Emerging technologies, combined with India’s offensive nuclear posture, may generate crisis instability and arms race instability between India and Pakistan. The evolving strategic dynamics in South Asia could jeopardize strategic stability between the two states in the future.

In such a strategic landscape, if a new crisis emerges between two states, both sides may have incentives to strike first. India may be encouraged to launch a first strike if it mistakenly believes it can achieve nuclear superiority.

Emerging technologies challenge second-strike capability, destabilizing nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan.

Similarly, in such a scenario, Pakistan may have incentives to use its nuclear arsenal pre-emptively, before India’s first strike. Therefore, unlike in the past, new crises between the two states may have a greater tendency toward escalation.

Furthermore, India’s persistent increase in military spending, coupled with its offensive nuclear posture, may compel Pakistan to counterbalance India’s military buildup, and the arms race persists between the two sides.

Moreover, the ongoing military-political trends between the two sides may prompt both sides to avoid crises. However, despite these efforts, crises may still occur, but this time, they could be more unpredictable and complex. Finally, India and Pakistan must adopt new arms control measures to achieve crisis stability and arms race stability, injecting greater predictability and certainty into their bilateral relationship.

The new emerging technologies are challenging nuclear deterrence stability between India and Pakistan in one way or another. These emerging technologies include increasing precision strike capability of weapons systems, cyber technologies, autonomous weapons systems, increasing use of satellites, special designs sensors to detect nuclear-deployed weapons, and effective development of defensive weapons systems including anti-ballistic missile defense shields.

These new emerging technologies have significant negative repercussions for the assured second-strike capability of nuclear weapons states. According to scholars, second-strike capability is a prerequisite for the effective working of nuclear deterrence.

India’s shift to an ambiguous nuclear doctrine and offensive military strategies promotes instability in South Asia.

Nuclear weapons effectively prevented full-scale war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. The scholars hold that nuclear deterrence continues to work between India and Pakistan because it is easier for nuclear weapons states to keep assured of second-strike capability.

Proponents of nuclear deterrence keep that when the MAD (Mutual assured destruction) situation exists between nuclear weapons states, it may become difficult for nuclear weapons states to escape such a situation, briefly because technology is difficult and impossible. If a nuclear weapons state develops nuclear capabilities to the extent that challenges the opponent’s second strike capability, such advantage may not remain for a longer period. The nuclear balance will be ensured in a brief time.

To counter such advantage, the weaker side may develop modern technologies to maintain the balance of power. It is easier for weaker nuclear weapons states to maintain the balance of power. The Cold War nuclear dynamics between superpowers demonstrated such a phenomenon. Furthermore, during the Cold War, both the belligerents realized that it was useless and hence futile to develop counterforce capabilities and to challenge the assured second strike capability of an opponent.

New era of emerging technologies may give confidence to South Asian belligerent particularly India to try to develop counterforce capabilities against Pakistan, thus challenging the assured second strike capability of Pakistan. Few of the experts are already claiming that India has started developing counterforce capabilities against Pakistan.

India has already shifted its nuclear doctrine from ‘no first use policy’ to ambiguous no first use policy. It is formulating more offensive military doctrines which includes India’s Cold Start, 2018 military doctrine, and new air warfare doctrine 2023 etcetera.

The arms race between India and Pakistan risks escalating crises, increasing the likelihood of preemptive strikes.

It is incorporating offensive weapons systems, which include the development of an Indigenous anti-ballistic missile defense system and imported systems including the Russian S-400. Furthermore, it continues to modernize its naval, land, and air force. It also has designs to emerge as a new space power.

Few scholars argue that India wishes to achieve escalation domination against Pakistan. However, contrary to these developments, repeated limited conflicts between India and Pakistan in the post-nuclearization phase have demonstrated that nuclear weapons effectively deter India and Pakistan from avoiding escalations and compel both sides to exercise restraint.

Kargil conflict, the 2001-2 military stand-off, the Mumbai crisis in 2008, and the Pulwama episode in 2019 just demonstrated that nuclear weapons deterred both India and Pakistan from escalating these limited conflicts.

Furthermore, India’s shifts towards the formulation of offensive military doctrines at conventional and nuclear levels, together with the incorporation of offensive military systems to its land, naval, and military forces may promote instability soon. First, these developments by India may lead to generating first-strike instability. Second, these developments for its part may lead to the instigation of an arms race.

In a nutshell, crisis stability and arms race stability are two primary prerequisites for ensuring strategic stability between two nuclear-armed states. New military developments on the part of India may create crisis instability. Doctrinal shifts and the incorporation of new offensive military systems may give a false sense of achieving counterforce capability against Pakistan.

A new crisis between India and Pakistan may occur as they occur in the past. In such a scenario, such a crisis may have a natural tendency toward escalation. First, India may come under the false sense that it has achieved a comprehensive first capability against Pakistan. Therefore, it might have an incentive to strike first in a crisis. Similarly, in such a given situation, Pakistan might face a situation of using or losing nuclear weapons. Therefore, in such a situation, it may have incentives to strike pre-emptively against India.

Strategic stability requires new arms control measures to mitigate emerging threats and maintain crisis predictability.

Furthermore, India’s efforts to achieve nuclear superiority against Pakistan may also led to a heightened arms race between the two sides. If Pakistan perceives that the balance of power is tilting in favor of India, it can also make efforts to maintain assured second-strike capability against India.

Scholars have long argued that it is easier and cost-effective to maintain assured second-strike capability against an opponent and it is self-defeating to threaten the retaliatory capability of an adversary. Therefore, for India, it will be counter-productive to develop such capabilities against Pakistan.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.