The unexpected May 2025 ceasefire between India and Pakistan following the deadly Pahalgam attacks and India’s provocative escalatory and Pakistan’s effective retaliatory strikes must not be treated as a return to business-as-usual. In fact, the fragility of South Asia’s peace demands exactly the opposite. Both nuclear-armed neighbors teeter perpetually near the abyss and since 2003 there has only been a “fragile” Kashmir cease-fire, punctuated by Kargil (1999), the 2008 Mumbai siege, 2016’s cross-Line-of-Control surgical strikes, and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes and Pakistan response in kind on LoC. As one analyst warned, “both India and Pakistan have sizable nuclear arsenals” and even restrained clashes risk spiraling out of control. In this context the new lull is not an endpoint but an opportune opening and a moment to insist on enforceable safeguards before any next round on any false pretext is played again.

Pakistan’s goal should be absolutely clear: the ceasefire must be conditioned on reversing India’s recent unilateral provocations and creating new crisis-stability mechanisms

Pakistan’s goal should be absolutely clear: the ceasefire must be conditioned on reversing India’s recent unilateral provocations and creating new crisis-stability mechanisms. Crucially, Islamabad should demand (a) a full restoration of the status quo ante on legal treaties and Kashmir’s autonomy, (b) an institutionalized crisis-management framework, and (c) formal reparations for Pakistani losses. These are not “extra” demands but logical corollaries of international law and past agreements. They would help transform a temporary ceasefire into durable deterrence by rules, rather than resume a shooting match between two nuclear armed neighbours under the guise of normalcy.

India’s recent moves – suspending the World Bank–brokered 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and abrogating Jammu & Kashmir’s special status under Article 370 were flagrant breaches of longstanding commitments

Respect for Binding Treaties and Kashmir’s Status: India’s recent moves – suspending the World Bank–brokered 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and abrogating Jammu & Kashmir’s special status under Article 370 were flagrant breaches of longstanding commitments. The IWT, which secures two-thirds of Pakistan’s water supply, contains no unilateral exit or “abeyance” clause. As an expert has noted, the treaty “has no end date, and any modification requires the consent of both parties”. By contrast, India’s announcing the IWT “in abeyance” is a one-sided act of aggression. Pakistan must insist that New Delhi rescind that action and reaffirm the treaty on its original terms.

Similarly, revoking Article 370 was a unilateral alteration of Kashmir’s governance – one that violated the spirit of bilateral dispute resolution. The Simla Agreement (1972) commits both sides to “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations” and explicitly prohibits either side from “alter[ing]” the Kashmir ceasefire line unilaterally. By integrating Article 370’s repeal into Indian law, New Delhi unilaterally changed the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir, undermining Simla’s mandate of mutual consent. Islamabad should demand a return to the pre-2019 legal status: in practice this means restoring Article 370’s framework or equivalent guarantees of autonomy. Such a step would honor both the treaty-based requirement of negotiation and the UN Charter’s prohibition on territorial changes by force. It would also recognize the deep grievances sparked by the 2019 decision, which Pakistan and Kashmiri leaders rightly called a “grave injustice”.

Reinstating J&K’s special status is not an unrealistic ideological demand but a necessary confidence-building measure: it would put both governments back into the negotiating box on Kashmir, rather than allowing perpetual grievance. Likewise, restoring full compliance with the IWT is non-negotiable. Pakistan’s essential water rights cannot be held hostage to diplomatic tit-for-tat. The ceasefire should explicitly require that India revoke any IWT “suspension” and resume data-sharing and project inspections at once. In short, peace cannot long coexist with New Delhi’s continued repudiation of key treaties.

A Verifiable Crisis-Prevention Regime: The ceasefire must also be backed by concrete communication and confidence-building mechanisms. The alternative is to rely on fragile informal understandings and an invitation to the next accidental escalation. History shows the dangers: the India – Pakistan dyad “has been the clearest example of the pitfalls of lackluster crisis communications,” and experts urge that the two states “transcend reliance solely on state-to-state hotlines”. In practice, Pakistan should seek something akin to a standing hotline along the Kashmir LoC and selected civilian channels, combined with joint and independent investigation mechanism of periodical flare-ups. This might include reviving and expanding military and diplomatic hotlines (which exist on paper but are rarely used) and establishing regular meetings of military commanders and diplomats as outlined in Simla. Indeed, Simla itself anticipated this: its text calls for heads-of-government to meet again at a “mutually convenient time” and for representatives of both sides to “meet…to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including…a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir”. Pakistan should invoke that clause now.

A formalized crisis framework with verified communication channels and a clear mandate to de-escalate incidents would institutionalize the very diplomacy that Simla envisioned

A formalized crisis framework with verified communication channels and a clear mandate to de-escalate incidents would institutionalize the very diplomacy that Simla envisioned. Such an architecture is the only reliable buffer against miscalculation in a nuclear neighbourhood. Absent it, every skirmish carries the risk of unintended escalation. Effective communication is vital not only in peacetime but especially so during crises. Both sides (and the third party mediators) must treat the ceasefire as an opportunity to negotiate these instruments, or else face routine breaches of the truce.

India’s admitted strikes on settled villages which Pakistan reports have killed dozens of civilians and damaged mosques, homes, and schools and violated IHL’s core protections

Reparation for Civilian Losses:Finally, lasting stability requires justice for those harmed. International humanitarian law (IHL) clearly prohibits attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. India’s admitted strikes on settled villages which Pakistan reports have killed dozens of civilians and damaged mosques, homes, and schools and violated IHL’s core protections. Under the laws of war (and the UN Charter’s prohibition on aggression), the state that commits such wrongful acts bears legal responsibility.

India must compensate Pakistani victims for all loss of life, medical costs, and property damage resulting from its cross-border operations

As the UN’s International Law Commission codified, “the responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act,” and “injury includes any damage, whether material or moral”. By this standard, Islamabad has a clear claim: India must compensate Pakistani victims for all loss of life, medical costs, and property damage resulting from its cross-border operations. In practice, Pakistan should demand that India either pay compensation directly (as post–Iraq-Kuwait tribunals did) or that amounts be deducted from any future economic engagements, investment flows, or international aid. This is not “extortion” but a routine legal expectation. If aggression goes unpunished and victims unremedied, deterrence itself erodes: grievances fester and violence repeats.

Why should the world let a nuclear-armed state flout its water-sharing treaty or alter a disputed border with impunity?

Taken together, these conditions would reset the terms of Indo-Pak future engagement. They would draw a clear legal boundary around acceptable conduct, an upgrade from the vague status quo. Pakistan is well within its rights to insist on them. The Simla pact and the UN Charter bind both sides to peace (forbidding force and unilateral changes). India has repeatedly cited Simla to demand bilateralism, yet now it blatantly breached its terms. For international audiences, this is a moment to apply pressure and support to Islamabad’s position which will strengthen norms (like treaty fidelity) that uphold global order. Why should the world let a nuclear-armed state flout its water-sharing treaty or alter a disputed border with impunity? Reversing these violations in exchange for peace would set a principled precedent.

This ceasefire should be treated as not the end of the conflict but its inflection point

For Pakistanis, it means dignity and security. Facing down unprovoked aggression by demanding rights under law is not maximalist it is self-defense in the international system. By insisting on these terms, Islamabad sends a message that the ceasefire is not free passage for India’s agenda. If India truly seeks normalcy, it must first undo the aggression that caused this crisis. This ceasefire should be treated as not the end of the conflict but its inflection point. Both sides have signaled willingness to stop the immediate fighting now let them make peace worth having.

Enforcing these demands could begin to stabilize deterrence, mutual respect for treaties, continuous dialogue, and accountability for violence

Pakistan should lead by putting these conditions forward as a package deal. Failure to do so would be to squander a rare chance, as history suggests that without concrete change; tomorrow’s crisis will be no different (rather more intense) from today’s. By contrast, enforcing these demands could begin to stabilize deterrence, mutual respect for treaties, continuous dialogue, and accountability for violence. That is how the cycle of crisis might finally be broken, one legalized step at a time.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.