situation has reached a point of chaos, their disagreements are such that they find reasons to argue over trivial matters, even resorting to disputes over the gravestone of Gholam Hossein Saedi. Videos, such as that of Narges Mohammadi in prison, provide fresh grounds for their insults and conflicts, turning minor incidents into crises as they turn against each other.

The opposition’s efforts, rooted in foreign influence, fail to resonate with Iranians who increasingly reject their narratives.

Given that their disagreements have entered a more critical phase than two years ago, it is natural that the Zionists and American command rooms would not place significant value on advancing their potential projects through these opposition figures.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.